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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of half a century, the expectation, reliance, and
restitution "interests" have come to determine the way we think about
contract remedies. Their vitality is due in large part to the brilliant
and influential article by Fuller and Perdue,' "often acclaimed [as] the
best, or the most influential, or the most important, contracts article
ever written."2 It has been said of the article that "[n] o scholarly work
during the period between the first and second Restatement of Con-
tracts had more impact on the law of contracts ...... Moreover, from
a practical point of view, "l[t] he interest analysis has ... become stan-
dard fare in law school classrooms and in legal writing about contract
remedies. Although explicit judicial recognition has been less wide-
spread, the few decisions that have employed the analysis enjoy a
'leading case' prominence that give it the feel of established
doctrine."4
This Article critically re-examines Fuller's tripartite regime of re-
medial interests. It accepts that the tripartite regime serves an essen-
tial role as a foundation for contract remedies, but argues that such an
1. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:1, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1]; Lon L. Fuller
& William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937)
[hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 2].
2. Todd D. Rakoff, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest as a Work of Legal Scholar-
ship, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 203, 204 (1991).
3. Robert E. Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REv. 704, 704
(1982).
4. Id. at 705.
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analytic device falls short of completing contract law's remedial struc-
ture. In particular, the tripartite regime fails to produce an adequate
system of damages to remedy a material breach of contract. That
problem is better resolved by a bipartite model of damages. In the
bipartite model, the expectation interest stands at one pole. It repre-
sents, for the injured party, the economic consequences of full con-
tractual performance. At the opposite pole is the restoration interest,
which returns the breach victim to the economic position he occupied
before the contract was made. The expectation and restoration inter-
ests pull logically and intuitively in opposite directions, one looking
forward to the fulfillment of the duties created by the contract and the
other looking backward to the status quo ante. This bipartite model,
rather than Fuller's tripartite model, defines the basic remedial alter-
natives for measuring damages for a material breach of contract.
The best way to investigate the expectation-restoration model is
to examine cases in which a breach victim claims damages that exceed
the expectation interest. Part I of this Article reviews the ways in
which conventional contract law and scholarship have dealt with such
claims. Although some useful rules apply to particular factual settings,
at a more general level the decisions of the courts, and the theories
used to justify them, become deeply incongruous.
Part II of this Article introduces the restoration interest. Notwith-
standing the nominal judicial acceptance of the Fullerian tripartite
regime, courts have intuitively recognized, as the alternative to expec-
tation damages, a remedy fully based on neither restitution nor reli-
ance, as these interests are conventionally understood. When courts
find that expectation damages are inadequate, they often grant relief
that restores the injured party to the legal and economic circum-
stances that existed prior to contract formation. The basis for that
remedy is the restoration interest. Although related in important ways
to reliance and restitution, it is distinct from each of them, as dis-
cussed in more detail in Part II of this Article. The restoration interest
consists of three remedial elements: restitution to the injured party of
the net benefit conferred upon the breacher under the contract; com-
pensation for other losses the breach victim has suffered, within the con-
straints applicable to contract damages generally; and discharge of
executory obligations of the victim under the contract.
Part III of this Article addresses the relationship between the ex-
pectation and restoration interests. A general rule, strongly respected
in practice, is that one injured by a breach of contract is entitled to
damages that protect, at a minimum, the expectation interest. Be-
cause expectation damages usually exceed those based on the restora-
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tion interest, courts are not often required to decide whether
restoration damages are available. But restoration inevitably exceeds
expectation from time to time; when it does, courts must decide
whether to protect this important interest.
Part III proposes two principles that govern claims for restoration
in excess of expectation. The first is the certainty principle, which places
on the breaching party the burden of proving that damages based on
the injured party's restoration interest would exceed expectation dam-
ages. If that burden is not met, then the case is treated as if the mini-
mum entitlement of expectation damages has not been exceeded.
When it is clear that restoration is greater than expectation, the
extent-of-benefit principle applies. The premise of this principle is that, as
the performance of the contract unfolds, the parties become commit-
ted not only to the benefits, but also to the risks, of their bargain.
When a contract is still a set of executory promises, one injured by a
material breach is entitled to recapture the precontractual position
through restoration damages. Stated otherwise, the advantages of a
favorable contract are assured to the nonbreaching party by making
expectation damages the floor, but escape from a disadvantageous
bargain nevertheless is allowed by making the restoration interest the
ceiling on recovery if restoration exceeds expectation. As a contract
moves from executory agreement to executed exchange, the ceiling
on damages approaches the expectation-interest floor. When that
movement is complete, damages are fully fixed by the expectation in-
terest: the injured party still enjoys the benefits of a good deal, but is
now stuck with the burdens of a bad one.
Recognizing that the restoration interest is the fundamental
counterpart to the expectation interest, and understanding how the
two interests accommodate each other, clarifies the conclusions that
many courts have reached instinctively. It brings order to two impor-
tant legal doctrines beset by stubborn incongruities: restitution as a
remedy for breach and restitution for a plaintiff in default. Moreover,
it produces an integrated system of contract damages and sets the
stage for further examination and trenchant criticism of the law.
I. RESTITUTION VERSUS EXPECTATION AS MEASURES OF RELIEF FOR
MATERIAL BREACH OF CONTRACT
A. Illustrating the Problem
The clearest view of the issues surrounding the restoration inter-
est is offered by cases in which one injured by a breach of contract
demands restitution rather than expectation damages. The manner
in which the current law treats competing claims of restitution and
1994]
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expectation may be illustrated by some simple, hypothetical cases.
The analysis of these and other cases in this Article is aided by Profes-
sor Farnsworth's convention for describing and categorizing cases in-
volving restitution-based recoveries for breach in excess of the
expectation interest.5 He notes that
[u] nder most agreements, one party, which will be referred
to as the "supplier," is to furnish something characteristic of
the type of contract, such as goods, land, or services, for
which the other party, which will be referred to as the "recip-
ient," is to pay a price in money. Typical pairs of suppliers
and recipients include the seller and the buyer under a con-
tract for the sale of goods, the vendor and the purchaser
under a contract for the sale of land, the employee and the
employer under an employment contract, and the builder
and the owner under a construction contract.6
The "supplier" and "recipient" designations, as defined by Professor
Farnsworth, are adopted here. In this Article, suppliers will be re-
ferred to in the masculine and recipients in the feminine.
Hypothetical Case 1:
During the winter, Builder enters a contract with Owner to
install a deck on the latter's house during the coming sum-
mer. The contract price of $3000, which on the date of con-
tract formation is the fair market value of the work to be
performed, is payable upon completion. When summer ar-
rives, the market value of the work Builder has undertaken
to do has risen to $4000 because of increases in the price of
lumber. Complete performance would cost the Builder
$3500. Before Builder begins the work, Owner wrongfully
repudiates her obligations, saying she will not pay the price.
If Builder is held to his expectation interest, he will owe the
breaching Owner $500, for he would have suffered a loss of that mag-
nitude had the contract been performed as agreed. Intuitively, that
result is absurd. It seems that Builder should be entitled simply to
walk away from the deal. Consider a similar case, however, with the
facts changed in one important respect.
Hypothetical Case 2:
During the winter, Builder enters a contract with Owner to
install a deck on the latter's house during the coming sum-
5. See generally E. AuAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcrs § 12.9 (2d ed.
1990).
6. Id. § 12.9, at 883-84.
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mer. The contract price of $3000, which on the date of con-
tract formation is the fair market value of the work to be
performed, is payable upon completion. When summer ar-
rives, the market value of the work Builder has undertaken
to do has risen to $4000 because of increases in the price of
lumber. Builder completes the work, as promised, at a cost
to himself of $8500. Owner then wrongfully refuses to pay
any part of the purchase price.
Should Builder be entitled to escape the unfavorable expectation
interest on these facts? He would prefer, of course, to recover in resti-
tution the value of the $4000 benefit conferred on Owner. But the
law is clear that he is limited to his expectation interest'-on these
facts, the contract price of $3000. By entering a fixed price contract,
Builder generally is thought to have accepted a risk that the price of
lumber might increase. But wasn't that same risk accepted upon for-
mation of the identical contract in the first case? What accounts for
our sense that expectation should limit recovery in the second, but
not the first example?
The same phenomenon occurs when the recipient is injured by
the supplier's breach. Consider the following pair of cases.
Hypothetical Case 3:
Buyer pays $100,000 in advance for industrial machinery to
be manufactured by Seller and delivered in six months.
When the time for delivery arrives, the market price of the
machinery has declined to $60,000. Seller, having encoun-
tered difficulty in manufacturing the goods to contract speci-
fications,8 fails to tender delivery and repudiates the
obligation to do so.
If Buyer were held to her expectation interest, she could recover
only $60,000 from Seller, the amount that would enable her to
purchase the machinery from someone else. Again, that result is both
intuitively incorrect and inconsistent with the law, which entitles
Buyer to restitution of the full purchase price.9 Now consider how the
matter appears under an identical contract, but with a change in the
status of performance.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 373(2) (1979); see also infra note 61 and
accompanying text.
8. For purposes of this hypothetical, we assume that Seller's breach is not excused
under the impracticability doctrine.
9. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1993).
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Hypothetical Case 4:
Buyer pays $100,000 in advance for industrial machinery to
be manufactured by Seller and delivered in six months.
When the time for delivery arrives, the market value of the
machinery required by the contract has declined to $60,000.
The goods are delivered as promised and Buyer accepts
them. She then discovers that the goods fail to perform as
promised, in breach of an express warranty given by Seller.
As a result, they are worth only $50,000.
Should Buyer be entitled to avoid the risk of the declining market
through restitution of the purchase price ($100,000), offset by the
value of the machinery delivered ($50,000), for a total of $50,000?
The Uniform Commercial Code says no. 10 The Code limits Buyer to
her expectation interest, determined by the difference in the value of
the goods as delivered and their value as warranted. 1 Thus, she is
entitled to only $10,000.12
In both pairs of cases, something about the fact of the Seller's
performance makes an obvious difference to one's sense of the appro-
priate measure of relief. It seems clear that neither expectation nor
restitution should trump the other in every case. But neither the
courts nor the commentators have been able to work out the relation-
ship between these two measures of relief in a way that avoids inconsis-
tencies and jarring anomalies. This Article takes a fresh look at the
conceptual framework used to resolve these simplified cases, as well as
the more complex situations that arise in real life.
B. The Conventional Approach to Contract Damages: The Three
Contractual "Interests"
Conventional contract theory sets out three alternative remedial
interests on which a court may base damages13 for breach: the expec-
tation, reliance, and restitution interests. 4 This framework is based
largely on the work of Fuller and Perdue. 5 The standard, though
10. The Code's answer assumes that revocation of acceptance under § 2-608 of the
U.C.C. is not possible.
11. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1993).
12. This conclusion assumes the absence of "special circumstances show[ing] proxi-
mate damages of a different amount." U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1993).
13. The focus of this Article is on damages rather than specific performance. The
latter is a method of protecting the expectation interest; it is a remedy that raises pruden-
tial and policy concerns not present when the reredy is substitutional.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 347 (1979).
15. See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1; Fuller & Per-
due, The Reliance Interest Part 2, supra note 11.
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elliptic, definition of the expectation interest is that it puts the injured
party in the same position as if the contract had been properly per-
formed.16 Thus, the expectation interest measures and defines a per-
son's rights and duties in terms of the bargain that was struck.
That bargain allocates certain risks and benefits to each party.
For example, in a simple contract for the sale of goods for a fixed
price at a specified time in the future, the buyer runs the risk that the
market price will decline by the time for performance; the seller bears
the risk that the market price will rise. In a fixed-price contract for
the construction of a building, the contractor runs the risk that his
costs will exceed his internal estimates (whether due to market forces
or errors in judgment), while the owner bears the risk that the
builder's actual costs will be so low that she could have found another
builder to do the job for less. An expectation-based remedy for
breach takes account of these risk allocations, leaving them where the
parties put them by agreement.
The reliance interest takes its bearings from the "sunk costs" of the
aggrieved party. When protected, it compensates a party for losses or
harms that were incurred or suffered based on the assumption that
the promise of the breaching party would be kept. The modern un-
derstanding of the reliance interest derives from the article by Fuller
and Perdue, which generalized that it puts the injured party in the
position he would have occupied had the contract not been formed,1 7
provided that the reliance damages do not exceed the expectation
interest. 18
Damages based on either the expectation or reliance interests are
qualified in important ways. Perhaps the most significant qualifica-
tion is that the victim's recovery is limited by his reasonable opportu-
nities to avoid injury to himself. The avoidability principle is best
illustrated by the rule on mitigation of damages, which reduces the
monetary recovery otherwise due the victim of a breach by the losses
16. JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4, at 591 (3d
ed. 1987); FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.1, at 840; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 347 (1979).
17. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 54; FARNSWORTH, supra
note 5, § 12.1, at 842. Depending upon how broadly the reliance interest is defined, it may
tend to merge with the expectation interest. This is particularly true when the parties are
assumed to be operating within a free and properly functioning economic market. The
making of one contract necessarily entails forgoing the opportunity to enter another and
enjoy the profits or benefits that the latter would have generated. If those lost benefits or
profits-and avoided losses and harms-are treated as elements of the reliance interest,
then reliance damages approach expectation. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1,
supra note 1, at 73-75; Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 2, supra note 1, at 417-18.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 349 (1979); see also infta Part I.C.1.
1994]
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he reasonably could have avoided.1 9 Expectation and reliance dam-
ages are also limited by the foreseeability of the injury caused by the
breach2" and by the certainty with which the extent of that injury can
be proven.21 Taken together, these limitations demonstrate that the
enforceable expectation interest is not simply the aggregate of all ben-
efits that would have been enjoyed and losses that would have been
avoided had the contract been properly performed. Likewise, the en-
forceable reliance interest is not simply the sum of all loss or harm
that would not have been suffered had the contract not been
formed.22 Rather, these interests are defined in terms of the inten-
tions and expectations of the parties themselves at the time when the
contract was formed. The guidance provided by the parties' expecta-
tions is relevant not only to the proper calculation of damages for
breach, but also to a variety of other important problems of contract
performance and enforcement. 23
Restitution represents a major element of our jurisprudence, one
that antedates and is at least partially independent of contract law.
The restitution interest in contracts cannot be understood without at
least a brief reference to the history of restitution generally.
Restitution is of ancient lineage. Throughout much of western
legal history, it has been tied to the notion of unjust enrichment.24
Nevertheless, restitution has never become firmly established as a co-
herent body of doctrine or concepts in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. That phenomenon is partially explained by the nature of the
English common law writ system, which was organized by causes of
action rather than by abstract doctrinal categories. The law of restitu-
tion, together with what we now call contract and tort, was embedded
in various causes of action, particularly the indebitatus assumpsit counts
19. The avoidability principle is reflected in other contexts as well. See Eric G. Ander-
sen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IowA L. REv. 299, 335-38 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Andersen, Good Faith Enforcement]; Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the
Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073, 1109 (1988) [hereinafter Andersen, Material
Breach].
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONrRACrS § 351 (1979).
21. Id. § 352.
22. Another important limitation on the expectation and reliance interests is that they
disregard the transaction costs of obtaining and enforcing ajudgment for breach, particu-
larly attorney fees. Contract law's refusal to recognize such costs as a component of the
expectation interest is a serious issue, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
23. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract 75 IOWA L. REv.
861, 861 (1990) (focusing on an approach to contracts "rooted in respect for the intention
of the parties and their reasonable expectations").
24. For a discussion of restitution in relation to unjust enrichment in ancient Roman
law, later European law, and English common law, see REINHARD ZIMMERmANN, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS: RoMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 834-901 (1990).
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for "money had and received," "money paid," "quantum meruit," and
"quantum valebat."25
After the writ system ended, contract and tort emerged as the
principal conceptual elements of private law. Restitution was largely
represented by the anomalous category of "quasi-contract" or "con-
tracts implied in law,"26 and thus was classified nominally and uncom-
fortably as an appendage to contract law. Nevertheless, restitutionary
elements also could be identified clearly in the law of tort, and restitu-
tion was part of the remedial inventory of both law and equity. 27
English law has struggled with the concept of restitution. The
characterization of restitution as somehow contractual "resulted in
strained and artificial analysis" 28 because courts were forced to find
implied or tacit agreements as bases for restitutionary awards. One
commentator has written that "[b] edevilled by historical accident and
legalistic fiction, the law of restitution has remained something of a
backward child of the legal family."29 Serious arguments have been
advanced that the law should recognize "a generali [zed] right to resti-
tution,""° and impressive efforts have been made to provide the neces-
sary conceptual framework.31 Yet even one of the most ardent
advocates of unifying and rationalizing the law of restitution charac-
terizes its current position in English law as "lack[ing] any agreed
framework and [therefore] standing in danger of being
unintelligible."3 2
In the United States, the unity of restitution as a body of law has
been promoted by the publication of a separate Restatement s3 and by
Professor Palmer's invaluable four volume treatise on the subject.34
Nevertheless, a review of the Restatement and of Professor Palmer's
25. Brice Dickinson, The Law of Restitution in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Compari-
son with English Law, 36 ITrr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 751, 753 (1987). See also ZIMMERMANN, supra
note 24, at 891-95, 892-93 n.363.
26. Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1210-
12 (1973).
27. See generally LORD Gor OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTrrUTION 4-5
(3d ed. 1986) (discussing claims in equity analogous to quasi-contractual claims).
28. Perillo, supra note 26, at 1211.
29. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 24, at 892-93.
30. GOFF &JONES, supra note 27, at 15.
31. See PETER BiRKs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTrrUTION 6-8 (1985) (identi-
fying five "strategic" points that would clarify the law of restitution).
32. Id. at 1. Similarly, Lord Diplock said in 1977 that "there is no general doctrine of
unjust enrichment recognised in English law [but only] specific remedies in particular cases
of what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is based upon the
civil law." Orakpo v. Manson Inv. Ltd., [1977] 3 All E.R. 1, 7, 95 App. Cas. 104 (H.L.).
33. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
34. GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
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treatise reveals that the subject is organized more around the dispa-
rate factual settings in which restitutionary claims are made than on
the basis of common doctrine or theory. It thus has been said that the
attempt to unify restitution in American law "disintegrat[es] ... into a
new typology of enrichment claims."35
When applied in a contractual context, restitution is "chiefly em-
ployed for the unwinding of contracts." 6 Restitutionary awards per-
form that function in a number of settings. For example, restitution
may provide relief when a contract is or has become unenforceable
because it runs afoul of legal restrictions such as the Statute of
Frauds.3 7 Restitution also may be used to adjust the parties' relation-
ship following the failure of a contract at formation or a discharge of
executory duties for reasons other than breach."8 A third example,
which is of interest here, is the use of restitution as a remedy for
breach of contract.
Unlike reliance, which focuses on the costs incurred by the non-
breaching party, or expectation, which is concerned with the gains
and losses that full performance of the contract would have produced,
restitution as a remedy for breach looks to the benefits conferred by
one party on the other. Restitution's concept of "benefit," however, is
elusive. It may be understood as requiring an increase in the wealth
of the receiving party. In that event, one of the primary purposes of
restitution is to avoid unjustly enriching one person at the expense of
another. Alternatively, a "benefit" may be understood as the commit-
ment of labor, material, money or other resources on behalf or at the
request of the receiving party. If so, then restitution is measured by
what it would cost on the market to procure the goods or services of
the supplying party, whether or not the recipient actually was en-
riched thereby.3 9
The restitution remedy is based on the net benefit conferred
upon the breaching party by the victim. Thus, it is a routine element
of restitutionary remedies for breach that the victim also must restore
35. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 24, at 895.
36. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 112 (1951).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (1979); CAL MAi & PERILLO, supra
note 16, § 19-40, at 834; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 6.11; Perillo, supra note 26, at 1215-
19.
38. For example, restitution becomes important when a contract is deemed avoidable
by one of the parties because of problems affecting its formation, such as mistake, duress,
misrepresentation, or the youth or mental incapacity of one of the parties. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (1979). Likewise, restitution is important when the
contract is discharged due to impracticability or frustration of purpose. Id. § 377.
39. I& § 371; Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 71-72; PALMER,
supra note 34, § 4.2. See also infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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the value of any benefits received from the party in breach.4" Such mu-
tual restoration might suggest that the goal of the restitution remedy
for breach of contract is to return the breach victim to the status quo
ante. Strictly construed, however, that is not the effect of the remedy,
as demonstrated by its disregard for the sunk costs that do not trans-
late into benefits to the other party. Nevertheless, the idea that the
purpose of the restitution interest is to return the parties to their
precontractual positions persists. It is expressed in a number of the
cases 41 and is suggested in the official commentary to the original Re-
statement of Contracts.42 As this Article will explain, this idea charac-
terizes the restoration interest, of which restitution is a key
component.
C. The Relationships Between Expectation, Reliance, and Restitution
as Remedies for Breach
1. Expectation Versus Reliance.-In conventional contract law, the
relationship of reliance to expectation is that of a lesser included rem-
edy-that is, expectation includes the reliance interest, and adds to it
the profit or gain a party would have realized from the transaction.
Significantly, if that profit or gain would have been negative because
the contract would have been a losing one for the nonbreaching
party, then the reliance interest is reduced by the amount of the loss.
Expectation, therefore, may exceed reliance, but not vice versa; the
expectation interest is a ceiling on reliance damages. Fuller and Per-
due made this point emphatically,43 and it has been accepted in the
40. CAIAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 16, § 15-4, at 651; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 12.19, at 947-48; PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.14; see also Duksa v. City of Middletown, 472
A.2d 1, 7 (Conn. 1984) (holding that the "rescission" of agreement under which a land
owner granted a sewer line easement to the city required the land-owner to return to the
city the value of a free tie-in to the sewer).
A procedural issue that has concerned both courts and litigants in this regard arises
from the availability of restitutionary remedies in both law and equity. The law courts
traditionally required the plaintiff to have made or tendered any necessary restoration of
benefits to the defendant before commencing the action. Equity courts simply required
restoration of benefits by the plaintiff as a condition of any decree ordering restitution.
PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.14, at 482-84. Modern courts, which frequently encounter diffi-
culty with the concept of "rescission," have grappled with this issue. See Binkholder v. Car-
penter, 152 N.W.2d 593, 596-97 (Iowa 1967) (noting the distinction between equitable
rescission and rescission of the contract by one of the parties); Liebsch v. Abbott, 122
N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 1963) (contrasting statutory from equitable "rescission" and resti-
tution). The better view would be to disregard the law-equity distinction in this context
and to follow the equitable rule, permitting the court to make reciprocal restitution a part
of its judgment.
41. See infra note 144 and cases cited therein.
42. RESTATEMENT OF CoTRAcrs § 347 cmt. b (1932).
43. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 75-80.
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First" and Second Restatements45 and in the courts.46 The breach
victim might seek or be limited to his reliance damages, which are less
than his expectation damages, because his profits cannot be proven
with sufficient certainty."' Similarly, a court might impose this lesser
recovery over the breach victim's objections. 48 But in a contest be-
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333(d) (1932).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1979).
46. E.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720, 729 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that the trial court's award to distributor of ophthalmic diagnostic equipment injured by
manufacturer's material breach could not be justified as reliance damages since it appar-
ently exceeded the expectation interest); Dade County v. Palmer & Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 339
F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that an engineering firm injured by county's breach was
entitled to protection of reliance interest where county was unable to satisfy burden of
proof that full performance would have resulted in a net loss); L. Albert & Son v. Arm-
strong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1949) ("[T]he promisee may recover his
outlay in preparation for the performance, subject to the privilege of the promisor to re-
duce it by as much as he can show that the promisee would have lost, if the contract had
been performed."); Michael Del Balso, Inc. v. Carozza, 136 F.2d 280, 281-82 (D.C. Cir.
1943) (holding that the recovery of supplier who is wrongfully prevented from completing
performance "must be regulated by the contract price," thus reducing damages by losses
recipient can prove supplier would have suffered); Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp.
442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that damages of manufacturer of Christmas cards
against breaching distributor consist of costs of reliance, reduced by losses manufacturer
would have suffered from full performance); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d
637, 638-39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that reliance damages of a freight company
whose contract was wrongfully cancelled should be reduced by losses the breaching party
can prove the freight company would have suffered); Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd.,
53 Md. App. 656, 662-63, 456 A.2d 82, 86 (1983) (holding that a corporation could recover
reliance damages from law firm that breached a contract to create a firm authorized to
raise capital and noting that such damages would not include losses the law firm could
prove that the company would have incurred); Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 178,
399 A.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1979) (holding that a distributor whose supplier breached an
exclusivity arrangement "should not be permitted to escape the consequences of a bad
bargain by falling back on his reliance interest").
47. E.g., Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 811 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the
trial court correctly awarded reliance damages to ice cream franchisees who did not offer
proof of lost profits); Re/Max of Georgia, Inc. v. Real Estate Group on Peachtree, Inc., 412
S.E.2d 543, 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the proper measure of damages for
breach of territorial covenant in franchise agreement was real estate franchisee's net ex-
penses in attempting to comply with franchise agreement and not lost profits, where fran-
chisee was a new business and therefore lost profits were too speculative); Herbert W.
Jaeger & Assocs. v. Slovak Am. Charitable Ass'n, 507 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(awarding injured owner reliance damages due to lack of reliable information to support
standard expectation damages); Wartzman, 53 Md. App. at 666, 456 A.2d at 88 ("The very
nature of reliance damages is that future gain cannot be measured with any reasonable
degree of reliability."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 349 (1979).
48. Fuller and Perdue proposed that, in a number of circumstances, courts either have
limited or should limit recovery to reliance below the expectation level, rather than either
awarding full expectation damages or no recovery at all. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance
Interest Part 2, supra note 1, at 373-401. Despite their article's considerable influence on
our understanding of remedial concepts, the courts have not widely adopted the reliance
interest as a ready, mandatory alternative to expectation. A case in which a court favorably
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tween the two interests, the choice is between the more generous ex-
pectation interest and the equally or less generous reliance interest.
49
Reliance as a remedy for breach is capped by expectation.
2. Expectation Versus Restitution.5 -In conventional contract law,
the relationship between restitution and expectation is problematic.
Although restitution has long been available as a remedy for breach of
contract, it retains much of its character as a basis of recovery in-
dependent of the contract. Accordingly, courts sometimes speak of a
restitutionary recovery as "off the contract," as opposed to expectation
damages "on the contract,"51 and otherwise frame their opinions in
terms suggesting that the contract ceases to govern the rights of the
parties when a restitutionary remedy is properly invoked.52 On this
reasoning, expectation cannot limit a restitutionary recovery as it does
a reliance-based award. When restitution exceeds expectation, the vic-
tim of the breach has every incentive to stress the independence of
considered restricting a breach victim to her reliance interest is Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296
N.E.2d 183, 186-89 (Mass. 1973) (plastic surgeon breached a contract to achieve a specific
result). The Sullivan court declined to decide the issue, however, concluding that the pa-
tient had waived her right to claim a difference between the reliance and expectation
damages. Id, at 189-90. Notwithstanding occasional instances of reliance damages below
the expectation being awarded over the objections of the injured party, expectation re-
mains the "basic principle for the measurement of... damages." FARNSWORTH, supra note
5, § 12.8, at 871. Cf Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissoy Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111 (1991) (demonstrating that courts usually protect the expectation, rather than the
reliance, interest when enforcing promises on the basis of promissory estoppel).
49. Situations in which damages have been measured by the reliance interest
have characteristically been those in which damages measured by the full expecta-
tion are for some reason regarded as inappropriate and the court turns to the
reliance interest as a lesser included component that will give a measure of relief.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.1, at 843.
50. The discussion here focuses on expectation versus restitution with the understand-
ing that reliance is encompassed in and limited by expectation, as discussed above. As a
remedy for breach, however, restitution often may be viewed as a component of the reli-
ance interest in that it includes any reliance loss to one party that also entails a benefit to
the other.
51. E.g., United States ex rel. Coastal Steel Erectors v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638,
641 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing a claim in quantum meruit from recovery "on the con-
tract"); Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 380 F. Supp. 298, 338 (E.D.
Ark. 1974) (contrasting restitution with recovery "on the contract"); Service Publications,
Inc. v. Goverman, 487 N.E.2d 520, 524 (Mass. 1986) (referring to recovery in quantum
meruit as "off the contract"); Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
387 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979) (limiting fully performing breach victim to
damages "on" the contract as opposed to quantum meruit "off" the contract); Kirkland v.
Archbold, 113 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (contrasting action "founded on the
broken contract" with one based on quasi-contract); Plante v.Jacobs, 103 N.W.2d 296, 298
(Wis. 1960) (distinguishing a claim in quantum meruit from recovery "on the contract").
52. See infra text accompanying notes 70-80.
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the restitutionary recovery from "contractual" damages to receive the
more generous measure of relief.53
Why should that more generous remedy be available? As the au-
thors of one analysis on the subject put it: "Where precisely the same
facts are operative and precisely the same interests are said to have
been abused, there is no sense in allowing the 'aggrieved' party to
select restitutionary language and render the contract limitations on
damages irrelevant."54 Yet it is clear that in some instances restitution
in excess of expectation is permitted, and sometimes not. A brief re-
view of what courts actually do when confronted with this issue is best
begun by noting three points on which there is general agreement:
(i) the breach must be a material one; (ii) according to the so-called
"full performance rule," restitution in excess of expectation is not
available if the supplier has fully performed and the only breach con-
sists of the recipient's failure to pay the contract price in money; and
(iii) a recipient of services, goods, or other property who has paid in
advance is entitled to restitution, even in excess of expectation, if the
supplier wrongfully fails to render any performance. 55 Beyond these
three points of agreement, however, the state of the law becomes con-
flicting and confused.
a. The Significance of Material Breach.--Courts and commentators
often state that the availability of restitution as a remedy turns on
whether the breach was material. 6 That proposition is true only in
53. Where expectation exceeds restitution, theoretical difficulties do not arise from
damages based on the latter unless the court requires the injured party to forego the more
generous expectation-based recovery in favor of restitution-a phenomenon that seems
not to have occurred in the context of remedies for breach. If, for some reason, the victim
prefers restitution to expectation in that setting, then giving the requested relief poses no
threat to the primacy of the expectation interest.
54. Robert Childres &Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 433, 441 (1969).
55. See infra Part I.C.2.c.
56. E.g., United States ex rel. Building Rentals Corp. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 498
F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Restitution is an available remedy for breach of contract
only when the breach is of such vital importance and so material that it is held to go to the
'essence' of the contract."); Bishop Trust Co. v. Kamokila Dev. Corp., 555 P.2d 1193, 1196
(Haw. 1976) ("The right to rescind and bring an action for restitution is well recognized as
an alternative to an action for damages where there has been repudiation or a material
breach of a contract."); Maytag Co. v. Alward, 112 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Iowa 1962) (holding
that an employee's wrongful termination of employment "was such a repudiation and
breach of the option contracts and amounted to such failure of consideration for the sales
of stock as entitled plaintiff to restitution of the stock upon repayment of the purchase
price"). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.19, at 947.
The English counterpart of the material breach requirement is that there must have
been a "failure of consideration." GorF &JONES, supra note 27, at 449-51. That trouble-
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the sense that a material breach makes possible the setting in which
restitution can occur: the "stopping [of] performance and [the grant-
ing of] ajudicial remedy as a substitute for all of [the victim's] contrac-
tual rights."57 But a material breach does not require that restitution
damages be made available to the injured party.
The essence of restitution-the return by each party of the value
of benefits received-is inconsistent with the continuing performance
of the contract. Restitution therefore requires some basis for halting
performance. A material breach provides that basis.5" It entitles the
victim to cancel the contract and claim damages in lieu of the per-
formance the breaching party would have rendered.59 Typically, of
course, the damages sought will be based on the expectation interest.
But if restitution exceeds expectation, the injured party will prefer the
former remedy. Nothing in the fact of cancellation on account of a
material breach requires that the victim have access to restitution
rather than expectation damages, however. Strictly speaking, a mate-
rial breach means only that the victim is entitled to bring contract
performance to an end and receive damages, based on an appropriate
measure. That measure could be either expectation or restitution.
Nothing in the notion of contract cancellation itself suggests that one
measure should be preferred over the other.6" The conclusion that a
breach is material therefore raises, but does not resolve, the question
whether restitution in excess of expectation should be permitted.
b. The Full Performance Rule.-When the supplier is the victim of
a breach, at least a part of the recipient's nonperformance generally
will consist of the failure to pay some or all of the contract price. If
the value of the supplier's performance exceeds expectation damages
some phrase, which occasionally appears in the American case law, can be misleading if
not understood. See BiRKs, supra note 31, at 219-42 (discussing the difficulties inherent in
the use of the phrase "failure of consideration"). The discharge of a contract under the
English ground of "failure of consideration" and under the American ground of "material
breach" may differ in important respects.
57. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1113, at 606 (1964).
58. Contract performance may cease even if the breach in question is not material.
The materiality analysis usually becomes inapplicable when the breach occurs or is acted
upon when the party committing it has no remaining executory duties to perform. Ander-
sen, Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1135-39. Restitution-based damages are possible in
that setting.
59. Andersen, Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1101-05; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 8.15, at 632-34.
60. This statement is not wholly consistent with Andersen, Material Breach, supra note
19, which was written on the assumption that cancellation due to material breach implies
protection of the expectation interest. The views expressed in this Article modify and su-
persede what was said there.
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for the breach, then the supplier will prefer restitution. Perhaps the
most confidently repeated generalization about restitution in excess
of expectation is that the damages of the fully performing supplier
whose recipient's only breach is a wrongful refusal to pay are limited
to the contract price.61 As noted below, that statement is incorrect in
some cases.6 2 Nevertheless, the full performance rule is a standard
feature of the traditional law of restitution as a remedy for contractual
breach.
c. Restitution in Response to the Supplier's Failure to Perform.-If a
recipient pays some or all of the contract price in advance, and the
supplier wrongfully fails to deliver or tender the required goods or
services, then the recipient is entitled to full restitution of the contract
price, even if the market value of the supplier's performance has
fallen. Such cases are rare because, when restitution does exceed ex-
pectation, it is usually because the deal is favorable to the supplier,
who therefore is unlikely to breach.
The most obvious and common manifestation of this principle is
found in contracts for the sale of goods. Section 2-711(1) of the
U.C.C. provides the statutory basis for this remedy by ensuring that
the recipient may "recover[ ] so much of the price as has been paid."6"
Contracts for the sale of real property provide another example. If a
purchaser (recipient) pays some or all of the purchase price before
closing and the vendor (supplier) fails to tender marketable title by
the required date, then the purchaser is entitled to the return of her
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 373(2) (1979); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 351(a-b) (1932); DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.20, at 893-94, § 12.24, at 918
(1973); PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.3, at 378-81. E.g., Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that where contractor ignored owner's
breach of contract and chose instead to complete the contract, the lower court correctly
limited the contractor to a recovery on the contract, instead of under quasi-contract). The
cases sometimes stretch the full performance rule, applying it to cases in which perform-
ance is almost complete. E.g., United States ex rel. Harkol, Inc. v. Americo Constr. Co., 168
F. Supp. 760, 761-62 (D. Mass. 1958) (preventing a subcontractor who "substantially com-
pleted" the contract, despite contractor's failure to make progress payments, from recover-
ing in quantum meruit); John T. Brady & Co. v. City of Stamford, 599 A.2d 370, 377-78
(Conn. 1991) (holding that where a contractor sought recovery in quantum meruit after he
had completed 99% of the job, the lower court correctly restricted recovery to the contract
price based on the full performance rule).
62. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. See also infra Part I.D.2.
63. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1993). The pre-Code law is consistent, as demonstrated by the
venerable case of Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485 (1818) (holding that a buyer of flour who
paid in advance was entitled to full restitution of the purchase price upon seller's failure to
deliver, notwithstanding the fact that the market value of the flour had fallen below the
contract price).
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payment, notwithstanding that the value of the property now may be
less than she agreed to pay for it.64
d. Cases of Conflict and Confusion in Expectation Versus Restitu-
tion.-The results in cases not falling within the two fact patterns just
described are conflicting and confused. Cases in which the injured
recipient seeks restitution and the supplier has performed partially or
fully (but defectively) are relatively rare in the case law. This is so
because recipients usually pay for goods or services only upon or after
delivery, and a supplier is unlikely to breach when the contract is
favorable to him and unfavorable to the recipient.65
The bulk of the case law concerns the aggrieved, partially per-
forming supplier-such as an employee or building contractor-who
is fired wrongfully after doing only part of the work for which he con-
tracted. Typically, such suppliers do initiate performance in advance
of receiving payment, which creates a net restitution interest in their
favor. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for a dispute over delays in
performance, contract interpretation, or the quality of the supplier's
work to lead the recipient to the erroneous conclusion that she is enti-
tled to dismiss the supplier. If the contract would have been advanta-
geous for the recipient and disadvantageous for the supplier, the
latter will have an incentive to seek restitutionary, rather than expecta-
tion-based, relief. There are a great many cases suggesting that the
supplier is freed from the constraints of the expectation interest in
such circumstances, and some holding that he is not.66
D. Attempts to Settle the Contest Between Expectation and Restitution
The issue of restitution in excess of expectation has attracted con-
siderable attention. Fuller and Perdue found it "remarkable that...
restitution as a remedy [for breach should have come to be seen as]
entirely distinct from the usual suit on a contract."67 Although they
noted the anomaly of permitting restitution in excess of expecta-
tion,6" they did not seek to resolve that difficulty. Courts and scholars
have offered justifications or proposed solutions to the problem at va-
rying levels of generality. Each justification, however, is subject to seri-
ous criticism.
64. DoBBs, supra note 61, § 12.9, at 843-44; PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.18, at 518-22.
65. See infra Part III.C.4.b for a discussion of such cases.
66. See infra Part III.C.4.a for a discussion of such cases.
67. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 72.
68. Id. at 76-77.
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1. Resort to the Notion of "Rescission" of the Contract. -Probably the
most common justification for permitting an injured party to obtain
restitution in excess of expectation is that the contract has been "re-
scinded" and therefore may be ignored as a source of damages mea-
surement. This argument treats rescission and restitution as a linked
pair, suggesting that the invocation of the latter as a measure of dam-
ages necessarily brings the former into play. It is widely recognized,
however, that in the context of remedies for breach of contract, refer-
ences to "rescission" are unnecessary and confusing.69 A true rescis-
sion may occur, of course, when the parties mutually agree to put an
end to their contract." Something like rescission, but more accu-
rately described as "avoidance," occurs when mistake, lack of capacity,
misrepresentation, or duress infects the contract formation process.7 1
When a contract comes to an end on account of impracticability or
frustration of purpose, one might loosely describe the event as a "re-
scission," although the basic term "discharge"72 is more appropriate.
But when one party seeks relief on account of the other's breach, the
word "rescission" is misleading.7" Bringing the contract to an end on
account of breach is more precisely referred to as a "cancellation."74
At stake is the proper form and quantum of relief that should be avail-
able on account of the breach. When, as in this Article, the focus is
on monetary, rather than specific, relief, the issue becomes one of
measurement. Using the word "rescission" in place of "cancellation"
69. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Billings v. Gardner, 745 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that buyer
and seller had mutually rescinded an oral contract for the sale of a business); Kirk v. Brent-
wood Manor Homes, Inc., 159 A.2d 48, 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (involving a mutually
agreed rescission of a contract to purchase realty); St. Norbert College Found., Inc. v.
McCormick, 260 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Wis. 1978) (holding that a donor to a tax-exempt trust
was unable to demonstrate mutual rescission of a contract by express agreement or by
inference from the acts of the parties).
71. CAL Miu & PERILLO, supra note 16, § 9-27, at 386-87, § 8-4, at 310, § 8-12, at 328,
§ 9-23, at 373; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 9.3-9.4, at 683-700, § 4.3, at 228-30, § 4.15, at
269-72, § 4.19, at 282-83.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265 (1979).
73. See CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1983) (Nelson, J., concur-
ring) (describing the legal ambiguities involved in using the terms "rescission and restitu-
tion"). See also DOBBS, supra note 61, § 12.1, at 792-93, § 12.9, at 844 (discussing the
interrelationship of recission and restitution); FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.15, at 632 n.2,
§ 12.19, at 948-49 (explaining that a court's use of the term "rescission" can be inaccurate);
PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.6, at 421 (discussing the concept of rescission).
74. The U.C.C. distinguishes "cancellation," or the bringing of a contract to an end on
account of breach, from "termination," in which no breach occurs. U.C.C. § 2-106(3)-(4)
(1993). The terms commonly are used interchangeably, however. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 5, § 8.15, at 632 n.2.
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to identify the event triggering the measurement process7 5 is more
likely to confuse than to clarify.
The notion of rescission is significant when courts think of it as
accomplishing something very different from cancellation. Cancella-
tion, of course, typically is the prelude to an expectation-based recov-
ery.76 Some courts conclude that rescission, by contrast, eliminates
the contract as a basis for measuring relief. As a consequence, the
injured party's remedy is defined solely in terms of the value of the
benefit conferred on the breacher, without any reference to contract
values. Perhaps the strongest statement of such reasoning is found in
Boomer v. Muir.
7 7
A rescinded contract ceases to exist for all purposes. How
then can it be looked to for one purpose, the purpose of
fixing the amount of recovery?. . .. The contract is annihi-
lated so effectually that in contemplation of law it has never
had any existence, even for the purpose of being broken.78
Such reasoning exalts form over substance; it permits one to dis-
pense with the contract as a source of remedial rights and obligations
merely by using the word "rescission" to describe the act of cancella-
tion. There is no apparent reason why simply invoking a restitution-
ary remedy should free the aggrieved party from the same contractual
constraints that apply when expectation damages are sought.79 As
75. Cf Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 176-77 & n.3, 399 A.2d 1374, 1377-78 &
n.3 (1978) (discussing the trial court's use of the term "rescission" where cancellation and
damages were the relevant remedies).
76. Andersen, Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1092-1105. Cancellation need not nec-
essarily lead to expectation damages, however. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
77. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
78. Id at 577. The plaintiff contractor in Boomer was permitted to recover restitution
far in excess of its expectation interest. Id at 578-80.
79. See DOBBS, supra note 61, § 12.24, at 916 ("The choice between the rule limiting the
contractor to the contract rate and the rule allowing him the full 'value' of his work with-
out limit is a difficult one."); George E. Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for
Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 264, 273 (1959) ("The word rescission has been a
source of many difficulties in the law of restitution. Some of them ... seem to stem from
the notion that a business transaction entered into by the parties has a physical reality that
must be destroyed in order for the plaintiff to obtain restitution."). For a view of English
law that treats restitution as detached from contract values, see A.S. BuRRows, REMEDIES
FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF CoNTRAcr 270-75 (1987). This approach to restitution may be
explained in part by the apparently different event that triggers the restitutionary remedy
in English, as opposed to American, law. English law requires a "total failure of considera-
tion," id at 270, which may be substantially more severe than a "material breach" under
American law. See supra Part I.C.2.a. A total failure of consideration "deprives the 'party
who has further undertakings still to perform of substantially the whole benefit which it
was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that he should obtain as the
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Professor Palmer has noted in reference to a specific contractual
context,
[The injured party's] discharge simply put[s] an end to the
contract, and there is no need to give any more extensive
effect to it than this. The contract ha[s] in fact been made,
and this remains as a relevant fact in the case after discharge.
If it is good policy to limit the [injured party's] recovery by
reference to the price term of the contract... nothing in the
concept of either cancellation or rescission stands in the way
of doing so.8°
2. Framing the Issue as Restitution Versus the Contract Price.-One
reason that courts and scholars may conclude that restitutionary relief
should not be confined by the expectation interest is that they frame
the issue incorrectly. The error, often committed in cases involving
an injured supplier, is asking whether restitution may be awarded in
excess of the contract price."1 This question seems to assume, uncriti-
cally, that the unpaid portion of the contract price is synonymous with
the expectation interest of the injured supplier-an assumption that
often is incorrect.
To be sure, the primary benefit the supplier expects is the pay-
ment of the contract price. In a great many contracts, however, that
payment is by no means the only thing of value the recipient owes. In
construction contracts, for example, the general contractor typically is
responsible, either by express promise or by implication, for providing
the subcontractor with a suitable site on which to perform the work, 2
consideration for performing those undertakings.'" GOFF & JONES, supra note 27, at 454
(quoting Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 2 Q.B. 26, 66 (1962)).
80. PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.4(f), at 407. Professor Palmer refers to a client's breach
of a contract with an attorney. As discussed infra note 127, Professor Palmer believes that
policy considerations unique to the attorney-client relationship justify a different result
than applies to commercial agreements generally.
81. Professor Palmer, for example, addresses the issue solely in terms of whether the
contract price should limit a recovery in restitution for breach of contract. PALMER, supra
note 34, § 4.4. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20, at 952-53 (discussing restitution-
ary recovery in excess of contract rate); DOBBS, supra note 61, § 12.24, at 915-18 (discussing
restitution in losing contracts); Childres & Garamella, supra note 54, at 445-46 (referring to
the injured supplier's expectancy in terms of the "contract price" and the "contract rate").
82. E.g., Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 248 U.S. 334, 340 (1919) ("It is
sufficiently obvious that a contract for the construction of a building, even in the absence
of an express stipulation upon the subject, implies as an essential condition that a site shall
be furnished upon which the structure may be erected."); R.G. Pope Constr. Co. v. Guard
Rail of Roanoke, Inc., 244 S.E.2d 774, 778 (Va. 1978) (holding that a prime contractor
materially breached a construction subcontract by failing to make a work site available to
the subcontractor by the agreed date).
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for scheduling the work to be done on the total project so that various
subcontractors do not impede each other's efforts,"3 and for not inter-
fering with each subcontractor's performance.84 The material breach
leading to cancellation very often consists, at least in part, of the
owner's (or general contractor's) breach of these obligations. When
that occurs, the contractor (or subcontractor) may be palpably in-
jured by delays in the job, having to work around other contractors, or
other difficulties. Under standard principles of contract damages, the
owner or general contractor owes compensatory damages to the sub-
contractors for those injuries, separate and apart from the unpaid
contract price.8 5 Whether those damages are characterized as "conse-
quential" or "incidental damages," or as a loss in value of the primary
performance owed by the party in breach,86 they demonstrate that the
unpaid contract price is but one component of the victim's expecta-
tion interest.
When the contract price is less than the expectation interest,
courts are correct in stating that the contract price does not limit a
restitutionary recovery. Such a limit would leave the victim undercom-
pensated, as measured from the baseline of expectation. Only when
expectation equals the unpaid contract price-that is, the entire loss
suffered by the supplier consists of the money not paid by the recipi-
ent-does limiting a restitutionary recovery to the contract price
honor the expectation principle.
The lack of identity between the contract price and the expecta-
tion interest explains the willingness of some courts to disregard the
contract price in favor of the injured supplier's right to restitution.
For example, in United States ex rel. Citizens National Bank v. Stringel-
83. E.g., United States ex rel Heller Elec. Co. v. William F. Klingensmith, Inc., 670 F.2d
1227, 1230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that a general contractor wrongfully delayed a sub-
contractor's work on a parking garage through its failure to coordinate adequately the
work of its subcontractors and its failure to provide sufficient supervisory personnel); Lamb
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Kraus-Anderson of Minneapolis, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 859, 864
(Minn. 1980) ("[Olne aspect of a prime contractor's duties is to coordinate the work of its
subcontractors and eliminate gaps and overlaps in their work.")
84. E.g., Continental Masonry Co. v. Verdel Constr. Co., 279 Md. 476, 478 n.1, 369 A.2d
566, 567 n.1 (1977) (noting that a general contractor is "under an implied obligation not
to delay or hinder, by his own actions, performance by a subcontractor"); R.C. Tolman
Constr. Co. v. Myton Water Ass'n, 563 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1977) ("[T]here is an implied
obligation arising out of a construction contract that the person hiring the work to be
done will cooperate with the contractor and will not hinder or delay him in his
performance.").
85. See FARNSwORTH, supra note 5, § 12.9, at 879-81 (discussing "consequential" and
"incidental" damages).
86. See id
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low, 7 a subcontractor sought to recover in quantum meruit after being
wrongfully discharged from a contract to perform earth moving.
8
The contract price provided for payment at a rate of $0.45 per cubic
yard.8 9 The court affirmed a trial court award based on a value of
$1.15 per cubic yard. ° The opinion emphasized that the subcontrac-
tor's "'labors were increased by the delays of [the general contractor]
in removing spoil for which it had responsibility and by other conduct
of [the general contractor]."'91 As a result, the contract price would
have been the reasonable value of the services performed by the sub-
contractor "'only if [the subcontractor] had been able to work un-
hampered by the numerous obstacles and interferences occasioned by
[the general contractor's] failure to properly co-ordinate the pro-
ject. "'92 The court further noted that "[the subcontractor's] costs had
increased significantly by the excess dirt and other obstacles scattered
over the jobsite, by the necessity of reworking some sections as many
as four times, and by delays caused by [the general contractor's] inter-
ference."9 3 Therefore, the court concluded that
forty-five cents may have been a reasonable price for moving
a cubic yard of dirt once. If, however, that cubic yard were
required to be moved two or three times before it came to
rest with finality at its proper destination, the costs incurred
would obviously be significantly higher, and the reasonable
value of the work would be similarly greater.9 4
On facts like these, limiting the injured party's recovery to the
contract price obviously would fall far short of protecting the expecta-
tion interest. The comparison between contract price and the value
of the benefit conferred thus is not an important one.95 In other
87. 414 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1969), cited with approval in PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.4(a),
at 109 n.7a (Supp. 1990).
88. Stringellow, 414 F.2d at 698.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 699.
91. Id. at 698 (quoting Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Vitt, 367 F.2d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1966)).
92. Id. (quoting the Dist. Ct. judge).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 700.
95. The fact that the expectation interest may exceed the contract price is apparent in
other cases cited to demonstrate that the price does not limit restitution. This is true, for
example, of the following cases, cited in PALMER, supra note 34, §4.4(a), at 389 n.1: United
States ex reL Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606, 607-08, 611-12 (2d
Cir. 1944) (calculating the injured subcontractor's recovery to include amounts for use of
its equipment by the general contractor, even though that use was beyond the scope of the
parties' agreement); United States ex rel. Wander v. Brotherton, 106 F. Supp. 353, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (holding that the subcontractor's quantum meruit claim included the value
of "increased and additional expenses for wages and materials not contemplated by the
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cases, however, the contract price will define the maximum extent of
expectation. An example of this principle is found in Dickson v. Em-
merson,96 in which the supplier promised to haul logs from a given
location to a river and to construct a length of roadway in return for
an agreed price of $2.50 per thousand feet of logs.97 After the sup-
plier had built the roadway and hauled a portion of the logs, the re-
cipient, who had paid only a portion of the contract price, wrongfully
discharged the supplier.98 The supplier sued in quantum meruit to re-
cover the value of the services performed.99 The Oregon Supreme
Court held that the supplier was "entitled to recover the reasonable
value of the work done which inured to the benefit of [the recipient],
within the limits of the. . . total contract."100 The facts of the case do not
indicate that the supplier suffered any harm other than the recipient's
failure to pay money as promised. The unpaid contract price (less the
cost of any performance avoided by the supplier) therefore was synon-
ymous with the expectation interest.10 1 The comparison of unpaid
contract price to the value of the benefit conferred was clearly rele-
vant to the relationship between expectation and restitution. 12
contract solely by reason of unwarranted delays on the part of defendants"). The same also
may be true of many other cases in which the necessary facts are not developed at trial or
on appeal because the focus of the courts and the litigants is misdirected toward the con-
tract price-that is, toward the relationship of contract price to restitution-rather than a
comparison of restitution with expectation.
96. 61 P.2d 439 (Or. 1936).
97. Id
98. Id. at 440.
99. Id. at 439.
100. Id at 441 (emphasis added).
101. The court went on to quote Williston on Contracts for the proposition that the con-
tract price is merely evidence of, but does not conclusively establish, the value of the bene-
fit conferred in such a case. Id The purpose of this discussion apparently was not to justify
a restitutionary recovery possibly in excess of the total contract price, but to explain why
the contract rate of $2.50 per thousand feet should not be applied to measure the plain-
tiffs recovery. The court correctly noted that the plaintiff had already constructed the
roadway, which was to be used for the entire job, and that the $2.50 rate for hauling only a
portion of the logs would not protect the plaintiffs expectation of recovering the costs of
that construction. Id at 440-41. The court's analysis on this point is consistent with its
conclusion that the total contract price formed an upper limit on the plaintiffs recovery.
102. In City of Portland ex rel. Donohue & Fleskes Corp. v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 596
P.2d 1305, 1313 & n.7, 1313-14 n.9 (Or. 1979), the Oregon Supreme Court correctly de-
clined to follow Dickson in limiting a quantum meruit recovery by the contract price. In
Hoffman Constr. Co., a general contractor (the recipient) materially breached a subcontract
by failing to have the work site adequately prepared for the subcontractor (the supplier),
failing to coordinate the work of various subcontractors, and interfering with the subcon-
tractor's work. Id at 1308. The effect of the breach was to delay the subcontractor's work
and increase its costs substantially. See id The subcontractor sued in quantum meruit for
the value of the work performed. Id The court briefly considered whether, on the
strength of Dickson, the recovery should be limited by the contract price. Id at 1313-14 n.9.
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Having (sometimes correctly) concluded that the contract price
does not limit restitution, courts and scholars have failed to consider
adequately the more pertinent question: should the expectation interest
limit the injured supplier's restitutionary recovery? Were it decided
that expectation should limit restitution, other questions would re-
quire attention. For example, in some cases the extent to which the
victim's expectation interest exceeds the unpaid contract price will be
unclear or difficult to determine. The principles governing the rela-
tionship between restitution and expectation need to take that prob-
lem into account.10 3 Unfortunately, neither the case law nor contract
scholarship consistently has framed the issue as a contest between res-
titution and expectation. Instead, the focus on-and rejection of-
the contract price as a limit on recovery has contributed to the conclu-
sion that restitution damages are not subject to any limitation at all.1°4
3. The Problem of the Full Performance Rule.-Assuming the cor-
rectness of the argument that, at the victim's option, the materially
breached contract may be treated as rescinded and therefore non-ex-
istent, a serious difficulty arises. As noted above,105 the "full perform-
ance rule" categorically precludes restitutionary relief in excess of
expectation when the injured supplier has fully performed, but the
recipient wrongfully refuses to pay. Why should the victim not be en-
titled to restitution in such a case, as he would be, in the view of many
courts, had he only partially performed?
The explanation generally given for the rule is that, by having his
damages limited to the contract price, the supplier receives precisely
what he bargained for. 10 6 The argument proves too much, however.
The partially performing supplier also receives what he bargained for
when he receives a damage award based on his expectation interest.
There may be a difference in the amount of the award, of course,
because the fully performing supplier is entitled to the entire unpaid
It concluded, however, that the contract price should not be a limit because, in contrast to
the facts in Dickson, the plaintiff here had incurred increased costs on account of the de-
fendant's breach. Id Because those increased costs would form part of the plaintiff's ex-
pectation damages, it would be incorrect to treat the unpaid contract price alone as a limit
on the plaintiffs restitutionary recovery. Id at 1313 & 1313-14 n.9. Although the court
correctly sensed that the subcontractor would be undercompensated if the contract price
formed the upper limit on restitution, it, like so many others who have commented on this
issue, failed to ask whether there was another, appropriate ceiling on restitution.
103. See infra Part III.A.
104. See supra Part I.C.2.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACs § 373 cmt. b. (1979); PALMER, supra note
34, § 4.3, at 383.
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contract price, while the partially performing supplier's award will be
reduced by the savings realized from not having to complete his per-
formance. The two situations, however, are economically equivalent.
In each case, the supplier gets the full value of the recipient's prom-
ised performance; in each, interest is available for delays in pay-
ment;107 in each, recovery may be had for consequential or
incidental 0 . losses. 0 9
The full performance rule probably can be explained in part on
historical grounds. The common law writ of assumpsit, which was the
main vehicle for the development of contract, originally was unavaila-
ble to enforce the payment of a liquidated sum of money owed by the
107. Awards of interest are often governed by statutes or rules of court that do not dis-
tinguish between fully and partially performing suppliers, but rather tend to focus on the
degree to which the amount of damages was liquidated or readily ascertainable. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287(b) (West 1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5001(a)-(b) (McKinney
1992). Nor do the courts take the extent of the injured supplier's performance into ac-
count in awarding interest. See, e.g., Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.,
380 F. Supp. 298, 342 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (requiring payment of interest on a quantum meruit
award for a partially performing supplier); Coleman Eng'r Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc.,
420 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1966) (granting interest to a partially performing supplier);
Nor'Easter Group, Inc. v. Colossale Concrete, Inc., 542 A.2d 692, 699-700 (Conn. 1988)
(upholding a statutory award of interest for a substantially performing supplier); Walter
Kiddie Contractors, Inc. v. State, 434 A.2d 962, 978-79 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding
that a substantially performing contractor was entitled to prejudgment interest).
108. Examples of cases in which an injured, fully or substantially performing supplier
was awarded damages for consequential losses include: S. Leo Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks
Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1028-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a subcontractor whose
performance was delayed by the contractor was entitled to damages caused by the delay,
including rises in material costs, excess field costs for equipment, and extra wages to super-
visors and additional workers), affd, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985); Moore Constr. Co. v.
Clarksville Dep't. of Elec., 707 S.W.2d 1, 14-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a con-
tractor was entitled to damages caused by the owner's and co-prime contractor's delay,
including extra supervisory costs and loss of use of equipment); Walter Kidde Constructors,
Inc., 434 A.2d at 978 (finding that a contractor was entitled to damages for the owner's
delay, including additional home office and field costs, inefficiencies, and loss of produc-
tivity). Injured partially performing suppliers were awarded such damages in Steeltech
Bldg. Prods. v. Edward Sutt Assocs., Inc., 559 A.2d 228, 230-31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)
(awarding damages for idle labor costs) and in Rome Hous. Auth. v. Allied Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 355 S.E.2d 747, 752 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing recovery of damages for extra
equipment expenses stemming from the government's delay).
109. The authorities showing that an injured, fully performing supplier may recover
damages for delay and for consequential and incidental losses do not focus on whether
restitution exceeded expectation. It would be absurd, however, to suppose that such dam-
ages would be available only to the supplier whose expectation interest exceeds restitution,
but not to one for whom restitution exceeds expectation. Because of the full performance
rule, the expectation measure would be used in either case. The availability of such dam-
ages further illustrates the point made above that the contract price does not necessarily
equal the expectation interest. To the extent that the full performance rule is stated as a
prohibition of recovery above the contract price, it is in error. Rather, the point is that the
supplier is limited to his expectation interest.
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defendant, even if based upon an express promise." ° For that pur-
pose, the action of "debt" was required.111 Ames attributed that
anomaly to the reluctance of the English courts to accept that "two
legal relationships, fundamentally distinct, might be produced by one
and the same set of words." 1 2
Over time, however, assumpsit did become available to enforce a
promise to pay money. The first step in the writ's extension came
when assumpsit was made available to a plaintiff who could prove that
an express promise to pay had been made subsequent to the creation
of the debt.11 The extension of assumpsit was completed in Slade's
Case," 4 in which the subsequent promise was "implied" by the court.
Assumpsit took on various forms, including "special assumpsit,"
in which the particulars of the contract had to be pleaded, and gen-
eral or "indebitatus assumpsit," which encompassed a variety of "com-
mon counts." '15 The common counts "are merely abbreviated and
stereotyped statements that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff
for a variety of commonly recurring reasons."1 16 The common counts
came to include quantum meruit and quantum valebat, both of which
applied an essentially restitutionary measure of relief, basing the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery on the value of the performance
rendered." 7
Notwithstanding the inclusion of the injured supplier's claim for
breach of contract under the umbrella of assumpsit and the presence
of the restitution-based quantum meruit and quantum valebat counts
within that writ, courts continued to treat the fully performing sup-
plier's claim against a recipient in breach as essentially one for a liqui-
dated debt, enforceable only in the amount of the promised
payment.'1 8 Consequently, the action of debt, though nominally
brought within the domain of assumpsit, effectively has operated as a
distinct basis for recovery, exclusively applicable when the claim is for
a liquidated sum of money expressly promised by the defendant. Yet
the fully performing supplier is no less the victim of a material breach
110. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 1.6, at 19; PALMER, supra note 34, § 1.2, at 6.
111. 1 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 20; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 1.6, at 19; PALMER, supra
note 34, § 1.2, at 6.
112. James Barr Ames, The History ofAssumpsi 2 HARv. L. REv. 53, 55 (1888), reprinted in
JAMES BARR AMES, LE1]REs ON LEGAL HisTORy 149 (1913).
113. PALMER, supra note 34, § 1.2, at 7.
114. 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602).
115. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 1.6, at 19.
116. 1 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 20, at 51.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
118. 5 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 1110.
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than is the supplier who has performed only partially. The latter's
recovery could be limited to expectation damages just as readily as the
former's, but usually is not. The course of tradition carved by the
common law forms of action is not a sufficient reason why expectation
damages should be a ceiling on recovery in one case but not the
other.
The full performance rule stands in sharp contrast to other cir-
cumstances in which restitution usually or invariably is permitted as a
remedy for breach. Under the reasoning typically used to justify resti-
tution as a remedy for breach, the remedial rights of an injured, fully
performing supplier whose recipient fails to pay are inconsistent with
those of an injured, fully performing recipient whose supplier fails to
perform. The latter routinely is permitted to choose between the ex-
pectation and restitution interests and to select the more generous
source of relief,'19 while the former is not.12 0 The remedy available to
a fully performing supplier also seems inconsistent with those avail-
able to partially performing suppliers, who are entitled to restitution
in excess of the contract price, and perhaps in excess of the expecta-
tion interest as well. 121
4. Scholarly Solutions for the Problem of Expectation Versus Restitu-
tion.-The anomalies in the relationship between expectation and res-
titution as remedies for breach of contract have been addressed at
various times by the scholarly community. Writers from a previous era
argued for the abolition of the full performance rule, seeking consis-
tency by fully liberating restitution from expectation.' 22 As noted
above,' 23 however, that position has been rejected in the case law.
Childres and Garamella pressed for consistency in the opposite direc-
tion. Focusing primarily on the injured supplier, they argued that ex-
pectation-based remedies should not be undermined by the ready
availability of a larger, restitutionary recovery.' 24 A number of other
scholars have noted the problem and the lack of an adequate explana-
tion, but have made no serious attempt to provide a conceptual or
119. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64 and Hypothetical Case 3 (supra text accom-
panying note 8).
120. See supra text accompanying note 61.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 87-104.
122. WiLLLAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUAsi-CoNTRACTS 298-302 (1893);
FREDERICK C. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QuAsi-CoNTRACTs § 262 (1913).
123. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
124. Childres & Garamella, supra note 54, at 437-41, 457-58.
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theoretical solution.1 2 1 In his treatise on restitution,126 Professor
Palmer apparently accepts the correctness of the full performance
rule, without coming to grips with its basic inconsistency with the
broader universe of cases on restitution as a remedy for breach.1 27
Professor Dobbs proposes a number of pragmatic solutions to mini-
mize the conflict between restitution and expectation, without at-
tempting a general resolution of the issue.
128
Professor Farnsworth has proposed a general theory to explain
the existing case law. He suggests that "restitution is available as an
alternative remedy unless measuring the amount of recovery would
involve the court in problems that could be avoided by awarding dam-
ages based on expectation."1 29 The "problems" to which he refers re-
125. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 110; J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON COcRACTS § 126, at
720-21 (3d ed. 1990); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 16, § 15-4, at 652. Williston's treatise
acknowledges the full performance rule, but provides virtually no discussion of its relation-
ship to the general rule permitting restitution in excess of expectation. 12 SAMUEL WILIS-
TON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1459, 1485 (3d ed.
1970).
126. PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.3. In an earlier article, Professor Palmer suggested that
the contest between expectation and restitution should be resolved in terms of "considera-
tions of fairness and convenience." Palmer, supra note 79, at 281. Professor Palmer's reso-
lution of the issue is reminiscent of the "essence of the contract" approach to material
breach. See Andersen, Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1091-92.
127. Professor Palmer states that giving the injured, fully performing supplier "the very
thing he bargained for in return for his performance, that is, a sum of money .... pro-
vide [s] a rational explanation of the full performance doctrine... ." PALMER, supra note
34, § 4.3, at 383. By contrast, he objects to reducing the restitutionary award of an injured,
partially performing supplier by the losses he would have suffered had the contract been
fully performed. Id That reduction would permit the breaching recipient to enjoy the
benefits of a contract favorable to her, which would be "a gross miscarriage of justice
... [because] the defendant is the party guilty of a breach of contract." Id § 4.4(a), at 392.
Professor Palmer does not attempt to explain why the fact that the supplier happens to
have fully performed makes it any less gross a "miscarriage ofjustice" to grant the breach-
ing recipient the benefits of a favorable contract.
It is noteworthy that in the context of a recipient client's breach of contract with a
supplier attorney, where the agreement is favorable to the former, Professor Palmer argues
that the partially performing attorney should be limited to expectation relief precisely to
the extent proposed infra in Part III.C. Id § 4.4(f), at 406-09. The proffered justification
for the different treatment appears to be that "a client should be free to terminate the
relationship when he has lost trust or confidence in his lawyer, whether justly so or not," id.
§ 4.4(f), at 408, and that not permitting the client to retain the benefits of the contract she
breached would unduly inhibit that freedom. One cannot help but conclude that Profes-
sor Palmer justifies restitution in excess of expectation as a means of punishing one who
materially breaches and that he excepts the breaching client from that policy on the as-
sumption that she is more entitled to breach the retainer agreement than is a party to an
ordinary commercial contract. He also uncritically excepts the recipient in an ordinary
commercial contract where the supplier has fully performed on the unpersuasive, though
oft-repeated, ground that the supplier got exactly what he bargained for.
128. DOBBS, supra note 61, §§ 12.20, 12.24.
129. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20, at 949.
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late to difficulties in measuring damages. Thus, restitution should be
available to an injured recipient, in many cases, because measuring
her restitution interest usually will require no more than determining
the amount of money she has paid."' ° The easiest cases are those in
which the supplier has failed to perform entirely or the recipient justi-
fiably rejects the supplier's entire performance, because there will be
no difficulty in measuring the offsetting benefit received by the in-
jured recipient.13 ' By contrast, measuring the restitution interest
might be difficult when an injured supplier has fully performed, but
expectation simply will be the unpaid contract price.13 2 Thus, the full
performance rule reflects the relative ease of determining expectation
rather than restitution damages.133 The hardest cases will be those in
which an injured supplier has partially performed, because measuring
either restitution or expectation is likely to be challenging.
3 4
The difficulty-of-measurement principle comes under strain, as
Professor Farnsworth acknowledges, when the injured supplier al-
ready has conferred a benefit greater in value than the contract price
before the contract is ended prematurely. In this situation, Professor
Farnsworth notes that
[u]sing the contract price as a ceiling on recovery in such a
case will not entirely avoid problems of measurement of the
benefit conferred on the party in breach, since that benefit
must, at least in principle, be measured before it can be
known whether the ceiling has been reached. On the other
hand, not using the contract price as a ceiling on recovery
may result in a more generous recovery for part performance
than would have been allowed for full performance.
1 3 5
Giving an injured, partially performing supplier restitution in ex-
cess of the total contract price is but one illustration of the general
130. Id. § 12.20, at 950.
131. Id.
132. Note the possibility of damages in addition to the unpaid price, however. See supra
Part I.D.2; see also infra Part II.B
133. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20, at 953-54.
134. Id § 12.20, at 950-53. Measuring restitution may be difficult because, even more
than in the case of the fully performing supplier, determining the market value of the
performance rendered can be problematic. How does one determine, for example, the
value of a partially completed construction job? Cf Andersen, Material Breach, supra note
19, at 1117-18 (suggesting a means of determining the value of the benefit conferred in
such cases). Expectation also may be difficult to measure because the measurement will
- require at least a finding of how much more the supplier would have spent on full per-
formance or, alternatively, what profit or loss would have resulted from full performance.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.10.
135. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20, at 954.
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problem of restitution in excess of expectation.1 3 6 It demonstrates
why Professor Farnsworth's theory, for which he makes only modest
claims,"3 7 is ultimately incapable of fully accommodating the compet-
ing claims of restitution and expectation in damages for breach of
contract. There will be cases, including some falling under the full
performance rule, in which measuring both restitution and expecta-
tion will not be particularly difficult.138 In any event, modem courts
have become increasingly willing to tolerate difficulties in measuring
the proper amount of damages awardable for breach of contract. 139 A
rule based on ease of measurement should not drive so fundamental
an issue as the proper basis for determining damages for breach.
To be sure, relative ease of measurement is not an insignificant
factor in the relationship between expectation and restitution. As will
be seen, 14 ease of measurement sometimes will play a major, even a
determinative, role in the analysis. But a sturdier conceptual founda-
tion is needed for deciding whether the remedial rights of a breach
victim should look forward, protecting the expectation interest, or
backward, guarding the restitution interest. Indeed, the first question
is whether "restitution" itself adequately encompasses the proper al-
ternative to expectation as a remedy for breach of contract.
II. THE RESTORATION INTEREST
The thesis of this Part of the Article is that the conventional, tri-
partite model of contractual interests should be superseded by a bi-
136. Professor Farnsworth's analysis apparently assumes that the contract price is
equivalent to the expectation interest, which may not be so, as pointed out above. See supra
Part I.D.2.
137. Professor Farnsworth describes his theory only as "a general principle serving to
rationalize many of the decisions." FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20, at 949.
138. See, e.g., id. § 12.15, at 923-24.
139. Early cases often interpreted the certainty limitation on contract damages rather
strictly. E.g., Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858) (holding that "damages to be recov-
ered for a breach of contract must be shown with certainty" and that speculative profits are
not recoverable). In recent years, the certainty requirement has been relaxed. See, e.g.,
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 261 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding
that the injured party need prove damages with "only reasonable certainty, not absolute
certainty" and that doubts will be resolved against the party in breach); Locke v. United
States, 283 F.2d 521, 524 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ("If a reasonable probability of damage can be
clearly established, uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery."). See also
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979) ("Damages are not recoverable for
loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable cer-
tainty."); 5 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 1020, at 124 (concluding that a basis for "a reasonable
estimate" of value of harm suffered is required for recovery of damages); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 5, § 12.15, at 881.
140. See infra Part III.A.
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partite regime. Within the bipartite regime are two alternative and
competing measures of damages for breach of contract. Expectation
is one of them.' But neither restitution nor reliance alone, as con-
ventionally defined, adequately describes the other. This Part of the
Article defines and describes the second interest, which is referred to
as the restoration interest. Part III of the Article then discusses the prin-
ciples governing the relationship between expectation and
restoration.
Restoration is the logical and intuitive counterpart to expecta-
tion. The expectation interest seeks the economic replication of full
performance. Subject to well-established qualifications,142 it looks for-
ward to the circumstances that would have existed had the agreement
been performed as the parties originally anticipated. Restoration
looks backward to the economic circumstances of the breach victim at
contract formation. Subject to the same qualifications, it seeks to re-
store the injured party to the precontractual position. Although the
restoration interest is not unambiguously recognized as an element of
conventional contract doctrine, its protection is a stated remedial goal
of many judicial opinions and is reflected in the results of numerous
cases.143 As governed by the principles discussed in Part III, the resto-
ration interest eliminates the anomalies in the law of contract dam-
ages previously discussed. The restoration interest also simplifies the
law of damages, making it more elegant and intuitive. For these rea-
sons, the bipartite restoration-expectation model is superior to the tri-
partite expectation-reliance-restitution regime.
The restoration interest consists of three components: restitu-
tion, compensation for other loss, and a discharge of executory obliga-
tions. An understanding of the restoration interest begins with an
examination of the goals and effects of restitution as a remedy for
breach.
A. Restitution
1. Restitution and the Goal of Restoring the Status Quo Ante.-The
choice between restitution and expectation frequendy is cast in terms
of whether the remedy for breach should enable the victim to back
out of the contract or to move forward through it. Restitution, with
the notion of rescission sometimes added to stress the "undoing of the
contract," is seen as the way backward. It is often said that the pur-
141. This analysis treats as belonging to the expectation rubric those cases in which
reliance is used as a subset of expectation in measuring damages. See supra Part I.C.1.
142. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
143. See infra Part II.B.2.
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pose of restitution as a remedy for breach is to restore the victim to
the status quo ante.144
The restitution interest as conventionally understood, however,
does not return the injured party to the status quo ante. When restitu-
tion is used as a remedy for breach of contract, both the First and
Second Restatements require the breaching party to have received a
"benefit" from the injured party's performance.1 4 5 To be sure, the
concept of benefit is defined generously. The breaching party need
not have been enriched in order to have "benefitted." It is sufficient
that the victim's full or part performance has been received by the
breacher or rendered at his request.146 Scholarly authority and the
case law are solidly in accord with the proposition that restitution does
not require the defendant to have become or remained wealthier as a
result of the plaintiffs performance. 4 7
Even if the restitution interest is generously defined, however,
protecting it alone is insufficient to restore the breach victim to the
status quo. Restitution excludes a number of potentially significant
costs-such as amounts expended in preparation for performance
and consequential losses arising from the breach-that do not confer
a benefit on the other party under even the most liberal concept of
144. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 347 cmt. b (1932) ("In granting restitution
as a remedy for breach .... the purpose to be attained is the restoration of the injured
party to as good a position as that occupied by him before the contract was made."); 5
CORBIN, supra note 57, § 1107, at 573 ("[I]n enforcing restitution, the purpose is to require
the wrongdoer to restore what he has received and thus tend to put the injured party in as
good a position as that occupied by him before the contract was made."); Riess v. Murchi-
son, 503 F.2d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the victim of a material breach "may
seek restitution in which both he and the wrongdoer will be restored to the position they
occupied at the time the contract was formed"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975); McEnroe
v. Morgan, 678 P.2d 595, 598 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) ("Rescission is an equitable remedy
that totally abrogates the contract and restores the parties to their original positions.");
Potter v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1988) ("Restoring the status quo is the goal of
the restitutionary remedy of rescission."); United Engine Co. v. Junis, 195 N.W. 606, 607
(Iowa 1923) ("A rescission contemplates and requires the restoration of the status quo.");
Shoreham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills, Inc., 269 Md. 291, 300, 305 A.2d 465, 471
(1973) ("The purpose of restitution [as a remedy for breach of contract] is to put the
injured party in as good a position as that occupied before the contract was made."); Cal-
liari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139, 142 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (explaining restitution in
kind).
145. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 348 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 370 (1979).
146. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 348 cmt. a (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON.
TRACTS § 370 cmt. a (1979).
147. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 34, §§ 1.2, 4.2, and cases cited therein (tracing the
beginnings of quasi-contract and discussing "The Legal Conception of Benefit"). See gener-
allyJohn P. Dawson, Restitution without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REv. 563 (1981).
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"benefit."4 ' As Fuller and Perdue observed, a definition of the resti-
tution interest based on a return to the victim's precontractual posi-
tion is more descriptive of the reliance interest than of the restitution
interest.14 9 Yet, as demonstrated above,"' ° when used as a measure of
damages for breach, the reliance interest routinely is treated as a
lesser included element of expectation. As so understood, the reli-
ance interest is reduced by losses that would have been incurred by
the victim from full performance. Reliance therefore also falls short
of fully describing what is at stake when the victim seeks a backward-
looking remedy for breach.
A puzzle of sorts thus arises. If the remedial goal of looking back-
ward is truly to restore the victim's precontractual position, then the
tool for accomplishing that goal is not restitution, but rather a more
robust reliance interest-one fully emancipated from the limits of ex-
pectation. Indeed, the relevant backward-looking interest has been
referred to as the "status quo interest," ' ' which describes the precon-
tractual position more accurately than does "reliance. 152 But despite
statements to the effect that their goal is to restore the status quo, the
courts, with stubborn consistency, use restitution instead of reliance as
the alternative to expectation. 53 When the purpose is not to replicate
the victim's rights to performance but to free him from its constraints,
restitution is the remedial measure of choice. This phenomenon
148. In other circumstances, of course, restitution does fully restore the status quo, as
when the only change in an injured recipient's position is the payment of the purchase
price, which she seeks to have refunded, or when an injured supplier has incurred no cost
or detriment that has not been realized as a benefit realized by the breaching recipient.
149. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 89.
150. See supra Part I.C.1.
151. A.S. Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution-A Satisfactory Division or Not, 99 LAw Q.
REv. 217, 221 (1983).
152. Although reliance is nominally defined in terms of the position the party in ques-
tion would have enjoyed had the contract not been made, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRAcrs § 344(b) (1979), A.S. Burrows argues that the connotation of "status quo" more
accurately represents the precontractual position for several reasons. Burrows, supra note
151, at 218-21. The term "status quo" encompasses more clearly than does "reliance" con-
sequential losses resulting from the breach that were not caused by the victim's reliance on
the breaching party carrying out the promise. Id. Furthermore, the term "status quo"
necessarily excludes reliance that benefits, rather than disadvantages, the party in question,
and it illustrates the conceptual unity of the interest being protected in breach of contract
cases with the interest for which remedies in tort exist: the interest in compensation for a
harm inflicted. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 201-222 regarding the relationship of
the restoration interest to tort remedies. In this Article, the term "restoration interest" is
preferred over "status quo interest" because the latter may connote a recovery freed from
the constraints of the avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty limitations applicable to all
contract damages. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
153. See cases cited infra Part II.B.2.
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might be explained in any of at least three ways: (i) courts might be
blind to the shortcomings of restitution to achieve their stated reme-
dial goal; (ii) the courts' true remedial goal might be something less
than the professed one of restoring the breach victim to the status quo
ante, or (iii) the remedy the courts have applied, and referred to as
"restitution," might extend beyond restitution, toward the full replica-
tion of the precontractual position.
The third position mentioned above seems particularly descrip-
tive of a good many opinions. Although courts refer to the remedy
they grant as "restitution," they commonly grant additional relief nec-
essary to return the breach victim to the status quo ante.154 If that is so,
then why does the concept of restitution enjoy such staying power?
Why has the alternative to expectation not come to be referred to
generally as the reliance or status quo interest?
2. Restitution as the Principal Element of the Restoration Interest.-
Despite the lack of complete conceptual fit between the restitution
interest and the goal of returning the victim to the status quo ante,
there are at least two important reasons, in addition to historical mo-
mentum, for the law's deeply rooted attachment to restitution as the
central component of the backward-looking remedy for breach of
contract. The first is that a restitutionary claim, at least insofar as it is
based on actual accretions to the wealth of the other party, carries
with it a strong moral justification. As Fuller and Perdue pointed out,
when costs incurred by A translate into added wealth for B, the result-
ing discrepancy from the status quo is double what would occur if A's
loss resulted in no gain to B.155 It is unsurprising, then, that a court
would justify a return of wealth to A not simply on the ground that A
has suffered a loss, which is relevant to the reliance interest as well,
but on the ground that B has enjoyed a corresponding gain. This is
the essence of restitution granted to prevent unjust enrichment. The
policy against unjust enrichment is ancient, finding expression in the
philosophy of Aristotle156 and in Roman law.157 It continues to exert
a powerful influence on modern jurisprudence, including the law of
contracts.
154. See infra Part II.B.2.
155. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest Part 1, supra note 1, at 56.
156. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (pages
1132a-1132b in I. Bekker trans., Berlin, Prussian Academy, 1831, the first modern edition,
to which most others cross-reference).
157. 1 THE DiGEsr OFJuSTINM.J 380 (Mommsen, et al., eds. and trans. 1985) (Book XII,
citing Pomponius); see also ZIMMERMANN, supra note 24, at 851-57 (explaining the develop-
ment of Roman law regarding unjustified enrichment).
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The second reason that resort initially is made to restitution
rather than to reliance is a practical one, which applies not only to
cases of unjust enrichment but also to the many instances in which
restitution is granted in the absence of any corresponding gain to the
other party. 158 The restitution interest often lends itself to more accu-
rate measurement of what is necessary to restore the parties' precon-
tractual position than does direct resort to the concept of reliance or
the status quo. Indeed, in some cases the precontractual position may
be virtually impossible to calculate except in restitutionary terms.
Suppose, for example, that a contractor provides labor and
materials to construct a building. Strictly speaking, the reliance inter-
est is measured by the costs to the supplier of preparing and perform-
ing under the contract. Some of those costs may be readily
ascertainable, such as the costs of materials purchased from third par-
ties for use on the job or the amount of wages paid to workers. Other
costs are likely to be inherently elusive, unless defined in terms of
market values. Consider the builder's own time or the use of tools
and equipment he already owns. Measuring the actual costs incurred
by the builder in the use of those resources would be a process riddled
with uncertainties. How much of the useful life of the equipment was
consumed on the job? What were the costs of transporting the equip-
ment to the job site? How does one determine or quantify the detri-
ment the builder suffered in expending his own labor?
For costs such as these, the price that others would be willing to
pay for the use of the equipment or for the builder's time provides the
most accurate, and often the only practicable, gauge of reliance.15 9 It
is perhaps for this reason that restitution as a remedy for breach com-
monly is measured by the market value of the claimant's performance,
whether or not the other party actually has been enriched. 6 ' The
point is not only that something is being taken back from the person
who received it, but also that something of value is being restored to
158. See supra text accompanying note 147.
159. There will be cases, of course, in which measuring the change from the breach
victim's status quo will be no more difficult than determining the breaching party's enrich-
ment. In that event, a court might well look directly to the former in calculating damages.
An example of a court doing so appears in McCray v. Murray, 423 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), in which a contractor engaged to construct a fish pond materially breached
the contract by abandoning the job prior to completion. The court decided that the land
owner was entitled to choose between expectation relief and "damages which will put him
in the same position as he was immediately prior to making the agreement." Id. at 561.
The court affirmed an award of $20,000 as the cost of restoring the property to its previous
condition, even though the data for calculating the extent of the builder's enrichment, in
the form of soil excavated and sold to third parties, was readily available. Id at 560.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. 9 (1979).
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the one who lost it. If the breaching party has been measurably en-
riched, then that defendant's increase in wealth is an available mea-
sure of restitution. But if, as often is the case, the victim's costs of
performance do not fully translate into enrichment of the breaching
party, then restitution measured by the market value of the perform-
ance in question becomes the most, and sometimes the only, feasible
way to restore the status quo ante.161 As so measured, restitution is
anchored not in the policy against unjust enrichment, but in the pol-
icy of restoring the breach victim to the precontractual position. Both
its moral claims (when unjust enrichment exists) and its practical ad-
vantages (whether or not unjust enrichment exists) make restitution
the principal element of the restoration interest.
B. Other Loss
Although a generous approach to restitution moves toward resto-
ration of the status quo, full restoration requires more. Some of the
injured party's costs, such as preparations to perform, cannot be con-
sidered "beneficial" to the breaching party under any reasonable defi-
nition. As long as restitution remains the starting point for
restoration, compensation for such losses is essential to the full protec-
tion of the restoration interest. In this Article, the general term
"other loss" is used to describe such costs. The "other loss" category is
at least roughly analogous to the "incidental" and "consequential"
losses that are a familiar part of expectation damages. 62 As is true of
other elements of contract damages, these losses are subject to the
limitations of avoidability, certainty, and foreseeability."6 ' A detailed
examination of the "other loss" category is beyond the scope of this
Article. It is enough for present purposes to define it generally as the
difference between what is covered by the restitution interest and the
net worsening of the injured party's position on account of the
breach. 164
161. This view is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371
(1979), which authorizes using either the market value of the performance rendered or
the actual benefit to the other party as the measure of a restitutionary award.
162. See U.C.C. § 2-715 (1993). The various categories of "other loss" are discussed,
though not by these labels, in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 351, 354 (1979).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22; see also infra notes 220-222 and accompa-
nying text.
164. "Other loss" overlaps with what Fuller and Perdue referred to as "incidental reli-
ance," to be distinguished from "essential reliance." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
Part 1, supra note 1, at 78. For an insightful discussion of the possible elements of reliance
as conceived by Fuller and Perdue, much of which would be relevant to a full analysis of
the "other loss" component of the restoration interest, see Hudec, supra note 3, at 718-33.
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The limitations perceived to be inherent in the notion of restitu-
tion have prevented some courts from awarding compensation for
other loss. Moreover, the election of remedies doctrine has caused
needless confusion about appropriate restitutionary recoveries. The
manner in which courts have struggled with these obstacles is ex-
amined briefly next, followed by a survey of court opinions that have
surmounted them successfully.
1. Obstacles to Compensation for "Other Loss. "-Courts often sense,
instinctively and correctly, that compensation for "other loss" ought to
be awarded to the injured party. The remedy they apply, however, is
not labeled "restoration," but rather "restitution," which suggests that
only those costs or losses that translate into a benefit to the breaching
party are recoverable. As Professor Perillo perceptively observed:
The harmful effect and, therefore, the failure of the un-
just enrichment theory as the basis of the entire law of quasi-
contract [i.e., restitution] is that it has inhibited, but not
killed, efforts by courts to restore the status quo ante to the
extent appropriate by requiring, where just, defendants to
compensate plaintiffs for expenditures under the contract
which have not been received by the defendant.... In short,
it tended to obscure the need to protect a party from unjust
impoverishment. 165
Some courts have responded to this problem by awarding as
much "other loss" as possible under the rubric of restitution. Their
efforts, however, do not succeed completely. An example is Caffey v.
Alabama Machinery & Supply Co.,' 6 6 in which the buyer of a machine
that failed to operate properly sued not only for restitution of the
amounts paid, but also for the costs of freight and transportation of
the machine, installation, efforts to make it work, and deterioration of
the sorghum crop that the machine should have processed. 167 Under
counts pleaded for "money had and received," the court allowed resti-
tution of the amount paid."6m It also awarded damages for the trans-
165. Perillo, supra note 26, at 1220. Professor Perillo also notes that the focus on unjust
enrichment as the basis of restitutionary remedies in contract tends to make the defend-
ant's enrichment the measure of the benefit conferred, rather than the fair value of the
plaintiff's performance. Id. As mentioned supra in the text accompanying note 147, courts
and commentators generally do recognize the latter as a legitimate measure of the restitu-
tion interest.
166. 96 So. 454 (Ala. Ct. App. 1922), cert. denied, 96 So. 459 (Ala. 1923).
167. Id. at 456.
168. Id.
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portation, installation, and testing costs.16 9 All of the latter costs were
clearly "other losses" that neither enriched, nor were incurred for the
benefit of, the seller. The court nevertheless treated them as "restitu-
tionary" by characterizing them as "in the nature of a part of the
purchase price."'70
Notwithstanding its generosity as to some items of "other loss,"
the Caffey court denied contractual recovery for others, namely the
deterioration of the crop and the installation of new equipment. 7 1
The court's rationale for refusing compensation of these losses was
that they "cannot in any sense be said to be a part of the purchase
money of the tractor, and, not being such, cannot be recovered in
these [restitutionary] counts [for money had and received]."172
In fact, the costs of transporting, installing, and testing the
machine-the losses that were compensated-were no more "benefi-
cial" to the seller than those that were not compensated-the losses
due to crop damage and the installation of new equipment. All of
these items clearly fell within the "other loss" component of the resto-
ration interest, in that compensation for them was necessary to restore
the plaintiff to the position he enjoyed prior to contract formation.
The concept of restitution alone is simply too inelastic to include im-
portant items of "other loss."
Another obstacle to compensation for "other loss" as part of the
restoration interest is the "election of remedies" doctrine. As applied
to remedies for breach of contract, the doctrine sometimes is stated as
a categorical prohibition against combining restitution with contract
damages. The theory is that restitutionary relief is an element of the
remedy of "rescission," 'x 1 while contract damages normally are associ-
ated with the expectation interest.174 Therefore, according to this
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. The plaintiff also sought and was denied damages for replacement equipment.
Id. Such a claim was part of the expectation interest, rather than the restoration interest.
172. Id. Although the court concluded that it was unable to compensate for the plain-
tiff's crop loss as a remedy for breach of contract, it held that it was able to compensate the
victim for the crop loss under a tort claim for misrepresentation. Id. at 458. As discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 201-222, to the extent the buyer's tort and contract
remedies sought to restore the status quo ante, they should have been essentially identical.
173. See supra Part I.D.1.
174. For example, in Kavarco v. TJ.E., Inc., 478 A.2d 257, 261 (Conn. 1984), the court
stated that "[t]o seek rescission is to waive any claim for damages arising from breach of a
contract." A North Carolina case took the election of remedies concept even farther: In
Industrial & Textile Piping, Inc. v. Industrial Rigging Servs., Inc., 317 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984), review denied, 321 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1984), the court confused restitution as a
measurement of damages for breach of contract with restitution (under the heading of
quantum meruit) as a basis for liability. The court treated quantum meruit as a remedy avail-
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theory, the plaintiff is entitled to elect a restitutionary or an expecta-
tion-based remedy, but cannot combine elements of both. Such state-
ments occasionally lead a court to exclude from contract damages
compensation for "other loss" that clearly is part of the restoration
interest. 175 Most courts, however, notwithstanding broad dicta about
the inconsistency of rescission and damages on the contract, correctly
understand that the purpose of the election doctrine is simply to
avoid allowing the injured party a double recovery.1 76 Thus, although
inconsistent theories may be pleaded and proved, 17 7 the judgment fi-
nally entered must not permit double recovery of the elements within
the expectation and the restoration interests. 178 But choosing to pro-
tect the restoration interest rather than expectation does not preclude
able only for breach of an implied contract. id. at 50. Therefore, the court reasoned that
once an express contract is formed, no implied contract covering the same subject matter
can exist, and thus recovery in quantum meruit is impermissible. Id Cf. Campbell v. Blount,
210 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975), in which an aggrieved building contractor was per-
mitted to recover in quantum mensit because the parties had abandoned the relevant por-
tions of their express contract in favor of an implied one. Id. at 516. The court noted,
however, that in general -[t] here cannot be an express and an implied contract for the
same thing existing at the same time. It is only when parties do not expressly agree that
the law interposes and raises a promise.'" Id. at 515 (quoting Concrete Co. v. Lumber Co.,
124 S.E.2d 905, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 1962)). The same reasoning was used in Siebler Heat-
ing & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Jenson, 326 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Neb. 1982), in which the
court denied recovery in quantum meruit to an injured, fully performing contractor. The
result in this case is explainable under the full performance rule.
175. An example occurs in Duksa v. City of Middletown, 472 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1984), in
which the court said that -'[a] definite election to rescind a contract is final and operates as
a waiver of the right to sue in damages.'" Id. at 7-8 (citation omitted) (quoting Haaser v.
A.C. Lehmann Co., 33 A.2d 135 (Conn. 1943)). The contract in that case granted the city
a sewer line easement over private property. Id at 2. The court ruled that the "rescission"
of a contract on account of the city's breach eliminated the land owner's right to conse-
quential damages. Id. at 8-9. The focus of the Duksa court's analysis was on whether a
promise to pay such damages was discharged when the contract was cancelled or could
stand on its own as a separate agreement. Id. at 4-6. The court rejected, at least implicitly,
the idea that those damages were recoverable even in the absence of an enforceable prom-
ise to pay them. See id ("[Ihfthe plaintiff could have proceeded on rescission, he could not
on this record also have had an award based in part on a recission theory and in part on a
Iseparate agreement' consequential damage theory."). See also Hepperly v. Bosch, 527
N.E.2d 533, 536-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (asserting that sellers of a house under an install-
ment contract, who were granted restitution of the property from a defaulting buyer, were
entitled to additional damages for injury to the property only if pleaded and proved as an
independent tort).
176. See, e.g., Head & Seamann v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), affd, 318
N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982); see also infra notes 208-219 and accompanying text.
177. See Walraven v. Martin, 333 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that the
trial court erred in forcing the purchaser of a cafe, who discovered that sewer construction
on the street would disrupt pedestrian and vehicular traffic and impede parking, to elect,
prior to trial, either expectation damages or rescission).
178. See id. at 574 ("We reiterate that, while plaintiff is entitled to complete relief, he is
not entitled to double recovery.").
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the recovery of damages for "other loss" in addition to straightforward
restitution.
1 79
Although the election of remedies doctrine has worked its full
share of mischief in cases involving the restoration interest, it does
raise a valid point. In determining the "other loss" component of the
restoration interest, one must avoid either double counting or omit-
ting an appropriate claim for relief. Suppose, for example, that an
accountant justifiably cancels a contract to provide accounting serv-
ices because of the wrongful interference of the client, who has not
yet paid for the services rendered. In calculating the accountant's res-
toration interest, the restitutionary component-the market value of
the services rendered-probably would include the normal overhead
and other expenditures the accountant incurred during the period of
contractual performance. The accountant might have an additional
claim for costs arising from the client's interference, however, such as
costs for preparations to perform under the contract. If those costs
are not reflected in the value of the performance rendered prior to
cancellation, then they fall within the "other loss" category of the res-
toration interest.180 An accurate calculation of the restoration interest
requires a determination of whether an incurred cost or loss is within
the scope of the restitution component of restoration or should be
added as an element of "other loss."181
2. Cases Correctly Perceiving the Role of Compensation for "Other
Loss. "--Many courts compensate for "other loss," readily going be-
yond restitution in order to reach the goal of returning the breach
victim to the status quo. An example is Sundie v. Lindsay,182 in which
the seller of a business sued for the return of $10,000, which had been
placed in escrow and identified as liquidated damages, when the
buyer wrongfully failed to close the transaction.18 The court affirmed
179. See id. at 572 (declaring that the purchaser is entitled to consequential damages in
addition to restitution, as long as double recovery is not awarded).
180. This statement is true assuming that these costs satisfy the normal limitations on
contract damages. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 220-222.
181. It also is important to distinguish between losses that belong to some element of
the restoration interest and those that do not. Suppose the accountant claimed damages
based on the lost opportunity to work for someone else. The inclusion of lost opportuni-
ties in the restoration interest tends to merge it into the expectation interest, particularly
where a functioning market exists. See supra note 17. Lost opportunities therefore gener-
ally are considered an element of expectation, not restoration. Courts generally recognize
and respect this distinction, particularly when the claim is for lost profits. See PALMER, supra
note 34, § 4.8, at 434-36.
182. 166 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
183. Id. at 153.
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a lower court ruling that the agreed sum constituted a "penalty" and
therefore could not be claimed by the seller.14 The court went on to
say, however, that the seller was entitled to choose "damages that will
put him in the same position as he was immediately prior to making
the agreement" 18 5 as an alternative to expectation-based relief. Those
damages included the expenses of preparing to perform, such as fees
paid to an attorney to arrange the transaction prior to the buyer's
breach. 8 6 Those fees obviously were not part of the seller's restitu-
tion interest.1
8 7
In CBS, Inc. v. Merrick,"'8 a television network sued a producer
who breached a contract for the production of a television series.1 9
The network sought the protection of its restoration interest by claim-
ing restitution of the sum paid to the producer himself as well as com-
pensation for "other losses," consisting of payments to third parties-a
director and a screenwriter.190 The court reversed the trial court's
denial of "reliance damages" for the latter payments.' 91 The Merrick
court noted that, although recovery may be limited to restitution
when a contract "is illegal or void from its inception,"1 92 a party in-
jured by a material breach of contract is entitled to recover the addi-
tional amounts the injured party spent in reliance on the contract.1 9 3
Similarly, in Miller-Piehl Equipment Co. v. Gibson Commission Co., 19 4
the seller of a grain storage bin promised the buyer that a government
"Storage Guarantee Agreement" would be awarded to him.' When
the government guarantee was not forthcoming, the buyer cancelled
the agreement.1 96 The seller sued for the contract price and the
184. Id. at 154.
185. Id. at 153. The court obviously was well aware that the election of remedies doc-
trine precluded only simultaneous protection of both the restoration and expectation in-
terests. Id.
186. Id.
187. The decision in Sundie was followed by Plantation Key Developers v. Colonial Mort-
gage Co., 589 F.2d 164, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (permitting a developer to recover from a
lender both a fee and a commission it had paid to a broker who had located the lender, in
response to the lender's breach of its commitment to make loans available to the purchas-
ers of a condominium).
188. 716 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983).
189. Id. at 1294.
190. Id. at 1295-96.
191. Id. at 1296.
192. Id.
193. Id ("A party injured by a breach of contract may recover both restitution and reli-
ance damages.").
194. 56 N.W.2d 25 (Iowa 1952).
195. Id at 26.
196. Id.
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buyer counterclaimed for the expenses incurred in installing a con-
crete slab for the bin.197 The court held that the seller's failure to
procure the guarantee entitled the buyer to "rescind."19 The court
then ruled that the buyer's counterclaim should have been allowed
because "[a] purchaser who has rightfully rescinded such a contract
may demand the complete restoration of the status quo which in-
cludes the return of any expenditure made by him which was contem-
plated by the contract." '99
The goal of restoring the victim to the status quo ante, so clearly
reflected in Miller-Pieh4 is also a part of the standard damages remedy
for tort actions, which aim to compensate the victim for harm caused
by the defendant.2 °° The baseline against which harm is measured in
tort is the plaintiffs position prior to the defendant's wrongful act or
omission. The baseline in contract is the breach victim's position
prior to contract formation. Given this similarity of remedial purpose,
it is not surprising that useful illustrations of the restoration interest
arise from an important intersection of contract and tort: cases in
197. Id. at 27.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 29. Several other courts have awarded "other loss" in connection with restitu-
tion or rescission as a remedy for breach. See Potter v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Iowa
1988) (allowing an injured purchaser of real property to recover miscellaneous expenses
for closing the transaction and relocating, in addition to restitution of installment pay-
ments, taxes, and improvements); United Engine Co. v. Junis, 195 N.W. 606, 608 (Iowa
1923) (permitting the buyer of an engine and generators, on a breach of warranty, to
rescind the contract and still demand payment for installment costs); Harris v. Metropoli-
tan Mall, 334 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Wis. 1983) (permitting the plaintiff in a case involving the
sale and leaseback of a shopping mall to recover out-of-pocket expenses in addition to
amounts paid to defendants).
In Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374 (1979), a manufacturer
broke its promise to give a distributor exclusive access to a certain territory. Id, at 177, 399
A.2d at 1379. The court held that this breach gave the distributor justification for cancel-
ling the contract and seeking damages. Id. The plaintiff sought to recover the $2500 he
had paid to the manufacturer for the distributorship. ld. at 175, 399 A.2d at 1377. He also
sought compensation for the salary he would have earned from the employment he had
given up in order to take the new position. I. at 184, 399 A.2d at 1382. The court con-
ceived of the remedy in terms of the plaintiff's traditional reliance interest and struggled
with the question whether the lost salary constituted an element of reliance. Id. Although
conceding that "[t]he forfeiture of an occupation in which one earns steady compensation
does not fit neatly within" the reliance category, the court awarded compensation. Id, If
the plaintiff's recovery were considered under the rubric of restoration, which more accu-
rately describes it, then compensation for lost wages would be a routine instance of "other
loss," which accompanies the restitution of the fee paid to the manufacturer and the dis-
charge of the plaintiffs executory obligations to perform under the contract.
200. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20
(5th ed. 1984) ("A recognized need for compensation is ... a powerful factor influencing
tort law.").
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which the defendant makes a fraudulent misrepresentation during
the formation of the contract.
The law governing remedies for such misrepresentation tends to
be confused and conflicting because of the concurrent application of
tort and contract bases of liability.2" The cases indicate, however,
that the remedial alternatives for tortious misrepresentation are essen-
tially the same as for material breach of contract.20 2 Damages may be
based on the benefit of the bargain-in essence, forward-looking, ex-
pectation damages. 20 ' Alternatively, the victim may claim the net
value of what has been lost in the transaction, which is essentially the
restoration interest.2 4 A number of opinions suggest that in cases of
misrepresentation in contract formation, either the victim of the
fraud or the court may choose one of these measures. 20 5 When the
201. Id. § 105, at 727-29 (discussing both the tort and the contract-warranty causes of
action for misrepresentation).
202. See, e.g., Kincaid Enters., Inc. v. Porter, 812 S.W.2d 892, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
("It is well to understand that a claim for breach of contract and a claim for fraudulent
inducement to make that contract are not inconsistent remedies."). Note that this compar-
ison leaves aside the additional possibility of punitive damages when the action sounds in
tort. See, e.g., Four "S" Alliance, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 432 N.E.2d 1213,
1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (upholding the trial court's award of punitive damages for fraudu-
lent misrepresentations in a gasoline service station lease).
203. See, e.g., Four "S" Alliance, Inc., 432 N.E.2d at 1216 ("A benefit-of-the-bargain
formula for damages is proper in an action for fraud."); Porter, 812 S.W.2d at 900 (measur-
ing damages both for fraud and for breach of contract as "the benefits and gain [the victim]
would have made under the contract had its terms been performed, and indeed had it
been intended to be performed"); Radford v. JJ.B. Enters., Ltd., 472 N.W.2d 790, 795
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (awarding defrauded boat buyers both the "benefit of the bargain"
and their consequential damages); Naranjo v. Paull, 803 P.2d 254, 263 (N.M. Ct. App.
1990) (concluding that "benefit of the bargain" damages, if properly computed, are avail-
able for fraud).
204. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3343(a) (West 1991) ("One defrauded in the purchase, sale or
exchange of property is entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that
with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received,
together with any additional damage arising from the particular transaction."); Hughes v.
Consolidated-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 615 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that under
Pennsylvania law, the proper measure of damages for fraud is the fair market value of the
property when sold minus the fraudulently paid price), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2300 (1992);
Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Cook, 821 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Ark. 1991) (affirming trial court's judg-
ment awarding out-of-pocket expenses for fraud damages); Miles Homes Div., Insilco
Corp. v. Smith, 790 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) ("The proper measure of dam-
ages for fraud at common law is the difference between the value of that which he has
parted with and received."); Tuchalski v. Moczynski, 449 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Wis. 1989) (in-
dicating that defrauded parties may recover their amount of actual loss).
205. See United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 203-04 (D.NJ.
1955) (selecting sua sponte in a federal False Claims Act case "what measure of damages
would most clearly do justice between the parties"); Turnbull v. LaRose, 702 P.2d 1331,
1336 (Alaska 1985) ("A plaintiff should have the opportunity to use either measure .... ");
Rice v. Price, 164 N.E.2d 891, 895-96 (Mass. 1960) (noting that a fraud victim may choose
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restoration measure is chosen, damages include a return of the value
conferred upon the defendant, in addition to such "other losses" as
can be proved. 20 6 The remedial goal of the backward-looking remedy
thus is the same whether the harm was caused by a falsehood at forma-
tion or by a failure to perform as promised.20 7 Therefore, it is appro-
priate to look to misrepresentation cases for examples of courts
protecting the restoration interest.
The fraud case of Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg2°s provides a
clear illustration. In Gregg, the plaintiff sold its house under an install-
ment contract and later sought to repossess the house when the de-
fendant buyer defaulted. The defendant had falsely represented to
the plaintiff that she had equity in another house that she was plan-
ning to sell and that she would pay over the net proceeds of that sale
to the plaintiff.2 9 The plaintiff sought not only recovery of the prop-
erty, but also damages to compensate for the property's rental value
while in defendant's possession and for out-of-pocket expenditures
made to repair damage done by the defendant.210 The trial court had
granted rescission of the contract, but had denied all other damages.
The trial court reached that result by concluding that the election of
remedies doctrine renders disaffirmance of the contract and rescis-
sion inconsistent with affirmance and damages.2 1  The court of ap-
peals agreed with the trial court that the purpose of the election
doctrine was to avoid inconsistent remedies. 212 The appellate court
disagreed with the trial court that disaffirmance and rescission neces-
the measure of damages, subject to adequate proof of damages); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 104
A.2d 54, 56-57 (N.J. 1954) (holding that the court may choose the measure of damages as
justice requires); Selman v. Shirley, 85 P.2d 384, 393-94 (Or. 1938) (concluding that, un-
less "content with recovery" of actual loss, the defrauded party may elect recovery under
the benefit-of-the-bargain rule); Martin v. Brown, 566 So. 2d 890, 891-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that either of the two measures of recovery for fraud "may be used to do
justice as the circumstances demand"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 200, § 110, at 767-70
(debating the merits of various court decisions applying either the benefit-of-the-bargain
or out-of-pocket measures in misrepresentation tort actions).
206. KEETON ET AL., supra note 200, § 110, at 769.
207. See CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A party may rescind
a contract if there was fraud in the inception or if there was a substantial breach.").
208. 311 N.W.2d 667 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), aft'd 318 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982).
209. Id. at 668.
210. Id The defendant had made no payments to the plaintiff, and so had no restitutio-
nary claim of her own.
211. Id
212. Id. The court declined to abolish the election of remedies doctrine altogether,
choosing instead to limit it to its proper role of preventing inconsistent recoveries. In
Gregg, the effect of the election doctrine was "'to prevent a defrauded party from both
repudiating the contract and then suing on it only to gain the benefit of the bargain.'" Id at
672 (quotingJennings v. Lee, 461 P.2d 161, 167 (Ariz. 1969)). In other words, the court of
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sarily are inconsistent with affirmance and damages, however.2 13 In-
stead, the court of appeals considered the purpose of the remedy
being granted to the plaintiff, concluding that the ultimate goal was
the restoration of the status quo ante.214 Accordingly, the court held
that the remedy must include "restorative damages,"215 consisting of
fair rental value and other expenses, because such damages "work to-
gether [with restitution] 216 to restore the injured party to his precon-
tract position."217 In its brief affirming opinion, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover "out-of-
pocket expenses.., even if the expenses do not directly benefit the
purchaser, as long as they do not constitute a double recovery." 218 In
other words, the plaintiffs full restoration interest was protected.1 9
appeals found that the seller was not entitled to simultaneous protection of the restoration
and expectation interests.
213. Id, at 673 ("[Rlescission and restorative damages are consistent remedies which
work together to restore the injured party to his precontractual position.").
214. Id
215. Id.
216. Although the court refers to the restitutionary remedy as "rescission," id., it is clear
from the context that to the court "rescission" meant the restitution or restoring of the
property to the sellers. See id. at 669 ("Rescission is always coupled with restitution: the
parties return the money, property or other benefits so as to restore each other to the
position they were in prior to the transaction.").
217. 1I at 673.
218. Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 318 N.W.2d 381, 382 (Wis. 1982).
219. For additional fraud cases illustrating the role of "other loss" damages in the resto-
ration interest, see Mock v. Duke, 174 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (allowing both
restitution of the purchase price of property sold on the basis of a false representation that
a water well drilled on the property would produce sufficient water for domestic use and
reimbursement of drilling costs expended by the defrauded purchaser); Garbark v. New-
man, 51 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Neb. 1952) (permitting a defrauded buyer of a used automobile
to recover as damages the costs of attempted repairs in addition to restitution of the
purchase price); Maurice v. Chaffin, 241 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Ark. 1951) (allowing a buyer of
a truck to recover from a seller, who misrepresented the truck's condition, costs expended
for repair in addition to the restitution of the purchase price).
The Garbark case was criticized in Authorized Supply Co. v. Swift & Co., 271 F.2d 242,
246-47 (9th Cir. 1959), but only on the basis of the now-discredited interpretation of the
election of remedies doctrine, the same interpretation that the court in Gregg rejected. It is
possible that an undercurrent of punishment for wrongdoing, and not merely of compen-
sation for harm, is implicit in the tort cases even when punitive damages are not formally at
issue. For an example of a case awarding restoration damages upon concurrent findings of
fraud and breach of contract, in which a punitive tone is clearly evident, see DeRosa v.
Boston Bakery & Italian Food Specialty, Inc. (In re DeRosa), 98 B.R. 644, 648-49 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1989) (ordering recission of a franchise agreement on the basis of substantial
breach of contract); DeRosa v. Boston Bakery & Italian Food Specialty, Inc. (In re DeRosa),
103 B.R. 382, 384-86, 388 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989) (again ordering recission of the franchise
agreement and awarding damages on the basis of negligent and intentional
misrepresentation).
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Compensation for "other loss," whether arising in the context of
a claim for breach of contract or a claim for fraud, is subject to the
important limitations applicable to contract damages generally.
When the claim is characterized as contractual, these limitations are
stated in terms of the familiar trio of avoidability, foreseeability, and
certainty.220 When the tort rubric is used, foreseeability and proxi-
mate cause limit recovery.22' It is unlikely, however, that the differ-
ences in the terms used often will lead to differences in the quantum
of damages. Indeed, it is frequently unclear from the cases whether
the wrongdoer's conduct is necessarily or properly characterized as
tortious fraud rather than as contractual breach of warranty.2 2 In any
event, potential differences between tort and contract in this context
do not belie the essential unity of the restoration interest protected.
C. Discharge as a Means of Protecting the Restoration Interest
The restoration interest frequently is protected in a form that
tends to be invisible. Assume a contract for the provision of consult-
ing services. The services are to begin in two months, with payments
to be made at thirty-day intervals thereafter. Before performance be-
gins, the supplier wrongfully repudiates the contract. If the cost of
replacing the supplier's services exceeds the contract price, then the
recipient probably will seek expectation damages. But suppose the
supplier's services can be replaced on the market for less than the
recipient had agreed to pay. In that event, she simply will cancel the
contract, and the parties' relationship will end.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. For a case applying these limitations to
restoration damages, see CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 188-193, in which the court noted that on remand the trial
court would be required to apply the avoidability ("mitigation") and foreseeability limita-
tions to the amount of "other losses" recoverable by CBS. Id. at 1296. Likewise, in Planta-
tion Key Developers v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 1979), the court
cited the venerable case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), to support
the proposition that damages for "other loss" are recoverable only if the injury was reason-
ably foreseeable. On the application of the avoidability limitation to restitutionary recov-
eries, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. e (1979) (explaining that the
restitution interest does not include "performances that a party has rendered following a
repudiation by the other party").
221. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 200, § 110, at 767 (reiterating that damages for fraud-
ulent misrepresentation are limited to those proximately caused by the fraudulent conduct
and reasonably foreseeable).
222. See Garbark v. Newman, 51 N.W.2d 315 (Neb. 1952) (discussing misrepresentation
regarding a used automobile in terms of both fraud and breach of warranty); cf Mock v.
Duke, 174 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that it was error for the trial court
to grant recission of a contract for the sale of land without also considering the plaintiff's
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and damages arising therefrom).
THE RESTORATION INTEREST
The restoration interest is protected in such a case of cancella-
tion. Under the facts presented, the recipient is no worse off econom-
ically than before she entered the contract. She therefore has no
restitution interest, nor has she suffered any "other loss." To return
her to the legal status quo ante, however, requires a discharge of her
obligation to pay the contract price. Under the material breach doc-
trine, she is empowered to obtain that discharge unilaterally and with-
out judicial action simply by declaring the contract at an end.223 Had
she paid some of the price in advance or had the breach caused her
some "other loss" she might have needed the court's help to get com-
pensation for those harms. But even in that event, the discharge of
her duty to pay would be part of her restoration interest.
As a general matter, the discharge of executory obligations to
perform under the contract is an element of the restoration interest.
The formation of a contract necessarily involves the conferring of ben-
efits between the parties. Those benefits consist of consensual, execu-
tory rights and duties-the obligations of which contracts are made.
Even if conditional, those obligations represent a departure from the
legal status quo. They are a form of "legal cost" incurred by the par-
ties concerned. If all goes well, at some point executory obligations
will be replaced by executed performance, meaning that legal costs
will have been converted to economic ones. The discussion in Parts
II.A and II.B has shown that restitution and compensation for "other
losses" must be combined with general restitution to restore the eco-
nomic status quo. But the restoration remedy is not complete until
the legal status quo also is restored. That is the function of discharge.
Under the common law material breach doctrine, discharge oc-
curs through the action of the injured party alone when that party
cancels the contract.224 Sometimes, however, the injured party will
seek or require judicial action in the discharge of executory duties as a
part of the court's protection of the restoration interest. Maurice v.
Chaffin 221 provides an example. In Maurice, the buyer of a truck sued
the seller for fraudulently misrepresenting its condition.2 6 The court
affirmed a trial court judgment that had protected the buyer's restora-
223. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.15, at 634 (discussing the material breach doc-
trine and the power to terminate the contract). Discharge of executory obligations also is
central to expectation damages. The purpose of expectation damages is to give the in-
jured party the economic equivalent of full performance. A discharge eliminates all re-
maining executory duties, replacing them with an immediate claim for their equivalent in
money. Andersen, Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1102-03.
224. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
225. 241 S.W.2d 257 (Ark. 1951).
226. Id,
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tion interest in three ways: by ordering the seller to return the buyer's
vehicle, which had been taken in trade for the truck (restitution); by
ordering the seller to pay damages to reimburse the buyer's expenses
in trying to repair the truck ("other loss"); and-of interest here-by
cancelling the promissory note and mortgage given by the buyer to
secure payment of the remainder of the purchase price (dis-
charge) .227 The cancellation of the buyer's executory obligation was
essential to protecting his restoration interest.
A discharge of the breach victim's executory duties does not af-
fect the dollar amount of restoration damages. But recognizing dis-
charge as an element of restoration is nonetheless important. As will
be illustrated by some of the hypothetical cases discussed in Part III,
focusing on the discharge element helps one recognize cases in which
the restoration interest is being protected, especially those in which a
party is permitted simply to walk away from a contract. Absent an un-
derstanding of the role of discharge, it may appear that no remedy at
all has been given.
D. Conclusion
Restitution, compensation for "other loss," and discharge of exec-
utory duties combine to constitute the restoration interest. The pur-
pose of protecting that interest is to return the injured party to the
precontractual position by compensating for detrimental changes in
that position-both economic and legal-occurring on account of
the contract, subject to the limitations of avoidability, foreseeability,
and certainty. The restoration interest stands as the alternative to ex-
pectation, which seeks to replicate the economic equivalent of full
performance-subject to those same limitations. The explicit recog-
nition of the restoration interest brings into focus the available reme-
dial choices when a contract has been breached. With the alternatives
made clear, the next problem is to understand how the expectation
and restoration interests operate together as part of an integrated re-
gime of contract damages.
227. Id. at 257. See also Caffey v. Alabama Mach. & Supply Co., 96 So. 454, 455-56 (Ala.
Ct. App. 1922) (holding that a buyer was entitled to rescind a contract entered on the basis
of fraudulent misrepresentation or following breach of warranty and that executory prom-
issory notes made to seller also could be cancelled), cert. denied, 96 So. 459 (Ala. 1923).
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III. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING AVAILABILITY OF THE RESTORATION
INTEREST
With few exceptions, a breach victim is always entitled to at least
expectation damages. 28 A demand for restoration damages in excess
of expectation requires justification. Although the problem does not
arise often, restoration in excess of expectation is claimed with suffi-
cient frequency to require a stable set of principles to govern its use.
More importantly, the cases in which restoration exceeds expectation
provide an opportunity to analyze the relationship between these two
interests as constituent elements of the larger regime of contract rem-
edies. That analysis sheds light on issues broader than the proper res-
olution of claims for restoration greater than expectation. In
particular, it clarifies the theoretical underpinnings for the commonly
applied doctrine of restitution for a party in breach.
This Part of the Article argues that two principles should govern
the competing demands of expectation and restoration, each arising
from a different set of contract law concerns. 2 9 The first is referred
to as the certainty principle. It is rooted in the same policy that sustains
the certainty limitation on a breach victim's expectation damages. 230
The certainty principle places upon the breaching party the burden of
proving with reasonable certainty that the victim's restoration interest
exceeds his expectation interest. If the breacher is unable to make
that showing, then the injured party will be entitled to restoration
damages because that measure of relief is deemed to comply with the
general rule that at least expectation damages are recoverable.
The second principle governing the expectation-restoration rela-
tionship is the extent-of-benefit principle. It is based on the idea that as
the performance of the contract unfolds, the parties become commit-
ted not only to the benefits, but also to the risks, of the bargain they
struck. In particular, as the contract moves from executory to exe-
cuted, the injured party no longer is permitted to escape the losses
that full performance would have caused. Commitment to the risks of
228. As noted supra in note 48, occasionally there may be cases in which the courts
conclude that only a lesser measure of damages is allowed. When some element of the
victim's expectation interest fails the test of avoidability, foreseeability, or certainty, one
might argue that the full expectation interest is not protected. The better view, however, is
that those tests help define that interest so that an award limited by them does not violate
the expectation principle.
229. In addition to the two principles discussed here, it remains a requirement that no
further performance will be rendered under the contract. See supra text accompanying
notes 56-60. The granting of restitution and the discharge entailed by the protection of
the restoration interest obviously are inconsistent with further performance.
230. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.15 (discussing this principle).
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the contract is represented by the expectation interest. Escape from
those risks is represented by restoration. Thus, as performance un-
folds, the injured party becomes increasingly limited by the expecta-
tion interest, and access to restoration decreases correspondingly.
For purposes of this analysis, the unfolding of contract perform-
ance is measured by the extent to which the benefits of the supplier's
performance are available to the recipient. The extent of the recipi-
ent's performance, which generally consists of the payment of money,
is not controlling. No matter which party is in breach, therefore, the
injured party will be limited to expectation damages to the degree
that the recipient can enjoy the benefits of the supplier's perform-
ance. To the degree that that is not so, the breach victim will be enti-
tled to "back out" of the contract economically through an award of
restoration damages. Applying the extent-of-benefit principle in prac-
tice requires resort to the venerable tool of contract divisibility, which
must be applied with sensitivity to the goals it serves in this context.
In analyzing a given case, resort to the certainty principle should
precede application of the extent-of-benefit principle. A conclusion
in favor of restoration under the certainty principle means that the
matter may be treated as if expectation damages equal or exceed res-
toration damages. Because a breach victim always is free to seek dam-
ages at or below the level of expectation, that treatment in principle
avoids the issue of damages in excess of the expectation interest.
When it becomes clear that the restoration recovery exceeds expecta-
tion damages, however, that issue must be confronted. The extent-of-
benefit principle resolves it.
A. The Certainty Principle
A standard element of the law governing expectation damages
for breach is that the injured party's loss must be proved with reason-
able certainty.23 Normally, the burden of making that showing rests
with the injured party.2 32 An instructive example involves a supplier,
such as a building contractor, who is wrongfully fired after partially
performing under the contract. The builder normally seeks expecta-
tion damages, which consist of the cost of his part performance until
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 352 (1979) ("Damages are not recover-
able for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable
certainty."); see also U.C.C. § 1-106 cmt. 1 (1993) ("Compensatory damages are often at best
approximate: they have to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts
permit, but no more.").
232. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.15, at 921 (discussing the imposition of the
.onerous burden" on the injured party).
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the time of the breach, plus the profits he would have earned had the
job been completed.2 3  The partially performing builder usually will
have no difficulty proving the reliance element of his claim with ade-
quate certainty because it consists of expenditures and costs already
incurred. 34 He may, however, have difficulty proving with sufficient
certainty that he would have earned a profit.235 As a result, the
builder may fail to recover damages for the profits he would have
earned under the contract. If his proof of profit is sufficiently weak,
he might even choose to ignore that element of his expectation dam-
ages claim, putting forward only the reliance claim. His expectation-
based recovery thus would consist of the costs of his performance up
to the time of the owner's breach.
In some cases, the law shifts the certainty burden to the party in
breach.2 36 Suppose that the owner argues that the builder would have
lost money had he been permitted to finish the job and that the cost-
of-performance element of his expectation damages should be re-
duced by the extent of that loss. If such a loss is proved, then the
builder's damages will be reduced accordingly. 237 According to the
Second Restatement 238 and the case law,23 9 it will be the owner who
233. Assuming the builder suffered no losses other than the unpaid portion of the con-
tract price and could not salvage any of the costs expended in part performance, the cost
of partial performance plus expected profit would be an accurate measure of his expecta-
tion interest. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.10, at 884-86.
234. Strictly speaking, some of the builder's reliance costs may be measured in restitutio-
nary terms, such as the costs of his time and use of his own equipment. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-161.
235. The certainty limitation on damages has become relatively relaxed in recent years.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.15, at 921-23. In addition, the drafters of the Second
Restatement argued that doubts should be resolved against the breaching party. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a (1979). Nevertheless, to the extent that the
victim is unable to satisfy the certainty test, as when a claim for lost profits is considered too
speculative, recovery may be denied.
236. See, e.g., Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("The
burden of proving loss in event of performance properly rests on the defendant who by its
wrong has made the question relevant to the rights of the plaintiffs."). See also infra note
239, citing cases.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 349 (1979).
238. See iUt (entitling breach victim to reliance damages "less any loss that the party in
breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the
contract been performed") (emphasis added). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 12.20,
at 950-52 (discussing the shift in burden to the breaching owner to prove, with reasonable
certainty, a negative "profit" term).
239. See, e.g., L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1949)
(maintaining that a breaching seller bears the burden of proving that the enterprise in
which buyer was to use the goods would have incurred a loss); In re Yeager Co., 227 F.
Supp. 92, 98-100 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (holding that a defendant department store whose
bankruptcy caused a breach of contract bore the burden of proving that a partnership
selling goods through the store would have suffered losses had the contract been per-
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bears the burden of proving that loss with reasonable certainty.
Should she fail to do so, the contractor will be entitled to recover his
costs of performance just as if the expectation interest-the presump-
tive limit on recovery-would not be exceeded thereby.
Placing the burden of certainty on the breaching party in such
cases serves as authority for, and indeed sometimes can be character-
ized as an illustration of, the proposition that if the party in breach
cannot prove with reasonable certainty that restoration exceeds expec-
tation, then the former remedy should be allowed. As discussed
above, 4 ° the reliance interest is understood conventionally as being
capped by the expectation interest. Absent that cap the reliance inter-
est, if defined broadly to include "other loss" and combined with the
discharge of executory obligations, becomes the restoration interest-
that is, within the normal limitations on contract damages, it restores
the victim of the breach to the status quo ante.
Perhaps the best known statement of the rationale for placing on
the breaching party the burden of proving that restoration damages
would exceed expectation relief is given in L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong
Rubber Co.24 In Armstrong Rubber Co., the buyer of machinery sued to
recover the cost of construction necessary to prepare for equipment
to be delivered by the seller.242 The seller's delivery was unjustifiably
tardy. 4 Meanwhile, the market for the goods the machinery was to
produce-"refined" or recycled rubber-collapsed due to the end of
World War 11.244 Expectation damages for the buyer in such a case
formed); Gruber, 126 F. Supp. at 446 (concluding that a distributor of Christmas cards bore
the burden of proving that the manufacturer would have incurred losses had distributor
not breached its duty to perform with due diligence); Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co.,
431 A.2d 569, 579 (D.C. 1981) (requiring a general contractor that materially breached to
prove that a subcontractor would have suffered losses if permitted to complete perform-
ance); Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 53 Md. App. 656, 662-63, 456 A.2d 82, 86-87
(1983) (maintaining that a law firm that breached its contract to incorporate a company so
that it would be legally authorized to sell shares of stock to the public bore the burden of
proving that the company would have incurred losses on such a venture); Dialist Co. v.
Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 182, 399 A.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1979) (asserting that although a
distributor whose supplier breached an exclusivity arrangement "should not be permitted
to escape the consequences of a bad bargain by falling back on his reliance interest.... the
burden of proving that performance would have resulted in a loss . . . should be on the
party breaching the contract"); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637, 638-39
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the breaching service company failed to support its
burden of proving both the fact and the extent of losses that would have been suffered by
the freight company).
240. See supra Part I.C.1.
241. 178 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1949).
242. Id at 184, 188.
243. Id at 186.
244. Id.
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ordinarily would include the costs of preparatory construction plus
the lost profits that the buyer could prove with reasonable certainty.245
It was doubtful, however, that there would have been any profits at
all.246 Indeed, the seller claimed that the buyer would have suffered a
loss and argued that the amount of the loss should be deducted from
the preparation-costs component of the buyer's damages.2 47 The
court, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, responded as follows:
In cases where the venture would have proved profitable to
the promisee, there is no reason why he should not recover
his expenses. On the other hand, on those occasions in
which the performance would not have covered the prom-
isee's outlay, such a result [i.e., permitting the recovery of
reliance damages] imposes the risk of the promisee's con-
tract upon the promisor. We cannot agree that the prom-
isor's default in performance should under this guise make
him an insurer of the promisee's venture; yet it does not fol-
low that the breach should not throw upon him the duty of
showing that the value of the performance would have been
less than the promisee's outlay. It is often very hard to learn
what the value of the performance would have been; and it is
a common expedient, and a just one, in such situations to
put the peril of the answer upon that party who by his wrong
has made the issue relevant to the rights of the other. On
principle therefore the proper solution would seem to be
that the promisee may recover his outlay in preparation for
the performance, subject to the privilege of the promisor to
reduce it by as much as he can show that the promisee would
have lost, if the contract had been performed.2 48
The buyer in Armstrong Rubber Co. had not yet paid the purchase
price.249 Thus, the restoration interest consisted solely of the "other
loss" incurred in preparing to receive the promised machinery, and of
the discharge of the buyer's executory obligation to pay the price. 5 °
Given the seller's present inability to prove that the remedy sought
245. Id. at 189.
246. Id. at 188.
247. Id at 189.
248. Id.
249. See it, at 184 (stating that the seller first had brought an action against the buyer for
nonpayment of the contract price).
250. Id. at 188. The court expressly discharged the buyer's duty to pay by ruling that the
buyer effectively and rightfully had rejected the portion of the goods that were delivered
and cancelled the contract, thus giving the buyer a defense against the seller's action for
the price. It at 185-88.
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would exceed the expectation interest, the court granted restoration
damages.251
The Armstrong Rubber Co. court's argument for placing on the
breaching party the burden of proving that restoration would exceed
expectation invites scrutiny. The court emphasized that the need to
measure damages had arisen because of the seller's breach, so the
seller ought to bear the burden of proof that the damages claimed
were excessive.252 A close reading of the quoted language, however,
shows that the injured buyer already had satisfied the normal burden
of proof as to the damages claimed. The buyer had established the
amount of its "outlay," which on these facts equalled the dollar
amount of the restoration interest. The court's rationale, stated in
terms of the certainty principle, might be generalized as follows.
The breach victim normally bears the burden of proving the fact
of breach and the extent of damages. As far as damages are con-
cerned, that burden includes convincing the judge or jury of all facts
necessary to satisfy the standards of avoidability, foreseeability, and
certainty. 253 The victim is entitled to prove damages measured by
either the expectation or the restoration interest. The inquiry ends if
the victim chooses the former and succeeds in making the proof, be-
cause a breach victim always is entitled to the protection of the expec-
tation interest. If the victim claims and proves restoration, however,
the breaching party still has a possible defense: that restoration dam-
ages exceed the expectation interest. The law places on the default-
ing party the burden of establishing that fact with reasonable
certainty. 254 If the breaching party fails to meet the burden, then it is
presumed that restoration damages do not exceed the expectation
251. Id. at 191 (awarding the buyer restoration damages subject to the seller's ability to
prove in a future hearing the amount that the buyer would have lost if the contract had
been performed).
252. Id. at 189.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22 and 220-222.
254. The breaching party's burden of proving with certainty that the victim's expecta-
tion interest is less than his restoration interest may be higher than the victim's certainty
burden in establishing the restoration interest initially. As to the victim, the certainty bar-
rier has been relatively relaxed in recent years. See FARNSwORTH, supra note 5, § 12.15, at
921-23. This relaxation perhaps has occurred in part because, as recommended by the
drafters of the Second Restatement, doubts should be resolved against the breaching party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 352 cmt. a (1979). Resolving doubts against the
breaching party may have the effect of increasing the showing that party must make when
it bears the substantive burden of proving certainty.
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cap, and the injured party's proved restoration damages are
allowed.255
A number of cases have expressly accepted the analysis of the cer-
tainty principle applied in Armstrong Rubber Co. 256 Others do so im-
plicitly, but unmistakably. For example, in Blake Construction Co. v. C.J
Coakley Co., 257 a general contractor materially breached the contract
by interfering with a subcontractor's performance and by failing to
reassure the subcontractor that compensation would be given for such
problems in the future. 25s The court noted that the breach victim's
costs of performance clearly would have exceeded the price payable
under the original subcontract. 259 The subcontract had been "signifi-
cantly amended,"26" however, by change orders and by the breaching
party's "mode of performance";261 consequently, the precise amount
that would have been payable to the victim under the subcontract was
unclear. 262 The court considered whether the subcontractor's recov-
ery of its expenses should be reduced by losses it might have suffered
255. Even if the breaching party can prove that restoration damages exceed the expecta-
tion cap, the matter is not necessarily concluded in that party's favor; rather, it proceeds to
the analysis under the extent-of-benefit principle, as discussed in Part III.C.
256. E.g., In re Yeager, 227 F. Supp. 92, 98-100 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (concluding that a
department store whose bankruptcy caused a breach of contract bears the burden of prov-
ing that a partnership selling goods through the store would have suffered losses had the
contract been performed); Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(holding that a distributor of Christmas cards bears the burden of proof that a manufac-
turer would have incurred losses had the distributor not breached its duty to perform with
due diligence); Michael Del Balso, Inc. v. Carozza, 136 F.2d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ("It
does not lie, however, in the mouth of the party, who has. .. wrongfully put an end to the
contract, to say that the party injured has not been damaged at least to the amount of what
he has been induced fairly and in good faith to lay out and expend (including his own
services) ... .") (quoting United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 340 (1884)); Dialist Co. v.
Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 182, 399 A.2d 1374, 1381 (1979) ("[W]here the breach has pre-
vented an anticipated gain and, at the same time, made proof of the consequential loss
difficult, the burden of proving that performance would have resulted in a loss... should
be on the party breaching the contract."); Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd., 53
Md. App. 656, 662-63, 456 A.2d 82, 86-87 (1983) (holding that a law firm that breached a
contract to complete the incorporation of a company so that the company would be legally
authorized to sell shares to the public bears burden of proving that the company would
have incurred losses on its venture); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637, 638-
39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the reliance damages of a freight company whose
contract was cancelled wrongfully should be reduced by the amount of any losses that the
breaching party can prove that the plaintiff would have suffered if the contract had been
performed).
257. 431 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1981).
258. Id. at 573-77.
259. Id. at 579.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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under the "amended" amount due.263 Ultimately, the court awarded
the subcontractor its full costs of performance, thereby protecting the
restoration interest and placing on the general contractor the burden
of showing that the expectation interest had been exceeded.264 The
court explained that "[a] court will not salvage a contracting party
from the consequences of a losing contract."26" But where the
amended subcontract "gave no means of calculating an ascertainable
profit margin, and in fact seemed to indicate that there was none, the
formula for the measure of damages was the cost of work actually per-
formed, less any progress payments [the victim] received."266
Although the court did not frame the issue in terms of the general
contractor bearing the burden of proving with reasonable certainty
that restoration damages exceeded expectation, such a showing by
that party evidently would have led to a reduction in the subcontrac-
267tor's recovery.
The certainty principle is less clearly at work, yet probably operat-
ing in the background, in many cases that appear to protect the resto-
ration interest without inquiring whether the expectation cap was
exceeded. Those decisions are based on facts under which proving
the expectation interest obviously would raise serious problems of un-
certainty. 68 Courts grant restoration relief in such cases, often under
the heading of "rescission,"269 without focusing on the expectation in-
terest at all. An example of such an award appears in the bankruptcy
case of De Rosa v. Boston Bakery & Italian Food Specialty, Inc.,2 70 in which
the franchisees/debtors successfully sought restoration based on the
franchisor's breach of a franchise agreement.2 7' The court, upon
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 579-80.
268. See, e.g., Brown v. United Ins. Co., 113 S.E.2d 26 (S.C. 1960). In Brown, an insur-
ance company wrongfully cancelled a policy providing health and death benefits. Id. at 28-
30. The court recognized that the insured party's expectation interest was "necessarily
dependent upon many factors, varying with the facts of each case, and thus rendering
impossible reduction of that value to an exact number of dollars and cents." Id. at 32. On
the facts of Brown, those factors included "the non-cancellability of the policy; its provisions
for weekly benefits in case of temporarily disabling illness; the insured's age and the state
of his health; and the unavailability of similar insurance." Id. Given the difficulty of calcu-
lating the expectation interest with any accuracy, the court ruled that a jury award of dam-
ages amounting to the total premiums paid under the policy-clearly a restoration-based
measure-was supported by the evidence. See id.
269. See supra Part I.D.1.
270. 98 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989).
271. Id.
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finding that the franchisor had materially breached the agreement,
granted "rescission" of the contract. 7 2 The franchisees were awarded
restitution damages for all amounts paid to the franchisor and dam-
ages for other loss, such as the money spent in operating the busi-
ness.273 The court did not discuss what expectation damages might
have been. But that measure of relief would have required estimating
the future profits of a new business, a classic example of a contract in
which the expectation measure is considered too uncertain to provide
a basis for relief.274
The courts' willingness to grant restoration damages in such cases
may be partly attributable to a general, but unarticulated, awareness
that the expectation interest is simply incapable of adequate proof
based on the facts. It may not occur to the court or to the parties to
consider whether or how expectation ought to be taken into account.
A significant number of cases in which restoration relief is
granted for material breach of contract can be based on the certainty
principle. There are many others, however, in which proof that resto-
ration exceeds expectation is plentiful. If the victim is to have the
relief sought, the award must be justified on some basis other than the
certainty principle. That problem is considered in Parts III.B and C.
B. Background to the Extent-of-Benefit Principle: A New Perspective on the
Doctrine of Restitution for a Plaintiff in Default
An understanding of the extent-of-benefit principle is facilitated
by an awareness of an important, but generally ignored, point about
contract damages: not only the victim, but also the breaching party,
272. Id. at 648-49.
273. Id. at 649.
274. See also CBS, Inc. v. Merrick, 716 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983). In Merrick, restoration
damages were awarded to a television network as a remedy for breach of a contract to
produce a TV series. The court did not consider whether expectation damages would have
been appropriate, possibly because those damages would have required a determination of
what profits the network would have earned had the series been produced-a highly spec-
ulative calculation.
Other cases in which the courts have awarded restoration damages where the expecta-
tion interest would have been difficult to determine include: Plantation Key Developers,
Inc. v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1979) (involving a lender's breach of
a contract with a developer of a condominium project to provide permanent loans to buy-
ers of individual units); Harris v. Metropolitan Mall, 334 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. 1983) (awarding
restoration damages to a party who purchased a shopping mall, in response to a material
breach by sellers); Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256 (D.C. 1984) (giving restoration damages
to a dentist who purchased shares of a professional corporation, in response to the other
owner's material breach); Runyan v. Pacific Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682 (Cal. 1970)
(granting restoration damages to a franchisee in response to a franchisor's material
breach).
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has a remedial entitlement, and the remedial entitlements of the par-
ties are mutually determined. To the extent that the breach victim is
awarded expectation damages, the breaching party also enjoys an ex-
pectation-based entitlement. Likewise, when the victim's restoration
interest is protected, the breaching party also has a restoration-based
entitlement under the contract. This statement is obviously relevant
to the venerable doctrine of "restitution" for a defaulting plaintiff. Its
implications go farther than that, however. A description of the link
between the remedial entitlements of the breacher and victim, as well
as a brief look at the implications of restitution for a party in breach,
provide important background to a discussion of the extent-of-benefit
principle.
1. Illustrating the Link Between the Victim's Remedy and the Breaching
Party's Entitlement. -The link between the remedial rights of victim
and breaching party is most easily illustrated by means of simplified,
hypothetical cases.
Hypothetical Case 5:
On January 1, Courier contracts with business Owner to pro-
vide certain delivery services for a six-month period begin-
ningJuly 1 for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is
the fair market value of those services. By July 1, the fair
market value of Courier's services has fallen to $9000 and
remains constant at that level until after December 31. Cou-
rier wrongfully refuses to perform any of the required serv-
ices. Owner has not yet paid any of the contract price.
Expectation would allocate the burden of the drop in the market
value to Owner, where it was put by the contract when the parties
agreed to a fixed price for Courier's future performance. Thus, the
recipient Owner's damages would be negative; she would owe Courier
$3000. From the money originally committed to the contract, she
would retain $9000-enough to have the work performed by someone
else. She then would be as well off as if the contract had been per-
formed properly. Significantly, protecting Owner's expectation inter-
est necessarily would mean that Courier enjoys an expectation-based
entitlement as well-that is, he would retain the benefit of the market
shift originally allocated to him by the agreement. Of course, no
court would, or should," 5 make such an award; the point is that, by
definition, an expectation-based award for the victim results in an ex-
pectation-based entitlement for the breaching party as well.
275. See infra Part III.C.2.c.
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On the facts of this hypothetical, Owner will prefer protection of
her restoration interest, which would result in an award of zero dol-
lars. Owner has not yet paid any of the price, nor has Courier per-
formed any of the promised services. Thus, Owner's net restitution
interest is nil. Moreover, she has suffered no "other loss." Restoration
on these facts simply means that she will be discharged from her pay-
ment obligation by virtue of her cancellation of the agreement.
Owner retains the funds that she would have paid to Courier and has
shifted back to him the risk of the drop in the market value of his
services, where it rested prior to the formation of the contract. Thus,
the status quo ante has been restored. Courier's entitlement, also nil of
course, is restoration-based as well. He loses the benefit of the shift in
the market and is restored to his precontractual position.
Hypothetical Case 6:
On January 1, Courier contracts with business Owner to pro-
vide certain delivery services for a six-month period begin-
ning July 1 for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is
the fair market value of those services. By July 1, the fair
market value of Courier's services has fallen to $9000 and
remains constant at that level until after December 31. Cou-
rier works the entire six months. Owner then discovers that,
due to Courier's incompetence, he has committed serious
malfeasance that will cost $1000 to correct.
One additional fact is relevant: whether or not Owner has paid Cou-
rier. The fact of payment will affect the net payment of damages be-
tween the parties, but it does not affect the allocation of contract
advantages and risks represented by the expectation and restoration
interests. If the expectation interest is protected, the Owner is stuck
with the fallen market. Under the restoration interest, she escapes it.
Consider the expectation interest first. If Owner has not paid,
she would be entitled to retain $1000 from the money committed to
the contract. With that amount she would be compensated for her
loss and would be in the same position as if the contract had been
performed properly. Her damages would be negative. She would owe
the remaining $11,000 to Courier. On the other hand, if she has al-
ready paid the contract price, then she would be entitled to collect
damages of $1000 from Courier to compensate her for his malfea-
sance. Either way, Courier's entitlement would be expectation-based
as well. He would not receive protection of his entire expectation in-
terest because he would be accountable for the $1000 needed to com-
pensate Owner for his malfeasance. Nevertheless, he would retain the
benefit of the drop in the market. Thus, Courier's expectancy interest
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would be the starting point of his claim, and the amount of his award
then would be reduced by the costs of making good the imperfections
in his performance.
Owner's restoration interest would be more favorable to her. If
she has not yet paid any of the purchase price, then she is discharged
from the duty to pay and (in the absence of any "other loss") will be
required to give restitution to Courier of $8000 for the value of the
services he has rendered (the $9000 market value of the services, less
the $1000 needed to compensate Owner for Courier's malfeasance).
Although Courier's work itself cannot be returned to him, Owner's
payment to Courier of the monetary value of his work restores him to
the economic equivalent of the status quo ante. On the other hand, if
Owner has paid the contract price, then she claims $12,000 in restitu-
tion from him, offset by the $8000 benefit he has conferred upon her,
for a net payment to her of $4000. In either event, Owner has recap-
tured the benefit of the market drop, which protection of her expecta-
tion interest would have denied her, and she has traded $8000 cash
for services of equal value. Courier's entitlement is obviously restora-
tion-based as well. He loses the benefit of the drop in the market that
the contract had allocated to him; except for the $1000 needed to
compensate Owner for Courier's malfeasance, however, he is re-
turned to the economic equivalent of the status quo ante by receiving
payment equal in value to the services he rendered.
2. Implications for the Breaching Party's Entitlement to Restitution.-
When Owner's damages are negative, Courier's affirmative recovery is
recognized under the rubric of "restitution" for a plaintiff in breach.
As these hypothetical cases demonstrate, however, whether the
breaching Courier's recovery is actually restitutionary rather than ex-
pectation-based is inextricably linked to the basis of Owner's damages.
Whether the remedy should be based on expectation or restoration is
an important question, discussed in Part III.C. The critical point here
is that a determination of which interest is protected ought not de-
pend upon whether the recipient happens to have paid in advance.
Yet when a court fails to perceive the link between the victim's remedy
and the breaching party's entitlement, the choice of the protected in-
terest may turn on precisely that factor. Referring to the breaching
party's entitlement as "off the contract," and therefore somehow dis-
connected from it, obscures the truth that the basis of the breaching
party's entitlement necessarily determines the basis of the victim's
[VOL. 53:1
THE RESTORATION INTEREST
remedy and vice versa. 76 Recognizing that the victim's remedy and
the breaching party's entitlement are two sides of the same coin en-
ables one to avoid that error.
The following analysis of the extent-of-benefit principle ap-
proaches the matter in this way. It considers the implications of the
principle for both parties, treating their remedial interests as part of
an integral whole. Part III.D of the Article revisits the doctrine of res-
titution for a defaulting plaintiff to show that courts generally apply it
consistently with the extent-of-benefit principle.
C. The Extent-of-Benefit Principle
The extent-of-benefit principle determines when and to what ex-
tent a party injured by a material breach is entitled to protection of a
restoration interest that clearly exceeds expectation. Because the re-
medial entitlements of the parties are mutually determined, the ex-
tent-of-benefit principle can be used to state, with equal accuracy, the
basis for either the victim's damages or the breaching party's entitle-
ment. It is sometimes helpful to consider the principle from the per-
spective of the breaching party as well as from that of the victim. As
will be seen, most of the decided cases that are not resolved by the
certainty principle are consistent with the extent-of-benefit principle.
That consistency, together with the capacity of the extent-of-benefit
principle to provide a coherent rationale for cases on which the au-
thorities are in conflict, underscores the principle's descriptive power
and lends it normative force.
1. Statement of the Principle and the Issues It Raises. -The extent-of-
benefit principle is based, in a general sense, on the unfolding of con-
tract performance. Performing the contract changes the world from
the way it was at contract formation to the way the parties envisioned it
would become as a result of performance.277 As that process occurs,
the victim of a breach-whether supplier or recipient-no longer may
276. The hypothetical cases in the text present the supplier as the party in breach. It is
equally true that the breaching party's and victim's remedial entitlements are mutually
determined when the recipient breaches. Hypothetical cases reflecting these facts are
presented in the cases on Charts I-A, I-B and I-C, discussed in Part III.C.
277. See Burton & Andersen, supra note 23, at 863 ("The most elementary contractual
concept is that of a promise. A promise is an act by which a person imagines a possible
world and signals a commitment to bring that world into being by future action."). For
purposes of the analysis in this Article, the transition from the imagined world at contract
formation to the world resulting from performance is not disrupted by impediments suffi-
cient to invoke the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose. See supra note
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avoid the allocation of advantages and burdens that was made at con-
tract formation and embedded in the expectation interest. To the
extent that contract performance has not unfolded, however, the in-
jured party is entitled to "back out" of the agreement by recapturing
advantages contractually forgone and by avoiding burdens contractu-
ally assumed. In other words, the victim of the breach is entitled to
protection of the restoration interest to the extent that the contract
has not been completely performed. Stated more precisely, the prin-
ciple is that the victim is limited to protection of his expectation interest, and
the breacher is afforded an expectation-based entitlement, proportionate to the
extent the benefit of the supplier's performance has been made available to the
recipient.
This definition raises two issues that should be addressed before
considering the application of the principle to both hypothetical and
decided cases. First, why does the principle turn on the supplier's, but
not the recipient's, performance? Second, why does the principle refer
to the extent the recipient has benefitted from the supplier's performance,
rather than to the extent the supplier has performed?
a. The Difference Between the Supplier's and the Recipient's Perform-
ances.-Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the extent-of-bene-
fit principle is its asymmetry. The breach victim's access to restoration
in excess of expectation is governed by the extent to which the recipi-
ent has access to the benefits of the supplier's performance, no matter
which party is in breach. The extent to which the supplier benefits
from the recipient's performance is irrelevant.
The explanation for this asymmetry lies in the difference between
the nature of the supplier's performance and the nature of the recipi-
ent's. The supplier provides services, delivers goods or other prop-
erty, or otherwise alters the existing state of affairs by his
performance. The recipient, by contrast, pays money. The payment
of money, while an economically important event, is of a character
different from other performances because (i) as a practical matter,
money payments are totally reversible and (ii) obligations to pay
money are readily-almost infinitely-severable. The capacity to
"undo" money payments completely and to divide them minutely
makes the degree to which a payment obligation has been performed
unsuitable as a basis for "locking in" the expectation interest.
Money payments are entirely reversible in the sense that they can
be undone without prejudice to either party, They are reversible be-
cause money is assumed to be constant in value and because, in a
sense, the payment of money is a purely procedural, rather than sub-
stantive, exercise.
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When interest is made available to adjust for the "time value" of
money, the law of contracts treats the value of money as constant.
Money returned, with interest, to a paying recipient is understood to
have the same value as it had when paid. By contrast, deterioration in
the value of goods or other property that has been delivered might
make it impossible to restore the supplier to the precise status quo ante.
As far as the law is concerned, therefore, the performance of an obli-
gation to pay money can be undone without any loss in value or other
prejudice to the party receiving the refund.
Especially in the modern world, money is pure form by defini-
tion. A dollar bill or a check has no intrinsic value. Each has worth
only because of a social consensus that it is useful to treat money as
valuable. Because money itself is pure form, its transfer is pure proce-
dure. Although acquiring money takes effort, paying or transferring it
does not. A monetary payment is something that is done and undone
in an instant, by the observance of the required ritual-handing over
bills, signing a check, or by other methods. By contrast, providing
property or services often (though not always) requires the investment
of time, effort, or creative energy, and restoring property or services in
kind is often impossible.
The second important characteristic of the recipient's money
payment obligation is that money is, by nature, almost infinitely divisi-
ble. It is defined in terms of fungible units (e.g., U.S. dollars), which
can be divided into subparts of only nominal value (e.g., cents) or
aggregated into large sum units (e.g., millions of dollars). Unlike
many supplier performances consisting of providing property or serv-
ices, obligations to pay money are always divisible. The analysis of the
extent-of-benefit principle in Part III.C of the Article will show that
one must attempt to divide a contract according to the degree the
recipient has benefited from the supplier's performance. Sometimes
that division simply is not feasible. When it is possible, however, it is
always possible to allocate an amount of money to the divisible por-
tion of the supplier's performance. The ready divisibility of money
means that a payment obligation will never preclude the prorationing
of the restoration and expectation interests as required by the extent-
of-benefit principle. Values assigned to the supplier's part perform-
ance are, by definition, stated in monetary terms. The very act of di-
viding the supplier's performance necessarily divides the recipient's
payment obligation as well.
These observations suggest that, upon cancellation of the con-
tract, it is equally as easy, so far as obligations to pay money are con-
cerned, to go forward (by protecting expectation) as it is to go
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backward (by protecting restoration). In a sense, nothing "real" has
happened when money has been paid because it can be "unpaid" in-
stantly and without loss in value or transaction costs. And if a payment
obligation has not been performed, it can be satisfied later, without
loss of value or other prejudice, by an award of money damages. The
basis of the extent-of-benefit principle is that, as the changes in the
world contemplated by the contract unfold, the breach victim is pro-
gressively restricted to protection of his expectation interest. The exe-
cuted or executory status of payment obligations is a fully transparent
and reversible part of that unfolding world, at least for purposes of
determining the measure of relief.
In its purest form, the supplier-recipient model does not apply to
very many contracts. One who pays money for goods or services fre-
quently has other obligations as well. One paying for construction
work or other services, for example, typically is obligated to provide a
work site and to refrain from interfering with the supplier's perform-
ance.27 Likewise, the buyer of goods may have duties relating to spec-
ification, shipping, or acceptance. 279  These obligations often are
implied or imposed as statutory default rules and exist primarily to
make the supplier's performance possible or feasible. They do not
themselves alter the existing state of affairs; rather, they make it possi-
ble for the supplier to do so. For that reason, such obligations do not
undermine the operation of the extent-of-benefit principle. The re-
cipient's primary obligation is to pay money, and that obligation is
always open to such divisibility as the supplier's performance lends
itself.
28 0
278. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-319(3) (1993) (explaining that the buyer bears the responsibil-
ity of informing the supplier of any delivery instructions).
280. There are a few contracts in which both parties' primary obligations are to provide
goods or services. The application of the extent-of-benefit principle to these contracts is
discussed infra, in note 385. Some contracts-primarily those dealing with money loans-
appear to have two recipients, in the sense that each party's obligation is to pay money.
For present purposes, however, a lender of money is in the same position as one who leases
personal or real property (a supplier), rather than one who pays for the use or ownership
of property or for the provision of services (a recipient). The money lender may appear to
differ from a lessor in that the former, unlike the latter, does not retain title to the thing
lent. But the notion of having "title" to money is nonsense. As discussed in the text above,
money is not a thing at all, but a form and practice that exists solely as a matter of social
consensus. For example, although the debtor is obligated to repay $100 to the lender, it
makes no sense to ask whether the borrower must repay the "same" $100 that was originally
advanced by the lender. In essence, the lender's promise is not to make a payment to the
borrower, but merely to give the borrower temporary use of a sum of money. The bor-
rower pays a fee (interest) for that use. In practice, damages for breach of loan agree-
ments usually are governed by express contract terms, rather than left to the rules of
common law remedies.
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b. Extent of Benefit Versus Extent of Performance.-The proposed
definition of the extent-of-benefit principle identifies as the crucial
element not the degree to which the supplier has performed, but
rather the extent to which the benefit of that performance is available
to the recipient. The latter standard is the proper basis for determin-
ing the measure of damages because it focuses on the transfer or ex-
change between the supplier and the recipient of what was bargained
for. The circumstances surrounding the breach- particularly when
the supplier is the one committing it-may mean that although a
great deal of work was done, it accomplished little or none of what the
contract intended. The appropriate gauge of the breach victim's con-
finement to the expectation interest, and corresponding relinquish-
ment of restoration to the status quo ante, is the degree to which the
supplier's performance actually accomplishes the contemplated trans-
fer of benefits to the recipient.
As a practical matter, two issues are relevant when the extent-of-
benefit principle is applied. The first is the degree to which the sup-
plier has performed. Within the meaning of the extent-of-benefit
principle, the recipient cannot benefit from something that has not
been done. Thus, the extent of benefit the recipient has realized can-
not exceed the degree to which the supplier has completed contrac-
tual performance. In other words, the breach victim (whether
supplier or recipient) is assured the protection of the restoration in-
terest at least to the degree that the supplier's performance remains
incomplete.
The second relevant issue is the extent to which the recipient ac-
tually has benefited, or can benefit, from that portion of the supplier's
performance that has been rendered. If the supplier is the party in
breach, then it is possible that, due to the nature of the breach, the
recipient will enjoy even less of the benefit of the supplier's perform-
ance than corresponds to the portion of the finished work. Indeed,
the supplier may have completed his performance, but may have done
so imperfectly. In some cases of imperfect performance by the sup-
plier, compensatory damages will be adequate, as a practical matter,
to give the recipient the benefit of so much of the supplier's perform-
ance as has been completed. In other cases that will not be so, and
then it will be necessary to gauge the extent of the benefit the recipi-
ent actually has received, measured in relation to the benefit she
would have realized had the supplier rendered full and proper
performance.
These issues are best addressed by observing the operation of the
extent-of-benefit principle in a series of factual settings. The analysis
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that follows will utilize facts similar to those in Hypothetical Cases 5
and 6 above, involving the Courier and the Business Owner. Where
found, decided cases reflecting the factual setting under considera-
tion are discussed or cited. In a number of possible factual settings,
however, decided cases are rare or non-existent because the facts
themselves are improbable, or the proper outcome of the dispute is so
obvious that litigation is unlikely, or both. The outcome of the hypo-
thetical case on those facts nevertheless will be discussed briefly for
the purpose of demonstrating the consistency with which the extent-
of-benefit principle leads to the proper result.
The results required or permitted by the extent-of-benefit princi-
ple will be reflected in a series of charts intended to illustrate how the
factual settings discussed relate to one another. The charts will be
developed and completed as the analysis progresses. For ease of refer-
ence, each chart will be reproduced at various points in the text as its
contents expand.
The application of the extent-of-benefit principle is simple when
the supplier either has not performed at all or has fully performed
and it is obvious that the recipient has fully benefited from that per-
formance. These cases are considered in Part III.C.2. But most cases
are not so easy. Part III.C.3 illustrates why the extent-of-benefit princi-
ple, applied by means of the divisibility doctrine, is needed in more
challenging settings. Part III.C.4 considers cases in which the supplier
has only partially performed, but the recipient has fully benefitted
from what has been done. Part III.C.5 deals with what may be the
most difficult cases of all-those in which the degree to which the
supplier's actual performance benefits the recipient is less than co-
extensive with the degree to which that performance has been
completed.
2. Cases in Which the Extent of Benefit from the Supplier's Performance
is Readily Determined.-In certain factual settings, it will be a simple
matter to determine the degree to which the recipient has benefited
from the supplier's performance in relation to the total benefit prom-
ised. The cases will be easiest when they involve neither imperfect nor
partial performance.
Three fact patterns fit this description: (i) the supplier is the in-
jured party and has rendered complete performance; (ii) the supplier
is the injured party and has rendered no performance at all; and
(iii) the recipient is the injured party and the supplier has rendered
no performance at all. These cases are discussed in turn.
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a. The Injured, Fully Peiforming Supplier.-Consider first the cases
in which the supplier is the injured party. In the facts common to the
cases in Column C on Chart I-A,28' the Courier has properly com-
pleted performance by the time he acts upon the Owner's breach,
which consists of interference with the Courier's work. Due to a
change in his costs, the contract has turned out to be a losing one for
Courier, so he prefers the protection of restoration to expectation.
In each case, Owner has enjoyed the full benefit of Courier's per-
formance, so the degree to which Courier may claim restoration is nil.
Thus, Courier is completely limited to his expectation interest; he can
claim only the unpaid portion (if any) of the contract price, in addi-
tion to compensation for the $1000 loss caused by Owner's wrongful
interference." 2 Although the net amount due Courier will depend
on whether none, some, or all of the contract price has been paid, as
represented in turn by cases Cl, C2, and C3, the extent to which the
contract price has been paid does not affect the choice of the interest
to be protected. Courier's recovery is wholly expectation-based.
The breaching recipient also enjoys an expectation-based entitle-
ment. In this setting, that entitlement allows the recipient to pay for
the supplier's work at the contract price, rather than requiring her to
pay the higher restoration damages the supplier might claim.
The results required by the extent-of-benefit principle in this set-
ting are fully consistent with the decided cases. That principle ap-
pears here in the form of the full performance rule. As discussed
above,283 in such cases the courts routinely hold that the supplier is
restricted entirely to the protection of the expectation interest-the
payment of the contract price plus damages for consequential losses
such as interference with the supplier's work.
281. The facts of the cases in Chart I and in hypothetical case 8 are suggested by Mistle-
toe Express Serv. v. Locke, 762 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App. 1988). In Locke, a freight company
sued an express service company for breaching a contract in which the freight company
had agreed to perform pick-up and delivery services. Id. at 638. The court awarded the
freight company the amount of money it had invested to perform the contract. Id. at 638-
39. The court did not deduct any losses that the freight company would have suffered,
however, because the service company was unable to prove the amount of these losses, if
any. Id. at 639.
282. In each of these cases, the $1000 loss caused by Owner's wrongful interference is
an item of "other loss" that also appears as a component of Courier's restoration interest.
See supra Part II.B.
283. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
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CHART I-A
Breach by Recipient in a Rising Market
Facts common to all cases in this chart:
On January I, Courier contracts with business Owner to provide certain delivery services for a six-month period beginning July I
for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is the fair market value of those services. The quantity and value of the work to
Owner are to be evenly spaced over the period. so that $2000 of the contract price can be fairly allocated to each month's work.
By July l, a collectively bargained wage increase applicable to Courier's employees has gone into effect, with the result that it will
cost Courier $2500 per month to perform, and he will lose $3000 if he performs the entire contract at the agreed price. The
employees of only some of Courier's competitors are unionized, and the wage increase has the effect of raising the fair market value
of Courier's services to $15,000. This value remains constant at that level through December 31.
A B C
Corier works the entire six
months. Interference by
Owner imposes era ect of
$1000 on Courier.
I Owner has paid C's mS $ 13 ,000"a"
n'h piC' : $ 1S,000""' j
nothing when C's re: $ 16,000
Courier acts upon
the breach.
2 Owner has paid C's . 0 , 0""''
$6000 wben C's P/.: $ O,00SC's cnn, $ 10,000
Courier acts upon
the breach.
3 Owner has paid C's Saps $ 1 0
*
"a
)
$12,000 when CS' P/is 1 0 0 0
*
n,$12,00wbenC'n ran: $ 4 00
Courier acts upon
the breach.
bold type:( ):
exp:
res:
p1r:
fpr:
+
results permitted or required under extent-of-benefit principle
numbers enclosed in parentheses are negative
expectation interest
restoration interest
expectation/restoration interests prorated under extent-of-benefit principle
result reflects the full performance rule
result consistent with majority rle in case law
result consistent with substantial number of decided cases
facts unlikely to arise and/or intuitively correct results
b. The Injured, Nonperforming Supplier. -Assume now that the
Owner wrongfully prevents the Courier from beginning performance
of what would have been a losing contract, as reflected in the cases in
column A of Chart I-B.
If the recipient Owner has paid nothing in advance, as in Case
Al, expectation damages for the supplier Courier would be negative,
requiring him to pay the recipient the loss he would have suffered by
performing. That result is intuitively absurd, of course, and is not the
kind of argument that results in litigation. The correct result, under
both common sense and the extent-of-benefit principle, is to let the
supplier walk away. That result-discharging the supplier of any obli-
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CHART I-B
Breach by Recipient in a Rising Market
Facts common to all cases in this chart:
On January I, Courier contrmacts with business Owner to provide certain delivery services for a six-month period beginning July I
for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is the fair market value of those services. The quantity and value of the work to
Owner are to be evenly spaced over the period, so that $2000 of the contract price can be fairly allocated to each month's work.
By July 1. a collectively bargained wage increase applicable to Courier's employees has gone into effect, with the result that it will
cost Courier $2500 per month to perform, and he will lose $3000 if he performs the entire contract at the agreed price. The
employees of only sonar of Courier's competitors are unionized, and the wage increase has the effect of raising the fair market value
of Courier's services to $15,000. The value remains constant at that level through December 31.
A B C
Coner is wrongfully Courier works the entire six
prevented from beginning months. Interference by
work. Owner imposes extra costs of
$1000 on Courier.
I Owner has paid C'S exp: $ S(3oo) cs .V, * 13,00o0'"-
nothing when C' pir: $ 0: C' pig. $ 13,000
* e
'
C V" 08 $ 0' C's rem: $ 16,000
Courier acts upon
the breach.
2 Owner has paid C's exp: $ (9000) C's sW. 7 .000 "n'
$6000 when C: P/l , 1 (6000)* CIs p. . 7.000
"*
'
Cueas 0 $ (6O00). CIs res: $ 10.000Courier acts upon
the breach.
3 Owner has paid C' exp: $ 115,000) CIS WW. $ 1oo'"
$1ZOOO when C' pIS. 11 (12.000)* C's p/.. 1000
" 
'"
C'S rea $ (13.000)' C's rem: $ 4000Courier acts upon
the breach.
bold type:
( ):
exp:
res:
p/r.
fpr:
I
results permitted or required under extent-of-benefit principle
numbers enclosed in parentheses are negative
expectation interest
restoration interest
expectation/restoration interests prorated under extent-of-benefit principle
result reflects the full performance rule
result consistent with majority rule in case law
result consistent with substantial number of decided cases
facts unlikely to arise and/or intuitively correct results
gation to perform-protects his restoration interest. Neither party
has conferred anything of value on the other, and therefore, the sup-
plier's net restitution interest is nil. Assuming no "other loss" is in-
volved, restoration for both parties on these facts simply means
discharging the Courier and leaving the parties where they stand. Full
restoration is available to the injured supplier, for the extent of the
benefit conferred upon the recipient, and thus the degree to which
the injured supplier is limited to his expectation interest is nil.
Although the facts might be more complex than simple preven-
tion of performance by a nonpaying recipient, the restoration interest
would remain the basis of the remedy in any event. Thus, if the recipi-
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ent had paid something in advance, as in Cases A2 and A3, the protec-
tion of the restoration interest requires the return of what was
received. If (unlike the simplified facts represented on the chart) the
supplier has suffered "other loss," such as costs expended in prepara-
tion for performance that could not be turned to other uses, then
compensation for that loss also will be part of the restoration interest.
Because the supplier's restoration interest is wholly protected, the
recipient's entitlement is necessarily restoration-based as well. The re-
cipient Owner receives back any payments she has made in advance,
but may not claim from the supplier Courier the benefit of the change
in the market, which would have been hers under an expectation-
based entitlement.
Current law generally is consistent with this position. Section 2-
718(2)-(3) of the U.C.C. requires the injured, nonperforming seller to
make restitution of the price the buyer has paid in advance, after de-
ducting any damages owed. 284 Deductible damages would include
compensation for "other losses" the seller has incurred, which pro-
tects his restoration interest. If the contract were a losing one for the
seller, there is no suggestion in the Commercial Code that he would
have to refund more than the price received, as would be the case if he
were limited to expectation relief.285 The common law traditionally
has been reluctant to award relief to the breaching recipient who has
paid in advance. 286 Under the influence of the U.C.C., that position
appears to have changed so that the defaulting recipient who pays in
advance now is entitled to restitution.287 Unsurprisingly, no cases
have been found in which the recipient who pays in advance and then
wrongfully prevents the supplier from commencing performance has
been awarded more than the amount of the advance payment. The
284. U.C.C. § 2-718(2)-(3) (1993).
285. Section 2-718(2) of the U.C.C. does contain one feature apparently inconsistent
with the extent-of-benefit principle-that is, the right of the seller to withhold the lesser of
$500 or 20% of the value of the buyer's performance without proof of actual loss. This
liquidated sum may be intended to compensate the seller for "other losses" such as incon-
venience in arranging substitute transactions or similar difficulties likely to occur, but diffi-
cult to prove.
286. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.14, at 628 ("[A] court would deny restitution to a
buyer of goods who defaulted after making a down payment or part payment .... ").
287. See CALAAm & PERILLO, supra note 16, § 11-22, at 476-77 (describing movement of
the law toward allowing restitution for all defaulting parties, including those whose con-
tractual obligation is to pay money); FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.14, at 628-30 ("The
Code rule on contracts for the sale of goods has encouraged courts to extend the rule of
Britton v. Turner [allowing restitution for the breaching supplier] to [the breaching recipi-
ent buyer in] contracts for the sale of land.").
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injured supplier therefore enjoys the protection of his restoration
interest.
c. The Injured Recipient Whose Supplier Renders No Performance.-
Consider now the injured recipient. In the cases in Column A of
Chart II-A, Courier breaches by failing to begin his promised
performance.
Because the contract has turned out to be a losing one for the
recipient, she will prefer restoration to expectation damages, and be-
cause she has received no benefit from the supplier's performance,
the extent-of-benefit principle entitles her to the full protection of her
restoration interest. If she has paid nothing toward the contract price,
as in Case Al, her restoration interest is protected by a simple dis-
charge. If, as in Cases A2 and A3, she has paid some or all of the
price, then she is entitled to a refund. Although the quantum of dam-
ages that she receives is affected by the amount of her advance pay-
ment, the choice of restoration over expectation is not affected.
The decided cases are consistent with this result, which is intui-
tively correct.2 88 A typical case is that of the buyer who pays in ad-
vance for goods, only to see the market price decline and the seller
(through bad luck or poor judgment) wrongfully fails to deliver. In
the seminal case of Bush v. Canfield,89 the buyer sought restitution of
$5000 paid in advance (out of a total $14,000 contract price) for
flour. 9 By the time for delivery, which the seller wrongfully with-
held, the market price had dropped to $11,000.191 The seller, seeking
to limit the buyer to expectation damages, claimed that only $2000
needed to be returned to the buyer, because a $3000 loss would have
resulted from full performance.292 The court disagreed, however, and
protected the buyer's restoration interest by awarding damages equal
to the full $5000 paid.293 If a recipient has suffered "other loss" on
288. If the recipient were limited to her expectation interest, then she would be re-
quired to pay part of the contract price to the breaching supplier, even though she had
received nothing from him.
289. 2 Conn. 485 (1818).
290. Id. at 485-86. The Bush case thus is like Case A2 on Chart II-A because the buyer
paid only part of the contract price in advance.
291. Id. at 490.
292. Id. at 486.
293. Id. at 488. See also Nash v. Towne, 72 U.S. 689 (1866) (holding that a buyer could
recover the full advance payment for flour that was wrongfully withheld by a seller, rather
than basing damages on the value of the flour at the time of delivery).
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CHART Il-A
Breach by Supplier in a Falling Maret
Facts common to all cas in this chart:
On January 1, Courier contracts with business Owner to provide certain delivery services for a six-month period beginning July I
for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is the fair market value of those services. The quantity and value of the work to
Owner are to be evenly spaced over the period, so that $2000 of the contract price can be fairly allocated to each month's work.
By July I, the fair market value of Couriers services has fallen to $9000, and remains constant at that level until after December
31.
A B C
Courier wrongfully
fails to begin work.
I Owner has paid O's exo: $ (3000)
nothing when ao' P/reg O"
Courier acts upon
the breach.
2 Owner has paid O'a exp: $ 3000$6000 when 0"8 pl. S 000'o'w 5*aml 9 $00"'
Courier acts upon
the breach.
3 Owner has paid O's exv: $ 9,000
$12,000 when O'. pir, $ 12,000*
Courier acts upon
the breach.
bold type: results permitted or required under extent-of-benefit principle
( ): numbers enclosed in parentheses are negative
exp: expectation interest
res: restoration interest
p/r: expectation/restoration interest prorated under extent-of-benefit principle
fpr: result reflects the full performance rule
result consistent with majority role in case law
+ result consistent with substantial number of decided cases
# facts unlikely to arise and/or intuitively correct results
account of the supplier's breach, then compensation for that loss also
is reflected in the restoration interest.294
The breaching supplier's entitlement is also necessarily restora-
tion-based. On these facts, it is nil at best and is negative to the extent
that any portion of the price paid in advance must be returned and
damages for any other loss paid. The supplier loses the advantages of
294. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-713, 2-715 (1993) (permitting a buyer (recipient) who has
not yet received the goods to recover "other loss" under the headings of incidental and
consequential damages). See also L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182,
189 (2d Cir. 1949) (illustrating the recovery of "other loss" as part of the restoration inter-
est, the buyer's rightful rejection of the seller's partial performance being equivalent to the
supplier's failure to perform at all).
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the change in the market that the expectation interest would have
given him.
3. Reasons Why Application of the Extent-of-Benefit Principle May Be
Challenging: The Need for the Divisibility Doctrine.-The operation of the
extent-of-benefit principle is simple when the supplier performs
either fully or not at all, as in the cases just discussed. In other circum-
stances, the principle may be more difficult to apply for either or both
of two reasons. First, the supplier's performance may be incomplete.
Because the recipient cannot benefit from performance that has not
been rendered, applying the extent-of-benefit principle in such a case
requires determining the degree to which the supplier's performance
has occurred. Second, regardless of whether the supplier's perform-
ance is complete, if he is the breaching party, then the benefit that the
recipient realizes may not be fully proportionate to the performance
that the seller renders. Application of the extent-of-benefit principle
in either case requires deployment of the venerable doctrine of divisi-
bility. Before focusing on specific fact patterns, a brief look at the
divisibility doctrine is warranted.
A good way to stress the importance of the divisibility doctrine to
the extent-of-benefit principle is to consider what would happen if the
doctrine were not employed. Without it, the victim's access to restora-
tion damages would be binary: either expectation would apply in its
entirety or restoration would. Jarring results could occur under such
a system. In the case of Oliver v. Campbell,295 for example, a lawyer
contracted to handle a client's divorce for $750.296 Events did not
unfold as the lawyer had expected, and he ended up expending time
worth $5000 on the matter.297 Just prior to the divorce becoming fi-
nal, the client fired the lawyer and refused to pay more than the $450
he had already remitted for the services rendered.29" The lawyer
sued, seeking not his expectation interest of the remaining $300, but
his restoration interest of nearly $5000.299 The court assumed that a
partially performing, injured supplier is entitled to full restoration
damages, without regard to the contract price.30 0 The court found,
however, that the lawyer in this case already had "performed practi-
295. 273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954).
296. Id. at 16-17.
297. Id. at 17.
298. I. at 16.
299. Id. at 17.
300. Id. at 18-19. Note that in Oliver the lawyer claimed his restoration damages solely
under the restitutionary rubric of quantum merui because there apparently was no "other
loss." IM.
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cally all of the services he was employed to perform when he was dis-
charged"30' and therefore that he could recover only an additional
$300 under the full performance rule. 0 2 The clear implication in Oli-
ver is that, had the client wrongfully fired the lawyer a little sooner, the
lawyer would have been entitled to recover almost $5000, instead of
only $750. He would have received much greater pay for having done
less work.
Although the road from restoration to expectation occasionally
will be rough or uncertain even under the best of circumstances, the
divisibility doctrine eliminates the precipitous drop in damages im-
plicit in the reasoning of Oliver v. Campbell As Professor Corbin
pointed out, the divisibility doctrine is applied in response to a wide
variety of problems.30 3 It is invoked, for example, when an obviously
material breach justifies the victim in cancelling only part of the
agreement; when a plaintiff is permitted to commence consecutive ac-
tions for breach of a contract although the doctrine of res judicata
otherwise would prohibit all but the first action; when an illegal term
is severed from the remainder of the agreement; and when the statute
of limitations bars enforcement of only part of a contract.30 4 That a
contract may be indivisible for one purpose does not necessarily mean
that it cannot be divisible for others.30 5 There is no "simple and uni-
form test of 'divisibility.' 30 6 Nor can any distinguishing rules be
drawn from "'the intention of the parties.' Too often they actually
had none and appeal to 'intention' involves mere fiction. . . . [In-
stead,] the court is forced to turn to considerations of policy and pre-
cedent and should be clearly conscious of the fact."30 7
The underlying goal of the divisibility doctrine in the context of
the extent-of-benefit principle is to determine the degree to which the
injured party will be limited to expectation relief, rather than awarded
more generous restoration damages. Divisibility in this setting is not
based on the express agreement of the parties, who usually contract
on the assumption of full performance. Rather, it is a policy choice
embedded within the legal regime that governs the parties' agree-
301. I&. at 20.
302. Id
303. 3A CORBIN, supra note 57, § 688, at 248 (explaining the difficulty inherent in for-
mulating an authoritative rule about contract divisibility because the concept applies to
various situations).
304. Id § 695 (1964 & Supp. 1993).
305. I.
306. Id
307. Id
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ment.s0 8 Just as using the expectation and restoration interests as the
basic alternatives for measuring damages is a part of that regime, so
too is applying the divisibility of contracts principle for purposes of
applying those measures of relief.
309
The basic task of the divisibility concept, as applied to the extent-
of-benefit principle, is to quantify the benefit received by or available
to the recipient from the supplier's incomplete or imperfect perform-
ance. Divisibility on this basis might be affected by the degree of com-
pleteness of the supplier's performance, the degree of benefit the
recipient realizes from so much of the supplier's performance as has
been rendered, or both. Determining the extent to which the sup-
plier's partial or complete performance produces a benefit to the re-
cipient may be easy or difficult. If it is so difficult as to be
impracticable, then the injured party has full claim to the restoration
interest.
4. Cases in Which the Recipient's Benefit is Commensurate with the De-
gree of the Supplier's Performance.-If the supplier's work is incomplete,
but the portion the supplier has completed conforms to the contract,
then the recipient often will benefit from that performance to the full
extent to which it is rendered. The most common cases in which this
situation occurs are those in which the supplier is the victim of the
breach and continues to perform properly until prevented by the re-
cipient. The same analytical issue arises when, although the partially
performing supplier is in breach, the recipient enjoys the full benefit
of what the supplier has done. These fact patterns are considered in
turn.
a. Damages for the Injured, Partially Performing Supplier.-A sub-
stantial number of decided cases, most of them concerning construc-
tion contracts, present the fact pattern of the injured, partially
performing seller.31 Consider a hypothetical case with simplified, but
not atypical, facts.
308. The position taken here thus rejects Professor Palmer's view that proration be-
tween expectation and restoration is inappropriate because the injured party "did not
agree to accept a proportionate part of the price or a unit rate for the part performance."
PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.4(c), at 401.
309. It may be possible for the parties to "contract around" the divisibility principle as
part of their general power to reach agreements about remedies. The power to modify
remedies, however, is not limitless. See generally, Andersen, Good Faith Enforcement, supra
note 19.
310. In the case discussed here, the Builder has committed no breach prior to Owner's
material breach. The same analysis applies if Builder first commits an immaterial breach.
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Hypothetical Case 7:
In January, Builder contracts to construct a new home for
Owner on Owner's property. The contract price is $100,000,
with work to commence in June. Builder estimates his total
costs of performance at $90,000, based in part on the current
prices of lumber. Because of an intervening increase in the
price of lumber, by the time performance is to begin
Builder's costs have risen to $110,000. At that time, it would
cost Owner $120,000 to make the same contract with an
equally competent contractor.
Builder commences work on schedule. After the foun-
dation has been laid, the walls and roof framed up, and
other parts of the work done, Builder and Owner disagree
on the interpretation of the contract. Owner claims that it
requires Builder, at his expense, to use a premium grade ma-
terial on the roof and exterior walls. Builder claims that the
marginal costs of using the premium grade material are an
"extra" to be paid for by Owner on top of the stated contract
price. When negotiations fail, Owner orders Builder off the
site. Builder has spent $55,000 on labor and materials.
Owner has paid Builder none of the $100,000 contract
price. 11 Owner engages another contractor to finish thejob
for $60,000. Builder's interpretation of the contract is
correct.
Due to the change in the lumber market, Builder would have lost
$10,000 from complete performance under the contract, and that per-
formance would have been worth $20,000 more than the contract
price. Builder's restoration interest therefore exceeds expectation,
and consequently he will prefer the protection of the former. 12 Con-
sider first what Builder would recover under either full restoration or
full expectation.
Builder's restoration interest consists of restitution based on the
value of the benefit conferred on the Owner, compensation for any
"other loss" (such as for preparations to perform), and discharge of
the obligation to complete the work. On the facts given, Builder will
be relieved of the duty to continue the work, and there is no "other
The results would differ only in that Owner's compensatory damages for Builder's initial
breach would be taken into account in calculating the final damage award.
311. Typically, owners make progress payments during the course of construction. The
absence of advance payments is posited here in order to simplify the analysis. Fact situa-
tions in which progress payments are made during the course of the supplier's perform-
ance are discussed infra in Part III.D.
312. In this situation, such claims by Builder usually are pursued through a claim in
quantum meruit.
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loss." The benefit conferred upon Owner might be calculated in vari-
ous ways, such as by subtracting the costs of completing the project
($60,000) from the value Builder's completed performance would
have had ($120,000). Thus, Builder would be entitled to $60,000 in
damages if his restoration interest were fully protected. That result
leaves Builder with $5000 more than his costs, an amount that in-
cludes some of the profit he originally had anticipated and also that
allows him to escape entirely the increase in the price of lumber.
Owner must pay a total of $120,000-$60,000 to Builder, and $60,000
to the second contractor-in order to get the completed house.
Therefore, Owner pays full value for the house and loses the advan-
tage of the rising lumber market. Her entitlement is restoration-based
as well.
On the other hand, Builder's expectation interest will consist of
the contract price ($100,000), less the amount he saved by not having
to complete the job ($55,000), for a total of $45,000. Builder thus
would be saddled with the entire loss resulting from the changes in
the lumber market. The benefit of that change will have been shared
by Owner and the new contractor. Owner has a new house worth
$120,000 after paying $45,000 to Builder and $60,000 to his replace-
ment, for a total cost of $105,000.
Consider now the application of the extent-of-benefit principle,
which requires division of the contract. Because Builder's work,
although incomplete, conformed to the contract and could be taken
over and completed by another contractor, Owner probably benefited
to the full extent of the work that Builder completed. On these over-
simplified facts, it is clear that Builder has completed half the work.
Thus, he would be entitled to half the contract price-or $50,000-
and would suffer a loss of $5000.
If one is troubled by the notion that Builder should lose money
when Owner was the party in breach, it is helpful to recall that Builder
assumed the risk that the costs of lumber would rise. As it is, he and
Owner will share the effect of the change in the market. She will pay a
total of $110,000 for a house that Builder initially was to construct for
$100,000, but that turned out to be worth $120,000. Builder escapes
with a loss of $5000 rather than the $10,000 loss he would have suf-
fered from full performance.
The facts in real cases undoubtedly will be more complex, mak-
ing it more difficult, though not impossible, to determine and com-
pare Builder's remedial interests. As a practical matter, the degree of
completion could be based on such factors as money or time ex-
pended. Alternatively, the costs of completion (to the new contrac-
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tor) might be compared with the total cost (to both contractors) of
full performance in order to quantify the portion of the work done by
Builder. Once Builder has made a primafacie case as to the degree of
completion, the burden would shift to the breaching Owner to refute
Builder's assessment of damages, with doubts being resolved against
Owner as the party in breach. However the degree of Owner's benefit
is determined, Builder will be limited to expectation damages to that
extent. He will be entitled to the protection of his restoration interest
for the remainder.
In a real case, Owner is likely to have caused Builder to incur
other expenses, by delaying or interfering with the work or by de-
manding work beyond that required under the contract. Recovering
damages for these items is necessary to put Builder in the same posi-
tion as if he had performed, and is a part of the expectation inter-
est.3 13 Those same expenses generally will constitute "other losses"
within the scope of the restoration interest, as well. They will be re-
coverable in full, regardless of the appropriate proration between ex-
pectation and restoration damages. The important practical effect of
the proration will be to apportion the economic risks and benefits of
contract performance between the parties according to the degree to
which performance has unfolded.
313. Work performed or value given that is genuinely beyond the scope of the contract
is compensable on a quantum meruit basis. Such a use of quantum meruit, which is restitutio-
nary in nature, is not inconsistent with the protection of the supplier's expectation inter-
est, for it applies only to work done beyond what was originally promised and not to the
work for which the parties contracted. Consider United States ex rel. Susi Contracting Co.
v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944), a case often cited for the proposition
that the injured, partially performing supplier is entitled to restitution without reference to
the contract price. In that case, Zara Contracting (a general contractor) wrongfully termi-
nated a soil excavation and grading agreement with Susi Contracting (a subcontractor).
Id at 609. Susi Contracting had encountered large quantities of clay during excavation,
which made performance much more difficult and expensive than anticipated. Id. at 607.
A term of the agreement, however, precluded Susi Contracting from claiming extra com-
pensation on that account. Id at 608. After ending the contract, Zara Contracting pro-
ceeded to complete the work using the equipment of Susi Contracting. Id. at 607.
Proceeding on the theory that a restitutionary recovery independent of the expectation
interest was available to Susi Contracting, the court granted a recovery substantially in ex-
cess of the contract price. I& at 610-11. With respect to the award for excavation and
grading work done by Susi Contracting, that result is inconsistent with the extent-of-benefit
principle. A substantial element of the recovery of Susi Contracting, however, was based
on Zara Contracting's use of its equipment after the contract had been terminated. Id at
611-12. That use of equipment appears to have been entirely outside the scope of perform-
ance promised by Susi Contracting in the contract and therefore would be recoverable
under a quantum meruit claim even if Susi Contracting had been restricted to expectation
damages as to the work performed.
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Hypothetical Case 7 is identical in principle to the cases dealing
with an injured supplier that are necessary to complete Chart I. In the
cases in column B of this chart, the Courier (supplier) is limited to his
expectation interest to the degree that his performance was com-
pleted, in accordance with the extent-of-benefit principle; otherwise,
he is entitled to restoration. He also has incurred an "other loss" of
$1000, which is included in both the restoration and expectation in-
terests. Affording Courier (or Builder, in Hypothetical Case 7) full
protection of the restoration interest does not produce the intuitive
sense of dissonance that arises if restoration is allowed after his full
performance. Yet the error is the same in principle in both cases.
The prorating required by the extent-of-benefit principle is necessary
to make a reasonable and sensible transition from the cases in col-
umn A, in which full restoration obviously is warranted, to those in
column C, in which the expectation limit has been accepted almost
universally.
Nevertheless, a majority of the decided cases do not prorate be-
tween restoration and expectation as proposed above. Instead, courts
have held 14 or assumed 1 ' that the injured, partially performing sup-
314. A notorious example appears in United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638
(4th Cir. 1973). As in Hypothetical Case 7, a subcontractor (supplier) and a general con-
tractor (recipient) disagreed about the proper interpretation of the contract during the
course of performance. Id. at 640. The dispute concerned payment for the use of certain
equipment. Id. The court found that the subcontractor's interpretation was correct and
that the general contractor's refusal to pay the amount in dispute was a material breach
that entitled the subcontractor to cancel the contract. Id. The subcontractor sued in quan-
tum meruit, seeking a restitutionary recovery equal to the value of the work performed. Id.
The trial court found that the subcontractor would have lost money had the contract been
fully performed and therefore denied all recovery. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the subcontractor's restitutionary recovery in quan-
tum meruit was not limited by the contract price. Id. at 641. Because there is no indication
in the opinion that the subcontractor suffered any injury other than nonpayment of a
portion of the contract price, the subcontractor's expectation interest presumably was
based entirely on the contract price. The opinion clearly stands for the proposition that
restitution is available in excess of expectation. Accord Salo Landscape & Constr. Co. v.
Liberty Elec. Co., 376 A.2d 1379, 1382 (R.I. 1977) (holding that an injured, partially per-
forming subcontractor was entitled to recovery in quantum meruit substantially in excess of
the modified contract price). See also PALMER, supra note 34, § 4.4(a), at 389 n.1 (providing
several examples of cases in which restitution was not limited to the contract price).
315. A number of opinions assume the correctness of the rule that quantum meruit recov-
ery for the injured, partially performing supplier is unlimited, although that issue is not
before the court. See S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Building 1 Housing
Dev. Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28, 41 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining that a general contractor could
recover in quantum meruit from a party who was not the party in breach, but rather one who
had been enriched unjustly by the contractor's work); United States ex rel. Aucoin Elec.
Supply Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 535, 542 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing an explanation
of the relationship between quantum meruit recovery and damages based on the contract
price for the benefit of the trial court on remand).
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CHART I-C
Breach by Recipient in a Rising Market
Facts common to all cases in this chat:
On January I, Courier contracts with business Owner to provide certain delivery services for a six-month period beginning July I
for a total price of $12,000, which on that date is the fair market value of those services. The quantity and value of the work to
Owner ae to be evenly spaced over the period, so that $2000 of the contract price can be fairly allocated to each month's work.
By July l, a collectively bargained wage increase applicable to Courier's employees has gone into effect, with the result that it will
cost Courier $2500 per month to perform, and he will lose $3000 if he performs the entire contract at the agreed price. The
employees of only some of Courier's competitors are unionized, and the wage increase has the effect of raising the fair market value
of Courier's services to $15,000. This value remains constant at that level through December 31.
A B C
Courier is wrongfully Courier is wrongfully Courier works the entire six
prevented from beginning fired after four months, months. Interference by
work. Interference by Owner Owner imposes extra cos of
imposes extra costs of $1000 on Courier.
$1000 on Courier.
I Owner has paid C's exP: $ (3000) C' exp: $ 8.000 C'. w, $ 1 3, 0 0 0
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"
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results permitted or required under extent-of-benefit principle
numbers enclosed in parentheses are negative
expectation interest
restoration interest
expectationirestoration interests prorated under extent-of-benefit principle
result reflects the full performance role
result consistent with majority role in case law
result consistent with substantial number of decided cases
facts unlikely to arise and/or intuitively correct results
plier is entitled to a restitutionary recovery in quantum meruit com-
pletely detached from-and unaffected by-the contract price. These
courts do not perceive that the restoration interest is no less "contrac-
tual" than is the expectation interest.
A number of forces probably have contributed to this detach-
ment of restoration damages from the contract whose breach they are
intended to remedy. One important contributing cause is the "re-
markably successful" '16 efforts of scholars late in the nineteenth cen-
tury to conceptualize restitutionary recoveries as entirely separate
316. Perillo, supra note 16, at 1213.
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from contract. They argued that quasi-contract was completely non-
contractual, thereby constructing a conceptual barrier between con-
tract and restitution."' As Professor Perillo observed, those who
characterized virtually all restitution-based actions as quasi-contractual
erred analytically and thereby distorted the comprehension
and development of some aspects of the law. They failed to
note that while implied contract [the concept to which they
objected] was an inadequate conceptual framework, true
contract was an adequate basis for the explanation and devel-
opment of rules for restitution in a contractual context.
3 18
Nevertheless, the notion that recovery in restitution, particularly re-
covery based on quantum meruit, is somehow disconnected from the
risks and benefits accepted in the contract has become a common
part of conventional contract doctrine.
Another explanation, as noted previously, is the uncritical and
often erroneous equation of the expectation interest with the contract
price.320 A court's correct, though improperly explained, refusal to
limit an injured supplier to the contract price when substantial "other
losses" exist may lead other courts to assume that the contract price is
irrelevant to the breach victim's access to restoration damages.
A further likely cause of the majority rule is the courts' under-
standable failure to perceive that restoration may exceed expectation
in the substantial number of cases in which the relative magnitudes of
the two remedies are unclear.3 " If it cannot be readily determined
whether the contract's allocation of risks and benefits is upset by a
restoration-based remedy, then the anomalies that result are unlikely
to hit home. 22
317. Id
318. Id
319. See supra notes 314-315 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part I.D.2.
321. See supra Part III.A and cases cited therein.
322. In Marine Dev. Corp. v. Rodak, 300 S.E.2d 763, 766 (Va. 1983), for example, the
court accepted the general rule that quantum meruit for the partially performing supplier
(in this case, a wrongfully discharged employee) may exceed the contract price. On the
facts of the case, however, it would have been difficult to measure expectation damages at
all. The parties had agreed that a substantial part of the employee's remuneration would
be a part ownership of a new company that was taking on certain portions of the em-
ployer's business. Id. at 765. The new company took on less of the employer's business
than had been agreed, and the employee was offered a smaller share of ownership than
had been promised. Id. On these facts, it is not at all apparent how to determine the value
of the employee's expectation interest.
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Some courts would limit Builder's restoration relief by making
the total contract price a ceiling on damages.323 These courts cor-
rectly sense that restoration should not be entirely unrestricted, but
they restrict it unduly by failing to apply the extent-of-benefit
principle.
A few courts, however, have prorated restoration and expectation
consistent with the extent-of-benefit principle. For example, in Dibol
& Plank v. W. & E.H. Minnott,324 a contractor agreed to paint ten
houses "for $70 each-$700."325 The owner wrongfully repudiated af-
ter the contractor had painted four houses. 326  The contractor
claimed that the market value of the work performed exceeded the
323. An example of a court taking this approach appears in Johnson v. Bovee, 574 P.2d
513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). In Johnson, a building contractor who had been wrongfully
fired from a job that, apparently, would have produced only a small profit sought to re-
cover in quantum meruit for the work performed. Id. at 513-14. The court limited the
builder's recovery to the contract price, concluding that it would be "illogical to allow him
to recover the full cost of his services when, if he completed the house, he would be limited
to the contract price plus the agreed upon extras." Id. at 514. See also Wuchter v. Fitzger-
ald, 163 P. 819, 820 (Or. 1917) (holding that the quantum meruit recovery of one who was
wrongfully prevented from completing a contract to clear land was limited by the contract
price); Dickson v. Emmerson, 61 P.2d 439, 441 (Or. 1936) (concluding that a wrongfully
fired contractor was entitled to recover in quantum meruit "within the limits of the price of
the total contract").
Some courts have given lip service to the prevailing rule that quantum meruit claims are
not limited by the contract price, but nonetheless have been reluctant to permit damages
in excess of the total contract price. For example, in Smith v. Brocton Preserving Co., 296
N.Y.S. 281, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937), a wrongfully fired, partially performing contractor
was awarded $2500 in quantum meruit damages by ajury. Full payment of the contract price
would have resulted in an award of only about $1000. Id. The Appellate Division con-
cluded that the trial court had incorrectly justified setting aside the jury's verdict on the
ground that quantum meruit damages could not exceed the contract price. Id. at 283. Nev-
ertheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's ruling that the defendant was
entitled to a new trial if the plaintiffs did not agree to reduce the award of damages to
$1,008.40, because the jury should have been instructed that the contract price was evi-
dence of the value of the work performed. Id.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has reached this same conclusion by treating
quantum meruit not only as a measurement of damages for breach, but also as a basis of
liability distinct from-and mutually exclusive with-an express contract. See Beckham v.
Klein, 295 S.E.2d 504, 507-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the existence of an ex-
press contract, which was not breached by the defendant, covering payment to a real estate
broker necessarily precludes recovery in quantum meuit for services rendered on an im-
plied contract theory). Thus, when a valid and enforceable express contract is breached,
only expectation damages may be awarded; restitution in the form of a recovery in quantum
meruit is categorically unavailable. Industrial & Textile Piping, Inc. v. Industrial Rigging
Servs., Inc., 317 S.E.2d 47, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 321 S.E.2d 895 (N.C.
1984).
324. 9 Iowa 403 (1859). Although the result of this case is an example of prorated
damages, the court does not frame its analysis in terms of the extent-of-benefit principle.
325. Id. at 404.
326. Id.
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contract price. He therefore sought damages based on his restoration
interest (consisting of restitution and, in the absence of any "other
loss," a discharge of the duty to complete the job) rather than his
expectation interest (consisting here of the contract price less costs
avoided).27 On these facts, it was simple to sever the contract on the
basis of the number of houses to be painted."' 8 Moreover, it was clear
that the recipient enjoyed a benefit from the supplier's part perform-
ance that was fully commensurate with the amount of work done.
Thus, divisibility required that the contractor be restricted to the ex-
pectation interest for the full extent of the work completed and that
he be entitled to the protection of his restoration interest as to the
remainder of the job. The court granted precisely that remedy."2 9 It
awarded damages limited to the payment of a portion of the total con-
tract price, based on the four houses painted, but discharged the con-
tractor's obligation as to the unfinished work. 3 ° Dividing the
contract in proportion to the completed work prevented the contrac-
tor from escaping the loss of market value that he suffered with re-
spect to the completed portion of the work, which fully benefited the
other party, but permitted him to recapture the opportunity to work
more profitably elsewhere with respect to the unfinished portion.
In Kehoe v. Mayor of Rutherford,a"' a municipality materially
breached a contract that was clearly favorable to it.332 The municipal-
ity had promised to pay $0.65 per running foot for the paving of a
street 4220 feet long, which put the total contract price at $2743. 333
At the time of the municipality's default, the contractor already had
spent $3153 and would have incurred an additional $1891 in expenses
to complete the job, a total cost of $5044. 4 The court prorated the
contractor's recovery between expectation and restoration on the ba-
sis of his costs.3 35 Thus, the court restricted him to a fraction of the
total contract price ($2743) represented by (i) the costs incurred
($3153) divided by (ii) the cost of full performance ($5044) .336 The
327. Id.
328. Id. at 406.
329. Id. at 407.
330. Id.
331. 27 A. 912 (NJ. 1893).
332. Id. at 913.
333. Id,
334. Id.
335. See id.
336. Id,
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result was an award of $1715.31 7 The division of the agreement on the
basis of the contractor's cost of performance may not have been the
only permissible way to prorate the expectancy limit on his recovery,
but assuming that it was an acceptable one, the result was proper
under the extent-of-benefit principle. The municipality (recipient)
benefitted from the contractor's (supplier's) performance to the full
extent of the paving that was done. To that extent, the contractor was
restricted to his expectation interest, based on the contract price. But
the contractor's restoration interest-represented, on these facts, by a
simple discharge of his duty to complete the job-was protected as to
the remainder of the work.33 8
The dissenting opinion in Paterno & Sons, Inc. v. New Windsort 39
urged the application of the extent-of-benefit principle. In New Wind-
sor, a municipality had materially breached a contract for the con-
struction of a sewerage trunk system by failing to make progress
payments to the contractor as required. 4 ° The majority opinion sum-
marily concluded that the contractor was not limited to recovering
"the balance due under the contract," 41 but was entitled to recover
$813,289 in quantum meruit as opposed to approximately $205,000 in
expectation damages.3 42 The dissenting opinion agreed that recovery
in quantum meruit was available to the contractor, but argued that the
recovery should be based on "a fair apportionment of the work done
against the total contract price."s ' a To the dissent, freeing quantum
337. Id. Because the builder already had been paid slightly more than this amount-
$1850-he was given no damages. Apparently, the municipality did not seek to recover the
excess payment.
338. The Kehoe analysis was accepted in principle in Harrison v. Clarke, 73 A. 43 (NJ.
1909), a case in which a portrait artist was wrongfully prevented from completing his work.
Id. at 43-44. The court reversed a trial court award of the full contract price, noting that
the recovery should be prorated according to the method used in Kehoe unless, under the
certainty principle, expectation damages could not be ascertained. Id. at 44. In the latter
event, full restoration damages would be proper. Id.
339. 351 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
340. Id. at 447.
341. Id. With this statement, the court committed the typical error of neglecting to
consider whether the "balance due under the contract" was less than the expectation inter-
est. See supra Part I.D.2.
342. The quantum meruit award was determined by subtracting $1,163,686 (the total pay-
ments made to the contractor prior to the breach) from $1,976,975 (the value of the work
performed). The figure of $205,000 was based on progress payments not made and
amounts withheld from previous payments. New Windsor, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 448-49. The ac-
curacy of this amount as expectation damages may be questionable because, as the dissent-
ing opinion notes, damages on the contract are not to be determined simply on the basis
of "stage payments," which do not necessarily reflect the contractor's expectation interest.
Id. at 451.
343. Id
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meruit from the constraints of the contract price would be the
equivalent of imposing a penalty of punitive damages on the breach-
ing party.
344
Even opinions that have prorated recovery between expectation
and restoration have not fully recognized the scope of the restoration
interest, often because it consists simply of a discharge of executory
duties. The failure to discern the elements and operation of the resto-
ration interest is undoubtedly one significant reason why attempts to
reconcile the competing demands of expectation and restitution have
been inconclusive. Once the dimensions of the restoration interest
are understood, however, the extent-of-benefit principle provides the
appropriate analysis for the common problem of the injured supplier
whose restoration interest clearly exceeds expectation. 45
b. Damages for the Injured Recipient When the Supplier Partially Per-
forms.-When the recipient is the injured party in cases of breach fol-
lowing partial performance by the supplier, the extent-of-benefit
principle may become more challenging to apply. It still may be the
case, however, that the recipient benefits to the full extent of the sup-
plier's partial performance. Consider first a simple hypothetical case:
Hypothetical Case 8:
On January 1, Courier contracts with business Owner to pro-
vide certain delivery services for a six-month period begin-
ning July 1 for a total price of $12,000, payable in advance.
The quantity and value of the work to Owner are to be evenly
spaced over the period, so that $2000 of the contract price
can be fairly allocated to each month's work. On January 1,
$12,000 is the fair market value of Courier's services. ByJuly
1, the fair market value of those services has dropped to
$9000, or $1500 for each month's work, due to changes in
the labor market, and the value remains constant at that
level until after December 31. Courier works as agreed for
four months, until October 31, then quits in breach of
contract.
Courier, the supplier, performed properly for part of the contract
period, and then he breached the contract by failing to perform at all.
The facts of this hypothetical case are devised so that the contract is
readily divisible according to the amount of time performance was
344. Id
345. Professor Palmer, who as a general rule does not accept the analysis proposed here,
does favor it in the case of a client's breach of an agreement with an attorney. PALMER,
supra note 34, § 4.4(0, at 407-09.
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rendered. Because the recipient Owner has received the full benefit
of that part performance-"full" in the sense that the value of the four
months' service rendered is not diminished by Courier's failure to
work for the last two months-Owner should be accountable on an
expectation basis for the four months' work. Owner therefore must
pay a pro rata portion of the contract price, $2000 for each month
worked. For the remaining two months, Owner is free to claim pro-
tection of her restoration interest. Because she paid in advance, pro-
tecting that interest requires restitution of the $4000 allocable to the
two months' work not done. Had Owner not paid in advance, she
would have been obligated to pay Courier $8000 for the work that was
done, but entitled to restoration as to the remaining contract price-
that is, a simple discharge of her executory promise to pay the last
$4000.
This solution apportions between the parties the value of the
change in the market between the parties. Because of that change,
the market value of Courier's services over six months was worth
$3000 less than Owner had agreed to pay. Courier is allocated $2000,
or two-thirds, of that difference, which is proportional to the amount
of work done; Owner is permitted to recapture $1000, or one-third, of
that difference.
Consider now circumstances in which the contract does not so
easily lend itself to divisibility.
Hypothetical Case 9:
In January, Builder contracts to construct a new home for
Owner on her property. The contract price is $100,000, with
work to commence in June. Builder estimates his total cost
of performance at $90,000, based in part on the current
price of lumber. Because of an intervening decrease in the
price of lumber, by the time performance is to begin
Builder's costs have dropped to $80,000. At that time it
would cost Owner $90,000 to make the same contract with
an equally competent contractor.
Builder commences work on schedule. After the foun-
dation has been laid, the walls and roof framed up, and
other parts of the work done, Builder and Owner disagree
on the interpretation of the contract. Owner claims that it
requires Builder, at his expense, to use a premium grade ma-
terial on the roof and exterior walls. Builder claims that the
marginal costs of using the premium grade material are an
"extra" to be paid for by Owner on top of the stated contract
price. When negotiations fail, Builder quits. Builder has
spent $40,000 on labor and materials. Owner has paid
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Builder the entire $100,000 contract price in advance. 46
Owner engages another contractor to finish the job for
$45,000. Owner's interpretation of the contract is correct.
Owner is the injured party. Because the contract has become un-
favorable to her, she will prefer restoration damages over those based
on her expectation interest. Consider the quantum of each of those
interests.
If Owner's restoration interest were fully protected, she would be
entitled to restitution of the $100,000 paid, less the value of Builder's
performance. That value might be set at $45,000, because the fin-
ished job was worth $90,000 and $45,000 was required to complete it
after Builder left. Assuming Owner suffered no "other loss," restora-
tion damages would give her a $55,000 claim against Builder. 47 After
subtracting from that recovery the money she paid to the second con-
tractor, Owner will have recaptured the full $10,000 drop in the mar-
ket price. Builder would come out $5000 ahead of his costs
(representing half of the profit he originally expected to earn), but he
will have lost the entire benefit of the change in the market.
If Owner were limited to expectation damages, she could claim
only the $45,000 paid to the second contractor. She then would have
the finished house for a total outlay of $100,000. Builder would retain
$55,000 of the contract price, which exceeds his costs by $15,000. Of
that amount, $5000 represents half of his originally anticipated profit
and $10,000 represents the entire difference between the market
value of his performance when the contract was made and its value
when performance began.
Suppose the extent-of-benefit principle were applied based on a
finding that the job was fifty percent complete when Builder quit.
Builder would be entitled to retain $50,000 of the contract price, and
would owe the other $50,000 to Owner in damages. After subtracting
the money paid to complete the work, she would be left with $5000,
representing a recapture of half the quantum of the fall in the market
value of Builder's performance. Builder would enjoy the other half of
that value, in addition to half of the profit that he expected to earn
when he entered the contact.
Although the facts of a real case would not be likely to lend them-
selves so neatly to the calculation of the remedial interests involved,
346. Payment of the full contract price in advance is atypical. It is posited here to sim-
plify the analysis. Facts in which the supplier's performance precedes the recipient's pay-
ment are discussed infra in Part III.D.
347. In these facts, Owner has no executory duties to perform, so discharge is not in-
volved in protecting her restoration interest.
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the principles used to decide the hypothetical case would still apply.
Practical judgment can be used to determine the extent of Builder's
performance and thus to prorate the parties' entitlements between
restoration and expectation.
Decided cases are rare in which, following a supplier's partial per-
formance, an injured recipient appears as a plaintiff seeking the pro-
tection of either her restoration or her expectation interest. Their
scarcity is due to the fact that suppliers generally do not breach con-
tracts favorable to themselves and to the relative infrequency with
which recipients, like Owner in Hypothetical Case 9, pay for goods or
services in advance. More commonly, the recipient's payments lag be-
hind the supplier's performance, so that the supplier appears as a
plaintiff seeking to recover on a quantum meruit claim. In the familiar
line of cases beginning with Britton v. Turner,348 the courts routinely
award the supplier "restitution," less damages owed on account of the
breach.3 49 As shown above,... whether the award given the supplier
actually is based on restitution-or, more properly, restoration-de-
pends on which of the injured recipient's interests is protected. The
problem of recovery by a materially breaching supplier is also relevant
to cases discussed later in the analysis, and closer attention to this is-
sue is deferred until Part III.D. Suffice it to say that, unless no reason-
able basis for divisibility can be found, analyzing the problem under
the extent-of-benefit principle requires measuring the breaching sup-
plier's recovery at least in part by his expectation interest. As will be
seen, many courts do precisely that, notwithstanding the entrenched
practice of referring to the supplier's recovery as "restitutionary."
In the few cases in which injured recipients have sought protec-
tion of the restoration interest as plaintiffs, courts sometimes have ap-
plied the extent-of-benefit principle. In Bollenback v. Continental
Casualty Co.,351 the plaintiff-recipient was a purchaser of health insur-
ance and the defendant-supplier was an insurer that wrongfully re-
fused to pay a claim. 352  The insurance company incorrectly
maintained that the policy had lapsed for nonpayment of premi-
ums.35 The plaintiff brought an action for breach of the insurance
contract, claiming restitution of all premiums previously paid under
the policy ($2166.50), as opposed to the amount of the unpaid
348. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
349. I&
350. See supra Part III.B.
351. 414 P.2d 802 (Or. 1966).
352. Id. at 803.
353. Id,
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claim. 54 The latter amount represented the plaintiff's expectation in-
terest.3 55 The plaintiff claimed in effect that the former amount,
given the absence of "other loss," was his restoration interest. The
court rejected the defendant's argument that the policy was really a
series of separate, six-month contracts based on the times at which
premiums were due. 5 6 The court also concluded that the defendant
had materially breached, thereby entitling the plaintiff to "rescind."3 57
The court in Bollenback declined, however, to give the plaintiff full res-
titution of premiums paid,"' although it characterized that result as
consistent with "the majority opinion in the United States."359 The
court observed that full restitution of the premiums paid would fail to
give the insurance company credit for the coverage it had provided
prior to its breach,"6 a value that must be returned to it pursuant to
the rule of mutual restitution. 61 The Bollenback court recognized that
restitution required crediting the insurance company with the value it
had conferred; therefore, the court granted the plaintiff only restitu-
tion of premiums paid after the time at which the insurer claimed that
the policy had lapsed-a point that preceded the denial of the claim
by several years.362
354. Id. at 804.
355. Expectation also would include any additional sum necessary to purchase compara-
ble coverage from another insurer. The plaintiff did not raise this issue, however, presum-
ably because the total of the expectation interest still would have been less than
restoration. For two reasons, cases like Bollenback, in which an injured insured's restoration
interest exceeds expectation, are unlikely to arise today. First, at least as far as medical
insurance is concerned, the value of the unpaid claim is likely to be great due to the infla-
tion of health care costs. Note that the unpaid claim in Bollenback of $107.33 was for a six-
day hospital stay. d. at 803. Second, the frequent availability of punitive damages against
insurers for wrongful refusal to pay claims tends to overwhelm restoration relief.
356. Id. at 808.
357. Id. at 807.
358. Id. at 809.
359. Id.
360. Id, at 811-12. As the Bollenback court observed, in a number of older cases courts
have assumed that, if an insured has made no claim against an insurer, then no benefit was
received from the coverage provided. See, e.g., Van Werden v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 68 N.W. 892, 895 (Iowa 1896) (holding that when an insurance "company violates
the condition of its contract it is liable to return to the assured as much as he (the assured)
would lose because of the breach of contract"); American Life Ins. Co. v. McAden, 1 A.
256, 258 (Pa. C.P. 1885) (noting that, although the insureds "may, in some sense, perhaps,
be said to have enjoyed the protection which the policy afforded in the event of the hus-
band's death; but as that event did not occur, the policy had as yet been of no appreciable
actual advantage to the plaintiff... [and] the company has paid nothing and the plaintiffs
have received nothing").
361. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
362. BoUenback, 414 P.2d at 812.
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The court in Bollenback characterized its result in restitutionary
terms: the plaintiff received restitution of premiums paid, less the
value of the insurance protection received.363 In fact, however, the
court made no inquiry about the market value of the coverage pro-
vided, which would have been necessary to a restitution-based claim.
Instead, it actually applied the extent-of-benefit principle. It did so by
uncritically-though correctly, as far as the result is concerned-valu-
ing the coverage provided at the contract price."6 The court thus
protected the expectation interest of both parties to the full extent of
the supplier's performance, from which the recipient had enjoyed a
complete benefit. By allowing the insurer to retain the premiums
paid during the period in which it had provided coverage, each of the
parties enjoyed the advantages and suffered the burdens of the expec-
tation interest with respect to that period. By awarding restoration of
the premiums paid after coverage was wrongfully terminated, the
court also protected the restoration interest of both parties with re-
spect to the time thereafter.
If, as in Bollenback, the recipient receives the full benefit of the
supplier's part performance, notwithstanding that the latter is in
breach, then the divisibility described here is straightforward. The
purpose of divisibility is simply to identify the portion or percentage
of the total performance that has been completed by the supplier.
That portion then forms the upper limit on the extent to which the
injured party will be limited to expectation relief. Therefore, it is nec-
essary only to identify some ground for quantifying the portion or per-
centage of the supplier's completed performance. That ground
might be based on units of goods delivered, time or money expended,
portions of work completed, periods of time during which insurance
coverage was provided, or other methods. If the performance ren-
dered conforms to the contract, it may be clear or uncontested that
the extent of the benefit realized by the recipient is fully co-extensive
with the portion of the supplier's completed performance. If so, then
the breakpoint between expectation and restoration has been identi-
fied. If not, further analysis, as described in Part III.C.5, will be neces-
sary. Nevertheless, even in the latter case, the initial step of dividing
363. Id.
364. Id. The court's only comment about the value of the insurance protection received
by the plaintiffwas cast in terms of"the cost to [the] defendant of carrying the risk of [the]
policy." Id. The cost to the insurer obviously may be very different from the market value
of the coverage provided. Other courts have approached the matter in the same way. E.g.,
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Ferrenbach, 144 F. 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1906) (noting the
potential disparity between the "value in insurance protection to the insured, and [the] cost
to the association in carrying the risk").
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the contract according to the degree to which the supplier's perform-
ance is complete may be useful because it establishes the maximum
reach of expectation and the minimum claim of restoration.
5. Cases in Which the Recipient Does Not Obviously Realize the Full
Benefit of the Supplier's Complete or Partial Performance.-In some cases,
dividing the contract solely on the basis of the extent of the supplier's
performance will not be satisfactory. Although that division sets the
maximum extent to which the victim will be limited to the expectation
interest, the supplier's part performance often does not confer a com-
mensurate degree of benefit on the recipient. A recipient who herself
is in breach may not benefit to the full extent of the supplier's part
performance simply because of the nature of that performance. Sup-
pose that one contracting for the receipt of equipment-maintenance
services wrongfully repudiates after the supplier has performed some,
but not all, of the required work. If the portion of the work com-
pleted produced a benefit to the buyer that was less than commensu-
rate with the degree of completion of the supplier's performance,
then the supplier would be limited to expectation damages only to the
extent of the buyer's benefit, not to the extent of his own
performance.
The more common case, however, will involve the breaching sup-
plier. The nature of the breach may be such that the extent of the
benefit enjoyed by the recipient will be less than the degree of the
supplier's performance. For example, the delivery of some parts for a
machine may have no value without the delivery of the remaining
parts, even if a separate price canl be established for each part;.65
goods delivered at one time during the year may be less valuable than
at other times, making an unadjusted price per item or unit unreason-
365. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.13, at 625 (stating that "[flairness requires that a
party that has received only a fraction of what that party expected under a contract should
not be asked to pay an identical fraction of the contract price unless it appears that the
value to that party or what was received is roughly that same fraction of the value to that
party or full performance"). Cf CALAMA1U & PERILLO, supra note 16, § 15-6, at 656-57 (stat-
ing that contract severability is not "mechanically applied" and the mere fact that a unit
price has been established by contract is not conclusive of severability if it can be shown
that the price is based on an average of the estimated market price for a product that
fluctuates in value).
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able; 6 and a job fifty percent complete may be worth far less to the
recipient than half the market value of the completed work.367
Even complete performance by the supplier, if it is imperfect in
some way, may fall far short of conferring on the recipient the in-
tended benefit of that performance. Consider, for example, the case
of Escher v. Bender,a in which the owner of land that had been used
for farming sold it to a buyer who intended to develop a resort.
369
The seller represented to the buyer that the southern part of the
property bordered on three lakes and 500 to 600 feet of a trout
stream.3 70 After the sale was completed, a survey revealed that the
property bordered on only one lake to the extent represented.3 71 The
frontage on the second lake and the trout stream were substantially
less than the seller had said, and the property failed to touch the third
lake at all.3 72 The court found no evidence that the seller was guilty of
366. Cf. Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 48 N.E. 888, 890 (Ohio 1897) (holding
that due to the fluctuation of coal prices with the seasons, in an action for breach of con-
tract for the refusal to receive coal, "justice and fair dealing require that the defendant,
having repudiated the contract, should pay the market price for the coal at the time it was
delivered").
367. See Pennsylvania Exch. Bank v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 629, 630-32 (Ct. Cl.
1959) (holding that partial performance of a contract to stand in readiness to manufacture
high quantities of goods that might be needed for national defense purposes did not con-
fer a proportionate benefit on the United States).
Note that contracts for the sale of goods are governed by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Although most of the hypothetical and decided cases referred to in
this analysis have been outside the scope of Article 2, occasional reference has been made
to U.C.C. sales transactions for illustrative purposes. It bears noting that some of the differ-
ences between Article 2 and the common law of contracts are relevant to the operation of
the extent-of-benefit principle. In particular, U.C.C. § 2-601 employs the so-called "perfect
tender rule." Inquiry into how the perfect tender rule bears upon the extent-of-benefit
principle warrants more detailed treatment than is appropriate to this Article. Suffice it to
say that the perfect tender rule, when applied together with the statutory concepts of "re-
jection" and "acceptance" defined in U.C.C. §§ 2-602 and 2-606, appears to give the injured
buyer (recipient) greater access to restoration before acceptance and lesser access to it
afterward than the extent-of-benefit principle would give. The perfect tender rule is sub-
ject to a number of important exceptions, and it has been the subject of much attention in
the scholarly literature. For recent discussions of the perfect tender rule, see John A.
Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Modest Proposals, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 375, 384-86, 422-25 (1990) (discussing the confusion
surrounding the perfect tender rule and proposing that the rule be replaced with the
substantial impairment standard); William H. Lawrence, The Prematurely Reported Demise of
the Perfect Tender Rule, 35 KAN. L. REv. 557, 591 (1987) (arguing that the perfect tender rule
is "still alive" under the U.C.C. and that the rule must be read in light of the drafters'
intent to be fully understood).
368. 61 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1953).
369. Id. at 144-45.
370. Id. at 145.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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intentional misrepresentation, but nevertheless concluded that he
had promised, and failed to deliver, marketable title of record to the
entire area as represented.37 Therefore, the buyer was allowed full
protection of her restoration interest.1
74
Whether the seller's performance in Escher is characterized as in-
complete, or as complete but imperfect, divisibility for purposes of the
extent-of-benefit principle ultimately should turn on the degree to
which the seller's performance satisfies the recipient's primary pur-
poses in entering the contract. Thus, if the purchaser in Escher had
purchased the property for the purpose of growing crops and all of
the acreage was equally fertile, the contract might well have been di-
visible on a per acre basis. The injured buyer's claim to restoration in
excess of expectation would be limited to the acres to which title was
not delivered.
Although the Escher court did not discuss the issue in the terms
presented here, its decision can be justified on the ground that the
buyer's entire primary purpose for purchasing the property-the de-
velopment of a recreation area-was undermined by the greatly re-
duced access to the lakes and stream and that no reasonable basis for
divisibility existed. 75 Under the extent-of-benefit principle, 6 there-
fore, she was free to claim full restoration.
77
373. Id at 147.
374. Id at 148.
375. Another real property case in which the buyers received no benefit from the
seller's full performance is Potter v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Iowa 1988). The seller in
Potter, who was himself purchasing the land under an installment contract, sold it to the
buyers under a similar arrangement. Id. at 149. The buyers made all their installments as
promised, paid property taxes and insurance, and made improvements to the land, which
they used as a residence and for farming. Id at 149-50. The seller, however, defaulted in
his own payments to the original owner, who then repossessed the land which, in the
meantime, had declined substantially in value. Id. The buyers sought, and were awarded,
full restoration damages. Id. at 150. They received: (i) restitution of all payments made,
less the rental value of the land during the time they lived on it; (ii) compensation for such
"other losses" as real estate taxes and insurance premiums, closing costs, and relocation
expenses; and (iii) implicit discharge of their obligation to pay the remainder of the
purchase price. Id Full restoration damages clearly in excess of expectation were appro-
priate if one concludes that, although the buyers had benefitted from their occupancy of
the property prior to the breach, no reasonable basis for divisibility existed.
376. The decision might have also been justified on the certainty principle if, as may
well have been the case, the seller was unable to demonstrate that the buyer's expectation
damages-probably based on the diminished value of the resort with the reduced water
frontage-were less than her restoration interest.
377. In land sale contract cases, courts often reject a purchaser's claim for restoration or
.rescission" on the basis of the "merger" doctrine, which holds that executory promises
regarding the land to be delivered are merged into and extinguished by the warranty of
title given on the closing of a contract to sell real estate. See, e.g.,Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc.,
414 P.2d 879, 884 (Idaho 1966) (applying the merger doctrine). Courts applying this doc-
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The fact that the supplier has committed malfeasance, however,
does not necessarily mean that the recipient cannot enjoy the in-
tended benefit to the full extent of the supplier's performance,
whether it be partial or complete. Compensatory damages may be ad-
equate as a practical matter to repair or make good the malfeasance,
up to the extent of the supplier's performance. 78 Consider the cases
in columns B and C on Chart II-B.
The basic facts are analogous to those in Hypothetical Case 9,
except that Courier has committed malfeasance. If the errors in Cou-
rier's work can be corrected, awarding Owner compensatory damages
sufficient to have the corrections made will give her the full benefit of
so much of Courier's performance as has been rendered, whether par-
tial or full. This is different from a case such as Escher v. Bender,7 9 in
which compensatory damages may not have enabled the buyer of land
to purchase the missing portion of the property.
This issue may arise frequently in the context of construction
contracts. Even though the extent-of-benefit principle may be more
challenging to apply in this setting, it can provide a practicable solu-
tion to the problem of apportioning the victim's remedy between ex-
pectation and restoration.
Hypothetical Case 10:
In January, Builder contracts to construct a new home
for Owner on her property. The contract price is $100,000,
with work to commence in June. Builder estimates his total
costs of performance at $90,000, based in part on the current
price of lumber. Because of an intervening decrease in the
price of lumber, by the time performance is to begin
Builder's costs have dropped to $80,000. At that time it
would cost Owner $90,000 to make the same contract with
an equally competent contractor.
trine assume, without evident justification, that only expectation damages may be given as
a remedy for breach of a warranty contained in a deed. As pointed out by Professor
Palmer, there is no reason why restitution--or, as proposed here, restoration-should not
be an available remedy for breach of a warranty of tifle contained in a deed. PALMER, supra
note 34, § 4.17. The merger doctrine appears to create an unnecessary and unfortunate
obstacle to protection of the restoration interest in appropriate cases.
378. Although damages may make it possible for the injured recipient to benefit from
the full extent of the supplier's performance, for purposes of the extent-of-benefit princi-
ple they do not substitute for nonfeasance. As discussed supra in Part III.C.1, the injured
party is entitled to claim restoration in excess of expectation at least to the extent that the
supplier has not completed performance. The distinction between damages intended to
compensate for malfeasance and those remedying nonfeasance is discussed in Andersen,
Material Breach, supra note 19, at 1101-05.
379. 61 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1953).
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CHART Il-B
Breach by Supplier in a Falling Market
Facts common to all cases in this chart:
On January 1, Courier contracts with business Owner to provide certain delivery services for a six-month period beginning July 1
for a total price of $12,000. which on that date is the fair market value of those services. The quantity and value of the work to
Owner are to be evenly spaced over the period, so that $2000 of the contract price can be fairly allocaed to each month's work.
By July I. the fair market value of Courier's services has fallen to $9000, and remains constant at that level until after December
31.
A B C
Courier wrongfully Courier is fired after Courier works dho entire .x
fails to begin work. four months fo months. Owner then
malfeasance coating disonvers serios
$1000 to correct. malfeausee costing $1000
to cmreL
I Owner has paid O's ex: $ (3000) O' eser $ (8000) O' am $ (21,000)
nothing when 0-s P/:s S 0,1 /i. (7000) Oe pWe s (11,000)"Os res $ up O's rer $ 5000) O's roes $ ( 8,000)Couir acts upon
the brach.
2 Owner has paid O's exp: $ 3000 O' exp $ (2000) O's eav $ (O00)Y$6000 when O's p/r $ 400n" O's p/i (1000) .4i p/ri 5 (5000)'O's rel $ s000" O's roes $ 1000 O'e roes: S (2000)
Courier acts upon
the breach.
3 Owner has paid O's exip: $ 9,0000 0's es: $ 4000 0,5 sa m 1000"
$12,000) when 0's p/ri $ 12,50 :0 ' p/Zi S 000 O's p/ri 1000"O's res S 12,000 ' 0's rem: $ 7000 O's res: $ 4000
Courier acts upon
the breach.
bold type: results permitted or required under extent-of-beiefit principle
() numbers enclosed in parentheses are negative
exp: expectation interest
res: restoration interest
p/r expectation/restoration interest prorated under extent-of-benefit principle
fpr result reflects the full performance rule
* result consistent with majority role in case law
+ result consistent with substantial number of decided cases
S facts unlikely to arise and/or intuitively correct results
Builder commences work on schedule. After the foun-
dation has been laid, the walls and roof framed up, and
other parts of the work done properly, Builder installs mate-
rial on the roof and exterior walls contrary to the require-
ments of the contract. The breach is material and Owner
justifiably cancels the contract.
Builder has spent $40,000 on labor and materials.
Owner has paid Builder the entire $100,000 contract price in
advance. 8 0 Owner engages another contractor to repair the
380. Again, payment of the full contract price in advance is stipulated in order to sim-
plify the analysis. A similar case in which progress payments are used appears in Part III.D.
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work incorrectly done by Builder and to finish the job for
$60,000.
If Owner's restoration interest were fully protected, she would be
entitled to restitution of the $100,000 paid, less the value of Builder's
performance. That value obviously is decreased by Builder's malfea-
sance. Establishing a market value for imperfect, as opposed to
merely incomplete, performance might be difficult in some circum-
stances, but as with the previous hypothetical cases it might be accom-
plished by subtracting from the value of the properly repaired and
completed job ($90,000) the costs of putting the work into that condi-
tion ($60,000). Under that approach, Builder is entitled to retain
$30,000 of the contract price. Owner would recover the remaining
$70,000 if awarded full restoration damages. Owner pays a total of
$90,000 for the house, recapturing the benefit of the falling lumber
market.
Limiting Owner to her expectation interest would give her a
claim equal to the $60,000 she paid to the second contractor. She
then would have paid a total of $100,000 for the repaired and com-
pleted house. Builder would be entitled to keep $40,000 of the con-
tract price, which includes the benefit of the falling lumber market.
Applying the extent-of-benefit principle is complicated in this
case by Builder's malfeasance. One effect of the malfeasance might
be to inject considerable uncertainty into the determination of the
expectation interest. Indeed, the appropriate measure of expecta-
tion-cost of repair or diminution in value-might itself be uncer-
tain." If these difficulties were severe enough, Owner might be
381. In a limited but notorious class of cases, courts must choose between measuring the
expectation interest by the relatively high cost to complete or repair the supplier's work,
and the lesser amount corresponding to the diminution in value resulting from the
breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 348(2) (1979); CALAAmm & PERILLO,
supra note 16, § 14-29;Jacob &Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (holding
that the expectation interest in a case involving a builder's breach of contract for using the
wrong brand of pipes "is not the cost of replacement, which would be great, but the differ-
ence in value, which would be nominal or nothing"); Groves v.John Wunder Co., 286 N.W.
235, 236-38 (Minn. 1939) (holding that where a contractor breached a contract for the
removal of sand and gravel by willfully failing to leave the property at a uniform grade as
specified in the contract, the expectation interest should be measured by the reasonable
cost of repairing the contractor's work, as opposed to the diminution in value of the land);
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962) (holding that in
an action for breach of contract "where the economic benefit which would result to [the
injured party] by full performance of the work is grossly disproportionate to the cost of
performance, the damages which [the injured party] may recover are limited to the diminu-
tion in value resulting to the premises because of the non-performance"), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 906 (1963).
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entitled to the protection of her restoration interest under the cer-
tainty principle.112
If the certainty principle did not govern the case, then the precise
portion of Builder's performance that Owner should be required to
pay on an expectation basis still would need to be determined. On
these facts, compensatory damages might be a practical means of rem-
edying Builder's malfeasance, 3  thereby making the benefit of his
performance fully commensurate with the degree of completion. The
proration between expectation and restoration then would require
distinguishing the costs of repair from the costs of completion. The
part of the contract requiring completion after repairs have been
made determines the portion of the expectation interest from which
Owner may escape.
In a certain class of cases, a third measure of recovery might be appropriate. As
pointed out in E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1382-92 (1985), there will be circumstances
in which a court might be unwilling to allow the full cost of repair as a measure of dam-
ages, but reluctant to limit damages to diminution in value because doing so would permit
the breaching supplier to profit unreasonably by the breach. In such cases, the proper
measure of recovery might be located between the two extremes, by requiring the supplier
to disgorge the benefits realized by the breach. For example, if a builder breaches by using
materials inferior to those called for in the contract, he might be required to pay in dam-
ages the amount he saved by so doing. Professor Farnsworth's article makes the point,
however, that disgorgement as a remedy for breach should be limited to this relatively
narrow factual setting. Id. Although on the surface disgorgement may appear to be a
restitutionary remedy, it properly is understood as a species of expectation damages. Bene-
fits disgorged by the breaching supplier were not received from the recipient. Disgorge-
ment is simply an alternative to two other, unsuitable measures of expectation. The
analysis in this Article would be applied by comparing the value of the disgorgement with
the value of the recipient's restoration interest and then choosing the proper portion of
each that make up the parties' entitlements upon breach.
382. As discussed supra in Part IIIA, Owner would bear the burden of proof as to the
extent of her restoration interest. Determining the value of that interest might itself in-
volve difficulties, because it would consist of the recovery of whatever amount she previ-
ously had paid offset by the value of the benefit conferred by Builder. Given the presence
of imperfections in the work, particularly if they arise from poor workmanship rather than
the use of incorrect materials, the extent of that benefit might be difficult to establish.
Owner, however, might find the additional effort of establishing such damages both feasi-
ble and worthwhile, if it resulted in a higher damages award.
383. The capacity of compensatory damages to give the recipient the full benefit of a
supplier's performance, notwithstanding malfeasance, should be considered as a practical
matter. In many cases, damages will be adequate to provide the promised benefit with
respect to the portion of the work completed. That will not always be the case, however. It
theoretically might be possible to award damages sufficient to compensate for almost any
improper performance, but the matter should be evaluated in terms of what the injured
recipient realistically can achieve with an award of compensatory damages made under
existing principles of law. Any doubts, of course, are to be resolved in the injured party's
favor.
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On the facts of Hypothetical Case 10, it might be found that, of
the $60,000 paid to the second contractor, $15,000 was required to
repair the faulty work, $40,000 was spent on additional labor and
materials to complete the job, and $5000 was profit. Builder and the
second contractor each had committed the same amount to the com-
pletion of the project (disregarding the amount needed for repairs),
although Builder may have saved something by using improper mater-
ials. On balance, one might conclude that Builder's performance had
been approximately fifty percent complete. If so, then under the ex-
tent-of-benefit principle Builder would be entitled to retain half the
contract price ($50,000), less the amount allocated to repairs
($15,000), for a total of $35,000. Owner would recover the remaining
$65,000 in damages. She then would have her completed house for a
total of $95,000-$35,000 to Builder, and $60,000 to the second con-
tractor. With that recovery, she will have split the benefit of the falling
market with Builder, although he properly has borne the full eco-
nomic burden of repairing his malfeasance.
Determining the degree of completion of work that is both im-
perfect and incomplete will not be simple; mathematical precision,
however, is not required. Approximation usually will do. In most
cases,"s4 it will be possible to develop a practical method of determin-
384. For example, in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1992), the
court appears to have applied the extent-of-benefit principle, although it did not frame its
analysis in those terms. The supplier, a manufacturer of ophthalmic diagnostic equip-
ment, materially breached a contract to sell exclusively to a buyer-distributor within a spe-
cific geographical area. Id at 724, 727. The breach consisted of making unauthorized
sales to others, followed by a wrongful repudiation of the contract before the expiration of
its term. Id. at 724-25. It appeared that the market for the equipment was declining. Id at
731. The court found the recipient-buyer's claim of lost profits uncertain and noted that
there was some evidence that the buyer might have suffered a loss under full performance.
Id. at 728-29. The buyer sought restitution of a $500,000 fee it had paid for its exclusive
distribution rights. Id. The court agreed that restitution in excess of expectation was per-
missible in principle; it declined to affirm the trial court's award of the entire fee, however,
on the ground that the buyer had enjoyed the benefit of the exclusive rights for some years
prior to the repudiation, even though those rights had not been fully respected by the
seller. Id. at 730. The court therefore remanded the case for a determination of the por-
tion of the fee that represented the net benefit enjoyed by the seller. Id. at 729-30. The
court suggested that, on remand, the trial court should prorate the fee according to the
portion of the full contractual term during which the contract actually remained in force,
with an allowance for loss caused by the unauthorized sales. Id.
In light of the uncertainty of gain or loss by the buyer under full performance, assume
that the buyer would have broken even under the contract, putting the expectation inter-
est at nil. In that case, prorating the fee based on the time of the seller's repudiation, with
an allowance for damages for malfeasance, is precisely the result required by the extent-of-
benefit principle.
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ing the breaking point between claims of expectation and
restoration."'
The decided cases suggest that dividing construction contracts in
this manner is feasible. Owners under construction contracts nor-
mally do not pay in advance for the supplier's performance, so that
division normally occurs in the context of an affirmative claim for re-
lief by the supplier for "restitution" as a plaintiff in default. Because
this very common use of the restitution doctrine fundamentally impli-
cates the extent-of-benefit principle, it invites closer scrutiny.
D. "Restitution "for a Plaintiff in Default Revisited
This Article has already shown that the doctrine of "restitution"
for a defaulting plaintiff is inaccurately named.386 The measure of the
entitlement the party in breach enjoys necessarily is determined by
the measure of the injured parties' damages. When the victim is
awarded expectation damages, the breacher enjoys an expectation-
based entitlement as well; if the victim gets restoration damages, the
breacher receives a restoration-based entitlement. If courts actually
awarded restitution to breaching parties whenever they were entitled
to affirmative relief, the law of damages would look far different.
Unsurprisingly, despite their persistent use of the word "restitu-
tion" in connection with a breaching party's claim for relief, courts
generally have granted relief consistent with the requirements of the
385. As noted supra note 280, a few contracts may consist of exchanges between two
suppliers. Such agreements are sufficiently uncommon that they do not warrant extended
treatment in this Article. Suffice it to say that the extent-of-benefit principle is applicable
to them in principle, although practical difficulties may be encountered in applying the
divisibility doctrine. As a general matter, divisibility in this context requires an appropriate
pairing of the parties' part performances and a finding that the performance on at least
one side is partially or wholly executed. Under such circumstances, the restriction of the
injured party to expectation damages never would exceed the extent of the greatest part
performance by either party. Suppose, for example, that A promises to perform interior
decorating in exchange for civil engineering work by B. If B wrongfully refused to con-
tinue performance after A had done half the promised decorating and B had completed
only one-fourth of the engineering work, then the worst possible situation for A would be
an award of damages based on half the value of the engineering work promised. A court
might find that the entire portion of the work done by A could not be paired with an
equivalent part of B's services. For example, instead of dividing the contract on the basis of
hours spent, a court might find that the completion of certain units of A's work-such as
the decoration of entire rooms or houses-corresponded in value to certain units of B's
work-such as the surveying of residential lots. In that event, A might be limited to expec-
tation damages only to the extent of completed units and entitled to the more generous
restoration relief for the remaining damages. Remember though that A should be
awarded full restoration damages only if there were no reasonable means for pairing part
of his work with part of B's promised performance.
386. See supra Part III.B.
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extent-of-benefit principle. Because the doctrine of restitution for a
defaulting plaintiff is a standard part of contract remedies, a look at
the basis on which such awards are made in practice is warranted.
Consider the following set of facts, which is similar to Hypotheti-
cal Case 10 except that Owner has paid for less of the work than
Builder has performed and the market price of lumber has risen in-
stead of dropped, making the finished project somewhat more valua-
ble. This is a typical case in which Owner will seek and be entitled to
the protection of her expectation interest, because it will be greater
than her restoration interest.
Hypothetical Case 11:
In January, Builder contracts to construct a new home
for Owner on her property. The contract price is $100,000,
with work to commence in June. Builder estimates his total
cost of performance at $90,000, based in part on the current
price of lumber. Because of an intervening increase in the
price of lumber, by the time performance is to begin
Builder's costs have risen to $100,000. At that time it would
cost Owner $110,000 to make the same contract with an
equally competent contractor.
Builder commences work on schedule. After the foun-
dation has been laid, the walls and roof framed up, and
other parts of the work done properly, Builder installs mater-
ials on the roof and exterior walls contrary to the require-
ments of the contract. The breach is material and Owner
justifiably cancels the contract.
Builder has spent $50,000 on labor and materials.
Owner has paid Builder $25,000 of the contract price in pro-
gress payments. Owner pays another contractor $70,000 to
repair the work that Builder incorrectly completed and to
finish the job. Of the $70,000, $15,000 is required to repair
the faulty work, $50,000 is required for labor and materials
to complete the project, and $5000 is profit for the second
contractor.
Builder is the plaintiff in this case, and he brings his claim under
the familiar restitutionary rubric of quantum meruit. In fact, most
courts would award him an expectation-based recovery, but refer to it
as "restitution." If Builder really were entitled to restitution, then he
would be awarded the value of the benefit conferred on Owner, less
the $25,000 in progress payments already received. That value might
be calculated, as in the Hypothetical Cases already discussed, by sub-
tracting the $70,000 repair and completion cost from the $110,000
value of the completed house, for a total of $40,000. Alternatively, the
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value of Builder's performance might be determined by giving him
credit for half the value of the completed structure ($55,000) and sub-
tracting the cost of repairs ($15,000). Either method yields the same
result. After giving Owner credit for the $25,000 already paid, Builder
would be entitled to collect an additional $15,000.
Owner would not accept that result because she would end up
paying $110,000 for the house-$40,000 to Builder and $70,000 to the
second contractor-rather than the $100,000 contract price.3 87
Owner would instead seek protection of her more favorable expecta-
tion interest, which would require her to pay no more than the con-
tract price for the finished house. By firing Builder, she avoided
paying $75,000 of the contract price. She paid $70,000 to his replace-
ment, therefore saving only $5000. She would argue that Builder is
entitled only to an additional $5000 beyond the $25,000 she has al-
ready paid.
Such a result would protect Owner's expectation interest. Ines-
capably, it also would base Builder's so-called "restitution" on his own
expectation interest. Builder's expectation interest begins with an en-
titlement to the contract price, but places on him the risk of increases
in the price of lumber. The increases that occurred exactly elimi-
nated his anticipated $10,000 profit, leaving him in a break-even posi-
tion. Moreover, Builder's malfeasance cost $15,000 to repair,
subjecting him to a loss to that extent. Finally, because Builder was
justifiably fired for his breach, he was accountable for the $5000 worth
of profit Owner paid the second contractor to finish thejob at current
market rates. As a result, expectation exacts a total loss of $20,000
from Builder, as reflected in his receipt of a total of $30,000 from
Owner ($25,000 in progress payments plus $5000 "restitution")
against his costs of $50,000.
The doctrine of "restitution" for a materially breaching party im-
plicitly has recognized from its earliest days that the party in default
must be held to an expectation-based recovery in order to protect the
injured party's expectation interest. In Britton v. Turner,'88 the court
said that "in estimating the value of [the benefit conferred by the party
in breach], the contract price for the service can not be exceeded."3 8 9
387. Such an award would represent Owner's restoration interest, as it must if Builder is
truly given restitution.
388. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
389. Id. at 494.
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The Second Restatement affirms that rule,39 0 and courts comply with
it in many cases by the simple expedient of resorting to the contract
price as the basis for the injured party's award. 91
When the expectation interest is favorable to the injured party as
in Hypothetical Case 11, basing the breaching party's entitlement on
expectation rather than restoration limits the breacher's recovery.
But in most of the cases discussed in this Article, in which the breach
victim's restoration interest exceeds expectation, basing the parties'
remedial entitlements on expectation would constrain the victim and
favor the breacher. In such cases, when the supplier has partially per-
formed, the remedial entitlements should be prorated between expec-
tation and restoration by the extent-of-benefit principle, provided that
division of the contract is feasible. Cases in which courts have valued a
breaching supplier's performance at the contract price demonstrate
that this proration does occur. As Professor Farnsworth has noted,
"The result is as generous as if recovery were allowed on the con-
tract."3 9 2 One of the principal arguments of this Article is that, to the
extent the recipient benefits from the supplier's performance, recov-
ery "on the contract"-that is, a recovery based on the expectation
interest-is precisely the correct result.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article revisits the expectation, reliance, and restitution in-
terests developed by Fuller and Perdue and now embodied in the Sec-
ond Restatement and much of the case law. Those concepts have
been instrumental in shaping our understanding of contract reme-
dies. Yet, they have failed to produce an internally consistent reme-
dial regime. A superior model is bipolar, with the expectation interest
standing opposite the restoration interest. Those two interests-one
pulling toward the economic equivalence of full performance and the
other toward the replication of the status quo-should constitute the
alternatives that determine the measure of damages for breach.
390. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 cmt. b (1979) ("[I]n no case will the
party in breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable portion of the total contract
price where such a portion can be determined.").
391. See, e.g., R.J. Berke & Co. v.J.P. Griffin, Inc., 367 A.2d 583, 587 (N.H. 1976) (hold-
ing that a subcontractor who did not render substantial performance should be allowed
restitution equal to the contract price less the cost of completing and repairing its perform-
ance); Kreyer v. Driscoll, 159 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1968) (awarding restitution of the
contract price less the cost of completion and other harm when a contractor failed to
complete construction of a house).
392. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.14, at 434.
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The restoration interest consists of three components. The first
is restitution. When the breaching party receives a net benefit from
the contractual performance of the victim, protection of the victim's
restoration interest requires that the value of that benefit be returned
to the victim. The second component is compensation for "other
loss." It compensates for harms to the breach victim on account of
the breach, but outside the scope of restitution. Such losses essen-
tially are the consequential and incidental losses traditionally associ-
ated with expectation damages, subject to the standard limitations of
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty. The third component of res-
toration is the discharge of executory obligations. To restore the in-
jured party to the status quo ante, the rights that person "gave" to the
other must be "returned." A return of those rights is accomplished by
eliminating the obligations in question. Failing to recognize dis-
charge as an element of the restoration interest makes it easy, in some
cases, to overlook that the restoration interest has been protected.
Once the restoration interest has been defined, the task is to find
the principles that accommodate it to the demands of expectation.
This Article examines cases in which restoration exceeds expectation
as the primary vehicle for this analysis. Such cases are valuable be-
cause they reveal the restoration interest when it eclipses the typically
greater expectation interest. The resulting view of restoration reveals
not only the proper resolution of these cases, but more important
things about both the expectation and restoration interests as well. In
particular, it casts new light on the routinely invoked doctrine of "res-
titution" for a plaintiff in default. The party who breaches a contract
enjoys a contractual entitlement that is necessarily measured on the
same basis as are the injured party's damages. Expectation damages
for the victim produce an expectation-based entitlement for the
breaching party. If the victim's restoration interest is protected, then
the breaching party has a restoration-based entitlement as well. Any
recovery by the breaching party must be considered part and parcel of
a larger remedial system, not merely a restitutionary outlier uncon-
nected with the contract.
When the injured party seeks restoration damages, the first step is
to apply the certainty principle. That principle places on the breach-
ing party the burden of proving that restoration clearly exceeds expec-
tation. If that showing is not made, then the case is treated as if
restoration does not exceed expectation. Under the firmly estab-
lished rule entitling a breach victim to expectation damages at a mini-
mum, restoration damages are available.
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
If it is clear that restoration exceeds expectation, the extent-of-
benefit principle comes into play. This principle limits the injured
party to expectation damages and grants the breaching party an ex-
pectation-based entitlement to the extent the benefit of the supplier's
performance has been made available to the recipient. The extent-of-
benefit principle is applied by means of the divisibility doctrine, which
requires one to quantify, on some reasonable and practicable basis,
the portion of the benefits of the supplier's performance that are
available to the recipient regardless of which party is in breach. If no
such division can be made, then full restoration is available to the
injured party.
The extent-of-benefit principle recognizes that the boundary be-
tween the claims of expectation and restoration moves as the sup-
plier's performance of the contract proceeds. When the agreement is
fully executory, a material breach by either party entitles the victim to
complete restoration. If the supplier's performance has been fully
and properly executed, then the injured party is restricted to expecta-
tion damages as recognized by the full performance rule. If the sup-
plier's performance is less than complete or is imperfect, then
practical judgment is required to determine the extent to which the
injured party is entitled to escape the constraints of the expectation
interest and be restored to the status quo ante by means of restoration
damages.
Many, though not all, of the decided cases are consistent with this
description of the restoration interest and its governing principles.
For years courts have been protecting the restoration interest intui-
tively, without explicitly recognizing it as such. It would be a step for-
ward to replace the current concoction of damages "on" and "off" the
contract with those produced by the conceptually integrated, expecta-
tion-restoration regime of remedial interests.
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